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Problems of Communism

Essay-Reviews

John A. Armstrong
Christine M. Sadowski
Clark Sorensen
Marcia R. Ristaino

JULY-AUGUST 1990

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Hannes Adomeit

Colloquium—**The Revolution of 1989**

The Burden of History – Jerzy Jedlicki

Comment – Roman Szporluk

28th CPSU Congress
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Problems of Communism

4

JULY-AUGUST 1990 VOL XXXIX

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1 Gorbachev and German Unification: Revision of Thinking, Realignment of Power
by Hannes Adomeit

24 The 28th Congress of the CPSU
by Giulietto Chiesa

39 *A Colloquium*—The Revolution of 1989: The Unbearable Burden of History
by Jerzy Jedlicki

45 *Comment*—The Burden of History–Made Lighter by Geography?
by Roman Szporluk

49 The Islamic Influence on Nationalism in Soviet Central Asia
by Yaacov Ro'i

65 *Perestroyka* in Kazakhstan
by Martha Brill Olcott

BOOKS

78 Soviet Nations
by John A. Armstrong

84 Poland: Phase Two and Beyond
by Christine M. Sadowski

91 North Korea's Search for Legitimacy In a Multipolar World
by Clark Sorensen

100 China's Leaders: Individuals or Party Spokesmen?
by Marcia R. Ristaino

107 Correspondence

COVER: East and West Berliners wave a flag declaring "Germany, One Fatherland" as they celebrate opening of the Brandenburg Gate on December 23, 1989. Photo by Frank Johnston, *The Washington Post.*

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IN THIS ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

Gorbachev and German Unification: Revision of Thinking, Realignment of Power

Hannes Adomeit

By consenting to the unification of Germany, Mikhail Gorbachev has laid the groundwork for Soviet withdrawal from a region that has long been considered of primary strategic importance to the USSR. This fundamental change in Soviet strategy has been accompanied by several policy shifts. The Gorbachev leadership no longer aims at the removal of the US military presence from Europe; no longer views a united Germany as a security threat to the USSR; and looks to existing international control machinery—particularly the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—as the chief means to neutralize Germany. Soviet conservatives are harshly critical of Gorbachev's abandonment of the policy toward Europe in general and toward Germany in particular pursued by Soviet leaders since Stalin. However, the opposition has no alternative to Gorbachev's policies, which promise not only to remove most of the barriers dividing Eastern and Western Europe but also to pave the way for expanded Soviet cooperation with existing all-European institutions.

The 28th Congress of the CPSU

Giulietto Chiesa

The 28th CPSU Congress initiated a new political era in the Soviet Union. Mikhail Gorbachev, with the help of Boris Yel'tsin, defeated the most important and dangerous group hostile to reform—the conservative party apparatus—despite the fact that representatives of this apparatus were numerically dominant among the congress delegates. It is now virtually impossible for party conservatives to turn back the clock. Having scored his most significant political victory since becoming general secretary, Gorbachev can now proceed with dismantling the "monster" party-state built up over the past 70 years of Soviet history.

A Colloquium—The Revolution of 1989: the Unbearable Burden of History

Jerzy Jedlicki

The revolutions of 1989 in East-Central Europe aroused historical consciousness in the region. Nations came back into possession of their own histories, and many older historical patterns began to reemerge. Perhaps the most fundamental historical pattern—the "unbearable burden of history"—is the region's political, economic, and cultural backwardness relative to the West. Communism was the most recent of numerous unsuccessful attempts, dating back to the 18th century, to catch up. In post-communist East-Central Europe, overcoming the region's backwardness and "rejoining Europe" are again on the agenda. This challenge could ultimately prove more difficult than cutting barbed wire fences, tearing down walls, and driving out dictators.

Comment—The Unbearable Burden of History—Made Lighter by Geography?

Roman Szporluk

In assessing the desire and need of the peoples of East-Central Europe, and particularly the Poles, to "rejoin Europe," Professor Jerzy Jedlicki seems to forget about that part of Europe with which most of Polish history is intertwined—the eastern regions of the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Since the mid-1980's, there has been an explosion of Polish interest in the East. Poles could channel this interest in a constructive direction—and lighten "the burden of history"—by reestablishing social, cultural, and above all economic relations with the Lithuanians, Belorussians, Ukrainians, and even the Russians in an effort to help these peoples rejoin Europe. A Poland thus engaged in the East will be a happier country, one less burdened by the condition of its backwardness vis-à-vis the West.

Abstracts continued on reverse side

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The Islamic Influence on Nationalism in Soviet Central Asia

Yaacov Ro'i

Both Islam and nationalism are becoming increasingly assertive in Soviet Central Asia, and the two currents have merged in some cases, particularly among the young. It remains to be seen whether Islam will ultimately serve as a cement uniting diverse Central Asian peoples against Moscow, or whether nationalism will set the nations of the region against one another.

Perestroyka in Kazakhstan

Martha Brill Olcott

Under the direction of Kazakhstan's communist party and its leader, Nursultan Nazarbayev, *perestroyka* has taken root in that republic. Party and government leaders have supported such popular causes as making Kazakh the official state language of the republic, filling in the "blank pages" of Kazakh history, endorsing a more open official attitude toward Islam, protecting the environment, and gaining economic sovereignty for the republic. So far, this regime flexibility has made it difficult for radical informal groups to gain popular support, but continued party dominance will depend on whether Nazarbayev and the party elite can reduce rising inter-ethnic tensions and resolve questions concerning the republic's economic autonomy.

Essay-Reviews

Soviet Nations

John A. Armstrong

A number of very recent volumes on the upsurge of national expression in the Soviet Union offer useful synoptic views of individual ethnic situations as well as of the entire Soviet nationalities problem, but none offers a broader synthetic interpretation based on theory, or at least the kind of pre-theory represented by systematic typologies. These works also generally give short shrift to the Transcaucasus and Central Asia, neglect the existing monographic literature on the various Soviet peoples, and overly rely on dubious information provided by on-the-spot Soviet informants.

Poland: Phase Two and Beyond

Christine M. Sadowski

In Poland, "phase one," the period of Solidarity's legal existence in 1980–81, was followed by a "phase two," which saw first martial law and then "normalization." This phase was characterized by internal struggles within the communist party, a stand-off between the party and society, and polarization between the security apparatus and those individuals and groups who promoted or would accept fundamental change. In the current "phase three," a Solidarity-led government is seeking to create a capitalist economy and a democratic polity. This phase is witnessing conflict between those who advocate gradual change and those who seek a rapid and radical break with the past.

North Korea's Search for Legitimacy in a Multipolar World

Clark Sorenson

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has been engaged in an unending struggle with its rival regime, the Republic of Korea, for the mantle of legitimate heir to the March 1, 1919, movement that first asserted Korean nationhood against Japanese colonial power. This competition, which exploded in armed conflict in the 1950's, has evoked rival distortions of the biography of North Korean strongman Kim Il-song and resulted in ongoing competition for exclusive diplomatic recognition. Despite falling behind in terms of economic performance, the North, with its stern self-reliance, still holds attraction for some Koreans abroad and in the South.

China's Leaders: Individuals or Party Spokesmen?

Marcia R. Ristaino

Chinese Communist political culture makes the country's leaders elusive quarries for their biographers. In this culture, they are not presented, nor do they present themselves, as unique individuals with personal views and private lives open to exploration. This flows both from the principle of collective leadership and from distortion of that principle by the cult of omnipotence and omniscience that was constructed around Mao Zedong. Works on Peng Dehuai, Hu Yaobang, and Deng Xiaoping afford useful insight into the lives of their subjects and this political culture.

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Gorbachev and German Unification: Revision of Thinking, Realignment of Power

Hannes Adomeit

History has decided. It has proven Stalin right in his prediction that, in the long run, it would be impossible to keep Germany down and divided. But Stalin himself failed to draw the right political lesson from his own insight. He permitted, and even actively promoted, the slide toward the division of Germany and hence the partition of Europe. Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev then turned this slide into deliberate policy. They attempted to transform the eastern part of Germany into an economically efficient, politically viable, and militarily effective ally. Lest it be forgotten, until the first half the 1980's, it appeared as if their policy was and would continue to be successful.

Mikhail Gorbachev has now abandoned this policy. In fact, he has done more than abandon it. He has embarked on a course of action that is unprecedented in modern history: comprehensive withdrawal from what until recently were considered, in both the East and the West, areas of paramount strategic significance for the Soviet Union. He has accepted not only the establishment of noncommunist regimes in East-Central Europe, including East Germany, but also German unification and even membership of a unified Germany in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

"How the past perishes is how the future becomes," it has been said. It is precisely for this reason that it is incumbent upon analysts to ask and to answer several important questions about the origins and basic reasons for the shift in Moscow's policy toward Germany.

- Did Gorbachev give up Soviet positions in Central Europe of his own free will? Or has the Soviet leader —like the sorcerer's apprentice of legend—evoked the spirits of reform only to find himself beset by an uncontrollable turmoil of revisionism and revolution, and the collapse of Soviet power in Europe?
- Did the Soviet leadership consent to German unity and membership in NATO because it had shifted to a new conceptual approach, including Gorbachev's vision of the "common house of Europe" (*nash obshchiy dom*), "freedom of choice" (*svoboda vybora*) for all European nations, and "new thinking" (*novoye myshleniye*) on international security matters? All three concepts, after all, were promulgated before the demise of Erich Honecker's regime in East Germany.
- Finally, did the Soviet Union have a choice? If not, then the above three notions are merely *ex post facto* rationalizations of and adaptations to a fundamental shift in the "correlation of forces."

Certainly, there are a number of objective indications that a basic shift in the "correlation of forces" has occurred to the disadvantage of the Soviet Union. First, the power base of the Soviet Union has eroded. This development is characterized by the deterioration of economic conditions, the disintegration of the social fabric, the increase in political conflict, and the spreading of secessionism and ethnic violence. Second, the importance and global influence of the "world socialist system" (or what remains of it) has declined. This decline is indicated by the disintegration of the system's binding glue, Marxist-Leninist ideology; the withering

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away of the socialist system's appeal as a model of development in the Third World; the loss of power and effectiveness of its institutions, including the communist parties, the Warsaw Treaty Organization, and the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance; and the system's inability to keep up in the technological (and military-technological) competition with the Western industrialized countries. Third, Western ideas and institutions have shown themselves to be more resilient and responsive to challenges than expected. This has been demonstrated, among many other ways, by the West's continued economic growth and technological innovation and the accelerated process of its economic integration, most notably by the European Community's commitment to create a single, integrated market by the end of 1992. But it is also revealed by the (re)constitution (with the exceptions thus far of Romania and Bulgaria) of political systems in East-Central Europe based on conservative and social-democratic principles. Fourth, West German influence in European affairs has been rising steadily since the 1960's; with the addition of East Germany to the West German state, a potentially powerful united Germany is reemerging.

Concerning the last factor, it would be irresponsible and ahistorical for any Soviet or Russian leadership to proceed on the assumption that the consummation of German unity will somehow spell the "end of history." With the passing of the postwar German problem, a new chapter of history will have to be opened. Policies for coping with German power and influence will have to be designed. This requirement is clearly dictated by the memory of several centuries of Russian and Soviet conflict and competition with Germany—with the Teutonic Order, the Hanseatic League, Prussia, Imperial Germany, and the Nazi Reich. Therefore, Gorbachev has to devise a new policy, if only for domestic political reasons.

This is not to say that the future power and influence of Germany will depend on its military strength. Indeed, it is questionable whether military power automatically enhances security and promotes political power. Among other things, nuclear weapons have largely invalidated such propositions. Nevertheless, Soviet civilian and military specialists, as well as traditional Marxist-Leninist and neo-realist analysts, agree on one proposition: economics, politics, and security are still closely intertwined. They recognize that only a modern, efficient economy can provide modern, effective armed forces; that economic decline weakens the foundations of military power and political influence; and that economic power ultimately translates into political power.

If one were to grant the argument that military power is destined to become obsolete as a "currency" in the "common house" of Europe, and that a civilian and civilized society is emerging in that geographic area, complex problems of transition still would have to be solved. Foremost among them, Gorbachev and his adherents would have to answer a crucial question to the satisfaction of both benign and hostile critics at home: with the possible or projected obsolescence of military power as the primary basis of Soviet influence in Europe, and the failure thus far of *perestroyka,* how can the Soviet Union succeed in retaining an influential role in Europe?

Several more specific analytical questions flow from this basic dilemma.

- What is Gorbachev's preferred security arrangement for Europe? Notwithstanding his consent to membership of unified Germany in NATO, is he still committed to the traditional Soviet goals of the dissolution of NATO; curtailment of the US military presence in Europe; neutralization and demilitarization of Germany; and replacement of the alliance structure by a "pan-European" security system based on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)?
- How firm is the commitment made by Gorbachev at Zheleznovodsk to withdraw Soviet troops from East Germany after a transitional period of three to four years? What about the temptation to use the Soviet military presence in that country (as of summer 1990 still about 360,000 officers and men) as a bargaining chip to extract maximum West German concessions on *economic* matters and to receive far-reaching German financial, technological, and managerial aid for the modernization of the Soviet economy?
- What is Gorbachev proposing to do with what remains of the Warsaw Pact after East Germany's defection to NATO and Hungary's announcement in May 1990 that it intends to withdraw from the Pact's military command structure? Is he content that the USSR shed its role and responsibility in regional security affairs, including with regard to Poland and Czechoslovakia? If not, what institutional forms could the Soviet role conceivably take?
- Finally, how much domestic room for maneuver do Gorbachev and his foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, retain on German and European security issues? The sometimes vicious attacks on their policies at the 28th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union have clearly revealed the presence—at least in the party and the military—of widespread frustration, anger, and resentment. How much longer can orthodox party *apparatchiki,* Russian nationalists, and the military be expected to put up with what *they* see as disastrous setbacks to political power and prestige, catastrophic

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changes in military doctrine, imprudent withdrawal of forces from strategically important areas, denigration of the armed forces, and a seemingly never-ending series of compromises, concessions, and cutbacks?

Before attempting to answer any of these questions, a review of the evolution of Gorbachev's German policy since his accession to power in March 1985 is of considerable importance.

Gorbachev's German Policy, 1985–90

Gorbachev's policy on the German problem evolved on four different but interacting levels: (1) change in the Soviet Union; (2) redefinition of the Soviet–East European relationship; (3) events in East Germany, notably the Honecker regime's refusal to embark on reform; and (4) Soviet *Westpolitik,* that is, the reordering of Soviet relations with the United States and Western Europe, including West Germany. It is also useful to divide Gorbachev's German policy chronologically into three main stages.

The first stage can be said to extend roughly from March 1985 to October 1988, when Chancellor Helmut Kohl visited the Soviet Union and a return visit by Gorbachev to Bonn was arranged. In this stage, the German Democratic Republic appeared basically stable, German reunification a long way off, and Soviet–West German relations vacillated between cool and correct.

The second stage covers the interval from October 1988 to January 1990, during which time significant improvements in Soviet–West German relations occurred. These improvements, however, were at risk of being undercut by the emergence and rapid acceleration of crisis symptoms in the GDR. The collapse of the Honecker and communist successor regimes and the unification of Germany became distinct possibilities during this time, but their realization had to be delayed.

The third stage begins with Gorbachev's public acknowledgement, at the end of January 1990, that the unification of Germany was inevitable, and ends with his consent, in the name of *Realpolitik,* in mid-July 1990 to the membership of a united Germany in NATO. This period witnessed the collapse of the GDR as a socialist state and ally of the Soviet Union, renewed Soviet attempts to slow down the process of unification, a plethora of proposals on how to bind Germany in a European security framework, and, finally, the Soviet consent to Western proposals.

Stage one: safeguarding stability and the status quo. The first level, Soviet domestic affairs, had top priority in the first stage (as, indeed, it did in all three stages). The Soviet Union was to be transformed into a modern, efficient, and prosperous state. Soviet foreign policy was to be designed in such a way as to create the most advantageous framework for a fundamental reform of Soviet society, economics, and politics. Initially, however, Gorbachev seemed to believe that a second New Economic Policy could be successfully implemented. Somehow, plan and market were to be harmoniously combined. Modernization was to be achieved through "acceleration," exhortation, and discipline, including the campaign against alcoholism, as well as mobilization of hidden "reserves" in the socialist system, and the "utilization of the achievements of the scientific-technological revolution." When this approach did not produce the desired results, Gorbachev proclaimed a further "radicalization" of the reform effort.

On the second level, quite in accordance with his assumptions about the likely evolution of events in the USSR, Gorbachev appears to have been genuinely convinced of the theoretical and practical possibility of a "third road" in Eastern Europe. He envisaged an evolutionary path between the neo-Stalinist, centralized, bureaucratic "socialist" system in the East, and the pluralist, social-democratic, market-oriented "capitalist" system in the West. There was, from Moscow's perspective in 1985–88, no reason for ruling out such an evolution in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and, above all, in East Germany. The model adumbrated by Alexander Dubček in Czechoslovakia in 1968 may have loomed large in Gorbachev's mind. Indeed, it is unclear even today whether Gorbachev has given up the idea of change in the Soviet Union within a modified "socialist" framework.[1] The spring 1990 elections in Romania and Bulgaria, which returned to power communists with a refurbished "socialist" program, demonstrated that such change, rather than explosive upheaval, was in the realm of the possible.

Turning to events in the GDR, the third level in the evolution of events, the country and its regime appeared to be basically stable during this stage. A separate East German national consciousness (*Nationalbewusstsein*) may have been lacking, but there seemed to be a considerable degree of identification among East Germans with the state (*Staatsbewusstsein).* There also appeared to be no potential for revolution. Indeed, since the failure of the communist revolu-

[1]See, for instance, Gorbachev's frequent attacks on Boris Yel'tsin for allegedly wanting to abandon socialism. Earlier, in a speech in Kiev in February 1989, Gorbachev had said that the goal of *perestroyka* in the Soviet Union was to "reveal the human face of socialism." See *Pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 24, 1989.

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tion in Germany in 1918–21, communists in the Soviet Union and elsewhere have often mused, in sorrow and in anger, that "you can't have a revolution in Germany because people would have to step on the lawn." The East German economy was also in good shape in comparison to the economies of its Eastern neighbors. In Moscow's view, the GDR's stability would be even further strengthened once East Germany undertook some unquestionably necessary reforms and aligned itself with the processes of *perestroyka, demokratizatsiya,* and *glasnost'* in the USSR. No need, then, artificially to raise the issue of German unity.

Gorbachev's policies at the fourth level closely corresponded with his perceptions of the GDR. Contrary to the grand fanfare about the "common house of Europe," from November 1985, when the Gorbachev-Reagan summit took place in Geneva, to October 1988, when Kohl visited Moscow, the Soviet leader concentrated on the reordering of relations with the United States. Europe played a subsidiary role in Soviet *Westpolitik,* and West Germany was given the cold shoulder. The "new page in the book of Soviet–West German relations," a phrase used several times in that period, ended up having little substance.[2] Moscow, in essence, continued its previous policy of attempting to isolate and circumvent West Germany, and presumably to "punish" it for its role in legitimizing the stationing of US medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe and supporting the idea of space-based strategic defense. It took one visit by the president of the Federal Republic of Germany to Moscow (July 1987), three visits by Chancellor Kohl (July 1983, March 1985, and October 1988), five by Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, and one by the prime ministers of Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg finally to elicit sufficient interest for Gorbachev to schedule a visit to Bonn.

How is one to explain this astonishing refusal to respond favorably to Bonn's overtures to improve relations in the period before October 1988? And how, too, can one explain the lack of content in the "European house" slogan? Gorbachev obviously realized that he faced a dilemma. If his policy of opening up the Soviet Union internally and internationally was to succeed, inclusion of the Federal Republic in the approach to the West as a whole was, of course, essential. But inclusion of the Federal Republic in wider East-West cooperation was likely to lead to greater West German penetration of the East and a reduction of Soviet influence and control in "Eastern Europe." At this stage, this was a risk that Gorbachev was unwilling to take.

Just how intense Moscow's reluctance was to deal with Bonn, let alone address the German problem, is indicated by Gorbachev's statements during this period. For instance, when Richard von Weizsäcker, president of the FRG, raised the issue of one "German nation" during his visit to Moscow in July 1987, Gorbachev was reported by TASS as not having wanted to "theorize" about it. In his view, only the political aspect, the existence of two German states with different socio-economic systems was relevant. He stated that what things would look like "*in a hundred years,* history will decide." He further pointed out that one could "hear time and again" that the "German problem remains open," and that this gave rise to doubts as to whether the FRG still intended to adhere to the 1970 Moscow treaty.[3]

Similarly, when Chancellor Kohl visited Moscow in October 1988, Gorbachev complained that he had already "spoken several times about the so-called 'German problem'," but that the matter apparently still needed clarification. "The current situation," he warned, "is the result of history. Attempts at overturning what has been created by it or to force things by an unrealistic policy are an incalculable and even dangerous endeavor."[4]

The Soviet refusal at this stage to turn to a new page on German unity could not have been stated more clearly. "History," not Gorbachev, would decide. Yet, conceptual shifts in Moscow were to steer history inexorably in the direction of German unity.

Stage two: the new conceptual approach. In the period from October 1988 to January 1990 the basis for the disappearance of the GDR as a separate state was laid—both conceptually and practically. Western observers and certainly many critics in Moscow feel that the key to understanding this turn of events can be found on the first level, namely, domestic developments in the Soviet Union. In this view, the state of crisis in the Soviet Union and the tilt of the "correlation of forces" in favor of the West was such that Gorbachev had no other option but to consent to the changes of system and foreign-policy alignment of his erstwhile allies in East-Central Europe.

This argument, however, fails to take into account

[2]The metaphor was used for the first time by Gorbachev when West Germany's foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, visited Moscow in July 1986. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (Frankfurt-am-Main), July 22, 1986. For a detailed treatment of Gorbachev's failure to respond to West German overtures, see the article series by Hannes Adomeit, "Gorbachev's *Westpolitik*: 'The Common European House' or an Atlantic Orientation?" *Osteuropa* (Stuttgart), Nos. 6, 9, 12, 1988.

[3]*Pravda,* July 8, 1987 (emphasis added—H.A.).

[4]In a dinner speech on Oct. 24, 1988. See ibid., Oct. 25, 1988.

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that, militarily, the Soviet Union was and still is a superpower. No one would have been able to force the USSR out of Eastern Europe unless the Soviet leadership itself had been inclined to change its relationship to the region. Thus, at the very least, changes in the power relationship *in conjunction with conceptual reinterpretation* ("new thinking") would seem to explain the shift in Soviet policies toward Eastern Europe and with regard to the German issue.

At the second level—that of change in East-Central Europe and Soviet relations with what used to be the "socialist community"—there are clear indications that such conceptual innovations did occur. The most important innovation is the principle of "freedom of choice."[5] First articulated at the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference in June 1988, this principle was clarified by Gorbachev in his December 1988 speech at the United Nations. Gorbachev stated that for the Soviet Union, "the obligation of the principle of freedom of choice is above every doubt. Freedom of choice is a general principle that does not admit any exceptions."[6] In February 1989, in Kiev, Gorbachev maintained that Soviet relations with the socialist states should be based on "unconditional independence (*bezuslovnaya samostoyatel'nost'*), full equality, and strict non-intervention in internal affairs."[7] This, in turn, presupposed "responsibility of the party and government of each socialist country toward its own people."[8] In other words, the local party leaderships could no longer rely on the Brezhnev doctrine and Soviet military intervention to keep them in power. They themselves had to establish their own political legitimacy and viability.

The principle of "freedom of choice" had tremendous implications for the third level of policy, namely, relations with East Germany. A crucial question needs to be asked here. Was the Honecker regime exempted from the obligation to establish its own legitimacy and viability? Did Gorbachev disingenuously imply that "freedom of choice" should apply to the GDR state and government but *not* to the people of East Germany?

On this issue, ambiguity can quickly be dispelled. The Soviet–West German Joint Declaration, signed by Gorbachev during his visit to West Germany in June 1989, clearly spoke of the "right of all peoples and states" freely to determine their destiny.[9] It went even further by endorsing the "precedence of international law in domestic and international politics" and "unqualified respect for the norms and principles of international law, *especially respect for the right of peoples to self-determination.*"[10] This wording is the international legal counterpart of "freedom of choice." As used in four decades of political and legal discussion in the Federal Republic, it referred to the holding of free elections in East Germany, which, in turn, were the precondition for the reestablishment of German unity. Any third-rate political adviser to Gorbachev, and certainly Valentin Falin, former ambassador to Bonn, head of the CPSU Central Committee's International Department, and adviser to Gorbachev on Germany, would have been able to recognize the significance of this formula. In the six months of careful preparation of the Joint Declaration, the Soviet Union certainly could have objected, if it so desired, to the inclusion of this wording in the document.

The Joint Declaration contains two other important indications of a shift in Soviet thinking on the German problem. One concerns the substitution of a single letter for another—a change in Russian from "i" to "a". The very first sentence of the document refers to the Federal Republic of Germany as *Federativnaya Respublika Germaniya* rather than *Germanii*. This alteration implies that there is only one single Germany (*Germaniya*) with a federal structure rather than two Germanys, with only one having a federal structure. This modification, too, was hardly inadvertent, since the West German foreign office had persistently attempted to get the Soviet Union to agree to it.

The second clue concerns the division of Europe. The Joint Declaration deplores the fact that the European "continent has been divided for decades" and goes on to say that both governments consider it "their paramount objective to contribute toward overcoming the division of Europe." Surely, it was obvious to everyone concerned that the division of Europe could not be overcome without ending the division of Germany.

At about the same time, the conceptual basis for the collapse of the GDR was supplemented by a practical precondition: the removal of the Berlin Wall. This was achieved for all practical purposes, beginning in May 1989, by the dismantling of the Iron Curtain in Hungary. Given the fact that Hungary refused to round up and return the ever-increasing number of East Germans who were attempting to make their way to the West through Hungary, and the fact that other East Germans were attempting to take special trains and buses to the

[5]As Soviet theoreticians have correctly emphasized, "the principles of new political thinking, including that of freedom of choice, are incompatible with the concept of class struggle." See E. Pozdniakov, *New Political Thinking and International Relations*, Moscow, Allied Publishers, 1989, p. 25.

[6]*Pravda*, Dec. 8, 1988.

[7]Ibid., Feb. 24, 1989.

[8]Ibid.

[9]*Izvestiya* (Moscow), June 15, 1989.

[10]Ibid. (emphasis added—H.A.).

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West from the Federal Republic's embassies in Prague and Warsaw, Honecker had to decide on one of two courses of action. He could attempt to prevent the exodus by sealing the borders not just with West Berlin and West Germany but also with Czechoslovakia and Poland, that is, he could build another, even longer, wall to keep the East Germans in. Alternatively, he could try to persuade them to stay. Under the circumstances, this would have meant introducing comprehensive reform measures along Soviet, Polish, and Hungarian lines —with the obvious risk of ultimate dissolution of the GDR and merger with Federal *Germaniya*.

The dilemma facing both East Germany and the Soviet Union in the summer and fall of 1989 was, according to information received by West German intelligence, cogently summarized by Valenin Falin. In a memorandum to the Soviet leadership, he is reported to have stated that one had "to be concerned about the possibility that the widely distributed dissatisfaction will, in a relatively short time—by the spring of next year at the very latest—lead to mass demonstrations which would be difficult to control."[11] Falin also reportedly noted that "the leadership of the SED is [reacting to] the exodus, for which it bears responsibility, essentially helplessly, not knowing what to do." Falin did *not* assume that an opposition movement could, in the foreseeable future, be strong enough to compel the party and government to embark on substantial reform. And even though he detected signs that Honecker had "no longer the full and complete support of the party apparatus" and that "a sense of resignation is spreading, putting in question the leading role of the party," he did not think that the party leader was likely to retire even after the SED congress scheduled for May 1990.

Falin also commented on a state of "alienation" between the CPSU and SED. Moscow had little power to exert influence on the party leadership in East Berlin—a state of affairs exacerbated by the "small reservoir of common political views" between the two. Furthermore, East Berlin had cut back on consultations with Moscow, and attempts by the Moscow leadership to induce East Berlin to embark on reforms along Soviet lines had been "harshly rejected."[12]

During his visit to the GDR in October 1989, Gorbachev again tried to exert pressure on Honecker to reconsider. He reminded the East German leader that *"Those who are late will be punished by life itself."*[13] The SED party leader still refused. But at the same time

One last time: on September 7, 1989, in East Berlin, leaders of the Soviet bloc watch a military parade marking the 40th anniversary of the German Democratic Republic. In the front row are, from left to right: Wojciech Jaruzelski, president of Poland; Miloš Jakeš, leader of the Czechoslovak Communist Party; Soviet Communist Party leader Mikhail Gorbachev; and Erich Honecker, first secretary of East Germany's Socialist Unity Party.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

he was unwilling to follow the Chinese example and, in a reenactment of Tiananmen Square, ruthlessly suppress the ever-increasing wave of demonstrations. It

[11]Report by the intelligence agency of the Federal Republic (BND), as quoted in "Moscow Fears Uprising in the GDR," *Die Welt* (Hamburg), Sept. 15, 1989. The BND report reflects information received as of Aug. 16, 1989. The report did not contain the precise date or circumstances of Falin's assessment.

[12]Ibid. Indirect confirmation of this state of affairs was provided in a meeting between the top Soviet and East German party officials in Moscow on Feb. 2, 1990. The SED/PDS delegation was led by its party chairman, Gregor Gysi; Soviet participants included Aleksandr Yakovlev and Valentin Falin. According to Gysi, as reported by the East German party newspaper, the participants noted that "after 1985, the relationship between the leaderships of the CPSU and the SED showed ever more irritations"—a situation for which "the previous SED leadership was clearly responsible." See "Gorbachev and Gysi in Moscow: A New Beginning in Relations with the CPSU," *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), Feb. 3–4, 1990.

[13]Gorbachev in a private meeting with Honecker on Oct. 7, 1989, as quoted by an official Soviet spokesman. See also the confirmation of this warning by Soviet foreign ministry spokesman, Gennadiy Gerasimov, Radio DDR II (in German), Oct. 19, 1989. In a recent interview, a former member of the East German Politburo, Günther Schabowski, claimed that Gorbachev did not put pressure on Honecker (see Serge Schmemann, "A Wistful Glance Back at When the Wall Fell," *The New York Times*, Oct. 17, 1989). However, such pressure referred to the East German leader's possible resignation, not to the introduction of reforms in the GDR.

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was not a surprise that Honecker was replaced by his own party in mid-October 1989.

It is in the logic of the Soviet conceptual shift that Soviet spokesmen at this time publicly began to talk about the possibility—not yet openly the desirability—of German unification. On October 27, 1989, Yevgeniy Primakov was quoted as saying he saw "no formidable obstacle to reunification."[14] Questioned about the recent demonstrations and other events in East Germany, an official spokesman of the CPSU Central Committee, Nikolay Shishlin, too, left open the possibility of reunification: "Nobody can predict what will happen. And I am sure that this situation should be changed and will be changed." When pressed as to how he thought the change would come about, he replied: "*By the right of choice.* Everything depends on the Germans. But it is necessary to understand our interests, not to destabilize the situation in Europe. Let us wait for a little bit, and I think that we will find a new situation."[15]

Shishlin did not directly address the issue when asked if the Berlin Wall would be dismantled. But he said, "I hope that everything will be changed. You are seeing these events in East Germany. We do understand the meaning of these events."[16] Thus, even though the Soviet leadership—as its counterparts elsewhere—did not foresee the rapidity with which "these events" were to proceed, it was, even at this stage, fully prepared to accept unity as one of the eventual outcomes of change in the GDR.

The evolution of Gorbachev's policy in "Eastern Europe" and East Germany is complemented by movement at the fourth level. In the fall of 1989, at long last, Soviet policy swung away from its fixation on the United States and brought Western Europe into sharper focus. This shift was indicated by Gorbachev's meetings with Prime Minister Ciriaco de Mita of Italy, Chancellor Franz Vranitzky of Austria, Chancellor Helmut Kohl of West Germany, and President François Mitterrand of France.

More important, however, was Gorbachev's earlier announcement, at the United Nations on December 7, 1988, of unilateral Soviet troop cuts and withdrawals. In addition to a reduction of the Soviet armed forces by 500,000 officers and men, six Soviet tank divisions were to be withdrawn from the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. Western intelligence sources estimated that a total of 28 Soviet tank and motorized rifle divisions were then based in those countries. Along with these six divisions, 5,000 tanks and 50,000 troops, including assault-landing formations and river-crossing units, were to be withdrawn. The six divisions were to be disbanded. The 5,000 tanks were to replace older models in the western parts of the Soviet Union, where a total of 10,000 tanks were scheduled to be dismantled.

The significance of this December 1988 initiative for the evolution of Soviet policy on the German problem is difficult to overestimate. Prior to it, one could still legitimately ask whether the agreement on the abolition of intermediate-range nuclear missiles was just a variation on the policy that Leonid Brezhnev had pursued, namely, denuclearization of Europe, erosion of NATO's doctrine of "flexible response," and the separation of Western Europe from the United States. By 1989, however, it was evident that the Soviet Union was serious about making progress toward a reduction of its conventional superiority in Europe, and about limiting its capabilities for surprise attack and invasion. In addition to the announcement of unilateral troop cuts and partial withdrawals, this seriousness was demonstrated by the significant Soviet concessions at the Vienna talks on conventional force reductions in Europe (CFE).

Another facet of new security structures in Europe became visible in January 1989. In talks with his West German counterpart, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze stated that the Soviet Union had set itself the objective "to withdraw *all* of its military forces from the territories of other countries."[17] Since the bulk of these forces was made up by the Western Group of Forces (WGF), this objective clearly included withdrawal of Soviet troops from East Germany.

In light of the above, to argue that Soviet attitudes and policies on Germany evolved against a backdrop characterized by a complete lack of foresight, conceptual incompetence, and loss of control reinforced by loss of power is to seriously misrepresent the facts. Even though Gorbachev, in 1988 and 1989, did not actively promote the unification of Germany, he did in all probability consider it a possible and, for the Soviet Union, an acceptable consequence of his policy conceptions. Once unity of Germany appeared on the European political agenda, he quickly adjusted to the idea and, as will be seen, was willing to deal with it in a constructive spirit.

Stage three: consent to the unification of Germany. At the Soviet-American summit conference at Malta, on

[14]Yevgeniy Primakov, chairman of the Council of the Union, the upper chamber of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and at the time a candidate member of the Politburo (previously head of the World Economics and International Relations Institute [IMEMO]), speaking at the Brookings Institution, quoted in ibid., Oct. 28, 1989.

[15]Shishlin speaking on the ABC news program, "This Week With David Brinkley," Oct. 29, 1989 (emphasis added—H.A.).

[16]Ibid.

[17]On Jan. 18, 1989, in Vienna during a CSCE human rights meeting, quoted in *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich), Jan. 20, 1989 (emphasis added—H.A.).

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December 3, 1989, Gorbachev had still asserted Moscow's traditional position on the German problem. He reiterated that "there are two German states in Europe today, the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic. They are members of the United Nations, sovereign states. This is the bidding of history, this is what history has willed."[18] But only a few weeks later, at a meeting with East German Prime Minister Hans Modrow in Moscow on January 30, 1990, he acknowledged that pressure was building up for German reunification. "*Time itself is having an impact on the process and lending dynamism to it.*"[19] In response to a question about the possibility of reunification, Gorbachev replied:

Basically, no one casts any doubt upon it. However, the development of events in the world, in the German Democratic Republic and in the Soviet Union, requires profound assessment and an analytical approach to a solution of an issue that is an important aspect of European and world politics.[20]

What had happened at the four levels that made the (public) shift come so quickly?

At the *first* level, the decline in Soviet power had accelerated. Five years of *perestroyka* had failed to bring about any significant modernization of the machine-tool industry or an acceleration of the rates of technological innovation. Popular support for *perestroyka* was being undermined by a deterioration in the supply of agricultural and consumer goods. Urgently required price reforms had been postponed several times, and a comprehensive economic reform package still had not been assembled. The deeply entrenched power of the economic bureaucracy and the "military-industrial complex" had not been broken. Internationally, there was lots of goodwill and some interest in economic cooperation with the Soviet Union but insufficient substantive commitment (e.g., to large-scale economic assistance and joint ventures) to promise a rapid change for the better in the economic situation.

The economic predicaments were sharpened by domestic political developments. The authority of the party was beginning to suffer; orders of party officials were increasingly being ignored. Strikes and ethnic violence were taking their economic and financial toll. Secessionism and separatism were beginning to put the very existence of the Soviet Union in question—or at least its survival in the form of a centralized state embracing all 15 republics.

All these developments affected Gorbachev's bargaining position on the German problem. Since the fate of Gorbachev and *perestroyka* were now widely being seen, in the Soviet Union and abroad, as hinging on rapid economic improvement, particularly in the supply of food and consumer goods, the Federal Republic's economic, technological, financial, managerial, and political support in the international community seemed more important than ever before.

These trends were reinforced by events at the *second* level. At the beginning of 1990, the Soviet Union was facing a fundamentally transformed political situation in Eastern Europe. The institutional framework of Soviet influence and control was being rendered illegitimate and irrelevant. East Germany, Moscow's important "strategic ally,"[21] was disintegrating as a socialist state. This will be examined below in more detail. In Poland and Czechoslovakia, Moscow's other two strategic allies in the "northern tier," the main noncommunist opposition movements, Solidarity and Civic Forum, had become the dominant political forces in their respective countries and governments. Hungary had declared itself an independent, democratic state based on democracy, pluralism, the rule of law, and a market economy. In Romania, the Ceauşescu regime had been overthrown, and in Bulgaria, the communist party was engaged in a fundamental revision of its principles and policies.

In Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the moral basis for the presence of Soviet forces was particularly tenuous. Soviet troops had been introduced, or reintroduced, in these countries in the course of military intervention and had been left there as a powerful reminder of Soviet control in East-Central Europe. Predictably, after the systemic changes in the two countries, both Prague and Budapest demanded that negotiations on the withdrawal of Soviet forces be opened. Moscow consented to the discussions and promised to withdraw its forces from both countries by June 1991. Significantly, in both cases the negotiations dealt almost exclusively with the *logistics* of the pullout. No serious effort was made by the Soviet representatives to justify leaving a residual force, other than some initial suggestions that unilateral

[18]Joint news conference with President George Bush, transcript provided by Federal News Service, Dec. 4, 1989.

[19]TASS report (in Russian), Jan. 30, 1990.

[20]Ibid. The question was put by an East German television reporter; see also Francis X. Clines, "Gorbachev Sees a German Union But Warns of 'Chaos of Nihilism,' " *The New York Times*, Jan. 31, 1990.

[21]Soviet foreign ministry spokesman, Gennadiy Gerasimov, at a press briefing in Moscow after the opening of the Berlin Wall; as quoted by Esther B. Fein, "The Kremlin Reacts Calmly, But Says Border Must Stay," ibid., Nov. 11, 1989, and David Remnick, "Soviets Warn Against Reunification," *The Washington Post*, Nov. 11, 1989.

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withdrawals might adversely affect the Warsaw Pact's position at the Vienna conventional arms reduction talks.[22]

But what about the Warsaw Pact itself? Col. Gen. Nikolay F. Chervov of the Soviet General Staff announced at a meeting attended by military chiefs from the CSCE signatory states, that the Warsaw Pact would be thoroughly restructured as a result of the "fast developments in Eastern Europe with the emergence of a multiplicity of parties and with the communist parties no longer leading the states."[23] A Soviet foreign ministry participant in the meeting added that the Pact's future would be shaped by political and regional interests rather than by ideological considerations.[24]

With troops soon to be removed from Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the Soviet forces in the GDR would have been in an exposed position in terms of purely military-strategic considerations, even if no systemic change in that country took place. But once systemic change began to occur, the scales swung decisively toward their removal.

Several trends were coalescing in this final stage to make reunification of Germany and the withdrawal of Soviet forces inevitable. First and foremost, East Germany's economy had reached a critical stage of deterioration, as more and more people were leaving the country. The *Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus* (PDS—the successor to the East German communist party, the SED), the Modrow government, and probably also some political leaders and analysts in Moscow were all still hoping that the right of unrestricted travel and emigration, combined with the prospect of comprehensive reform, would persuade East German citizens to stay in their country. This assumption turned out to be wrong.

In November 1989 alone, 133,429 East German refugees (*Übersiedler*) had registered in West Germany; this was more than a third of the total for all of 1989 (324,776 persons). In December, the rate of emigration fluctuated between 2,000 and 4,000 persons a day. In the first two weeks of January 1990, 25,550 citizens left the GDR.[25] These rates of emigration surpassed those during the previous peak period, August 1961, when the East German party chief, Walter Ulbricht, saw no other option but to close the borders and build the Berlin Wall. For a country with less than 16.6 million inhabitants as of January 1990, the exodus was a serious drain on the economy and society. In January, the GDR economics minister revealed that the budget deficit had swollen to between 5 and 6 billion East German marks; that hard-currency assets had shrunk to the equivalent of 6 to 7 billion marks; and that the net external debt had risen to 20.6 billion marks.[26] The only remedy that objectively remained was that of rapid reunification.



East German workmen tearing down a section of the Berlin Wall between the Reichstag and the Brandenburg Gate (in the background) on the night of February 19, 1990.

—DPA via Photoreporters.

This objective necessity coincided with a decisive shift in mood in favor of reunification. At the first demonstration of the new year in Leipzig, in which an estimated 150,000 people participated, the calls for "socialist renewal" had practically disappeared. They were replaced by slogans such as *Deutschland, einig Vaterland* (Germany, united Fatherland) and *SED auflösen, Deutschland vereinen* (Dissolve the SED, Unite Germany).[27] The mayor of Dresden, Wolfgang Berghofer, correctly stated that the demands for unification were pro-

[22]See Douglas L. Clarke, "Soviet Troop Withdrawals from East Europe," Radio Free Europe Research, *Report on Eastern Europe* (Munich), Mar. 30, 1990, pp. 41–46.

[23]Alan Riding, "Russians, at Conference, See Broad Changes in Warsaw Pact," *The New York Times*, Jan. 18, 1990.

[24]Ibid.

[25]According to official figures of the Federal Republic's Ministry of the Interior, as reported in various issues of the *Bulletin des Presse-und Informationsamts der Bundesregierung* (Bonn), 1989 and 1990.

[26]Christa Luft, at the round-table talks in East Berlin; as broadcast on East German Television evening news, Jan. 3, 1990.

[27]Deutsche Welle (Cologne), Jan. 9, 1990.

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viding ample "proof that, despite the emergence of two German states, the unity of the German nation has been preserved" and that "no separate national identity has evolved in the GDR."[28]

Third, the socialist successor of the communist party continued to lose power and influence in the country. Party membership was shrinking. Leading reformers, such as Berghofer and Hans-Joachim Willerding, a secretary of the Central Committee and a non-voting member of the party's Politburo, were leaving the party. Its attractiveness as an electoral force was declining. In an interview in late 1989, Prime Minister Hans Modrow had expressed the fear that the SED would win no more than 20 percent of the vote if elections were held in the GDR.[29] As it turned out, in the March 18, 1990, elections to the East German parliament (*Volkskammer*), the PDS received 16.3 percent of the vote. It thus ceased to be an important political force in the life of the country.

Fourth, the West German government and West German political parties were becoming the dominant force in the GDR. When Chancellor Kohl and Prime Minister Modrow met in Bonn, in mid-February 1990, the atmosphere and outcome of the meeting conformed to the new realities in East Germany.[30] The established political parties of the Federal Republic were closely involved in the organization, financing, and management of their sister parties in East Germany, and their leading members were actively campaigning in the March 1990 electoral campaign. As one of the members of the independent opposition movement New Forum was to remark scathingly, the various East German parties had become "absolute puppets" of their more powerful counterparts in West Germany. "They can't open a boiled egg without first calling their party chairman to ask which end."[31]

The outcome of the March 1990 elections confirmed the dominant role of Bonn and the West German political parties in East German affairs. Approximately three-fourths of the votes were cast for the Federal Republic's sister parties in the GDR. The conservative Alliance for Germany (Christian Democrats, Christian Socialists and Democratic Awakening) won almost an absolute majority of votes. In order to influence events in East Berlin, Moscow now had to deal with Bonn.

This was clearly reflected at the *fourth* level, that of Soviet relations with West Germany and the Western alliance. The Soviet Union rapidly and, for the most part, constructively responded to the new conditions. This became evident during Chancellor Kohl's visit to Moscow in mid-February 1990, which turned into an historic occasion. The German Chancellor received "unequivocal" assurances from Gorbachev that Moscow would respect the right of the two Germanys "to decide for themselves the timing and structure of their reunification."[32] Agreement was also reached on a framework of negotiations. The agreement was to be confirmed a few days later, at the "open skies" foreign ministers' conference in Ottawa. It stipulated that after the elections in the GDR and the formation of a representative East German government, the four principal World War II victors would hold a series of "two-plus-four" meetings with representatives of both German states. This formula was emphasized and clearly distinguished by Foreign Minister Genscher from a "four-plus-two" format, which could have implied that the Germanys were simply to be consulted or informed about four-power decisions.

Both Kohl and Genscher were surprised and visibly moved by the Soviet leadership's attitude toward German unification. They had braced themselves for tough bargaining, stringent conditions, and unpleasant controversy. Instead, they were met with much understanding and a cooperative spirit concerning possible ways to safeguard the security of the Soviet Union and Germany's neighbors.[33]

The Soviet leadership, however, was anxious to dispel the notion that the German problem could be resolved by the Germans alone. Soviet foreign ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov confirmed that "we have declared that the Germans themselves have to decide the question of the unification of the German nation, including its speed, dates, conditions, and provisions." But this was not the entire picture. Gerasimov also said that the German problem "does not exist in isolation but in a political, historical, geographic, and even psychological context."[34] Nevertheless, the German participants in the

[28]To the Dresden city parliament, as broadcast on East German Television evening news, Jan. 25, 1990.

[29]*Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), Dec. 1, 1989.

[30]The East German head of government and his delegation of 17 cabinet ministers were met at the airport by low-ranking protocol officials. Delegation members, after their return to East Berlin, complained that the attitude of their West German counterparts had been disdainful, condescending, and high-handed (as reported in *Neues Deutschland*, Feb. 13 and 14, 1990). The FRG government refrained from providing the scale of economic assistance that the Modrow government had requested. It evidently preferred to support the government that was to emerge from the March 1990 elections.

[31]Interview with Sebastian Pflugbeil, as quoted by Henry Kamm, "Some East Germans See Their Hopes Eclipsed by Bonn's Ascendancy," *The New York Times*, Jan. 28, 1990.

[32]Statement on Feb. 10, 1990, by Chancellor Kohl in Moscow, as quoted in *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, Feb. 12, 1990.

[33]Interviews conducted by the author in May 1990 at the foreign office in Bonn.

[34]Press conference in Moscow, reported by DPA (West German news agency) from Moscow in German, Feb. 12, 1990.

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Moscow meeting had the distinct impression that the Soviet leadership had not made up its mind what sort of security arrangements it would like to see set up in Europe.[35]

The plethora of proposals, put forward by Moscow in the period from mid-February to mid-July 1990, are convincing evidence of its indecision. The proposals included calls, in rapid succession and often with no compatibility among them, for (1) the dissolution of the two military alliances and their replacement by permanent pan-European security structures; (2) a European-wide referendum on the international and security aspects of German unification; (3) the neutralization and demilitarization of Germany; (4) a military-political status for Germany in NATO similar to that of France; (5) continued, though modified, exercise of four-power occupation rights in Germany; (6) the formation of a center in Berlin to control all military forces in Germany; (7) membership of Germany in both NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization; (8) membership of the Soviet Union in NATO; and (9) membership of the Federal Republic in NATO and "associate" status for the eastern part of Germany in the Warsaw Pact.

While these proposals can be interpreted as part of a *genuine* Soviet search for new security arrangements in Europe, they can also to be regarded as a *tactical* device. Gorbachev may have wanted to get the best possible security deal for the Soviet Union in Europe; to retain for his country a significant measure of political influence; and, perhaps most important, to provide as much time as possible for the Soviet public to adjust to new realities.

Building Blocks of Soviet Security in the 1990's

Returning to the questions posed at the beginning of this article, answers can now be suggested concerning near- and medium-term Soviet security policy toward Germany in the form of the following propositions.

- The Soviet leadership has, for the time being at least, *abandoned traditional Soviet objectives on European security and NATO.* It no longer aims at the dissolution of NATO, and the removal of the US military presence and security guarantees from Europe. It has come to accept, perhaps reluctantly, that both NATO and the United States have an important role to play in European affairs.

- The Gorbachev leadership appears to base its revised approach on the assumption that a *united Germany will not be a significant security threat to the Soviet Union in the 1990's.* Nevertheless, prudence and domestic considerations demand that safeguards be put in place. But Moscow is no longer looking to new international control machinery for the neutralization of Germany but to the existing institutions into which today's West Germany is integrated, that is, primarily the European Community and NATO.

- Consequently, *NATO membership for Germany is acceptable for the Soviet Union.* The main conditions of this acceptance were codified in the July 16, 1990, accord between Kohl and Gorbachev at the Caucasian spa of Zheleznovodsk. The accord hinges on a close interrelationship among the "two-plus-four" talks on



FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl strolls with Mikhail Gorbachev and the Soviet president's wife, Raisa, in the town of Arkhyz, Karachevo-Cherkessk Autonomous Region, after talks there between the two leaders; they subsequently flew to Zheleznovodsk for a press conference on the discussions.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

[35]Udo Bergdoll and Bernhard Küppers, "The Small Miracle of Moscow," *Süddeutsche Zeitung,* Feb. 12, 1990.

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Germany, the CFE negotiations in Vienna, confirmation of the Oder-Neisse line as the permanent border between Germany and Poland, the Soviet-German economic talks, transformation of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, and the creation of permanent institutions under CSCE auspices.

- Foremost among the *specific conditions* to be met by the West on security issues are: *NATO's* abandonment of the strategy of "forward defense"; prohibition of NATO forces on what is now GDR territory; limitation of the overall size of the German armed forces; significant reduction of the number of US and other foreign forces in the western part of Germany; stationing of Soviet troops in the eastern part of Germany only for a transitional period; no German access to nuclear, biological or chemical weapons; no modernization of US nuclear weapons stationed in West Germany; and (probably) removal of US nuclear weapons from German soil.

These building blocks of Soviet security vis-à-vis Germany need to be analyzed in some detail.

United States in Europe, Germany in NATO. On the issue of NATO and the US military presence on the European continent, it would be an exaggeration to speak simply of a "revision" of Soviet attitudes. Even in the Brezhnev era, there was sufficient ambiguity in Soviet policy to justify doubt as to whether the USSR was absolutely determined to remove the US presence from the continent. But whatever Brezhnev's policies may have been, with the exception of a brief interval, from March to October 1985, Gorbachev's concept of the "common house of Europe" has always included the idea that the United States and Canada not only do but also *should* play an important role in European affairs.

Leading proponents of "new thinking" have provided several rationales as to why this should be so. They have argued that there is a close and inseparable *economic* relationship between the United States and Western Europe and that the ties which bind these two entities ("centers of imperialism" in the orthodox Soviet lexicon) are objectively stronger than the issues that divide them. In *military* affairs, their reasoning is that advances in transport and communications technology have significantly reduced the geographical distance between the United States and Europe. The nuclear age and intercontinental strategic missiles have drastically shrunk the significance of the Atlantic. In security terms, America is now as close to Europe as Great Britain was at the beginning of the century. From a practical *political* perspective, even if it were desirable, the abolition of the US military presence in Europe would be impossible because American policymakers have no intention of disengaging the United States from Europe; the greater attention given to the Asia-Pacific region does not represent a substitute for US involvement in Europe but is merely supplementary. But above and beyond that, binding the United States to security responsibilities in Europe serves to preserve the mostly salutary influence of the European powers on American policy and military strategy. Finally, a withdrawal of the US forces from Europe could create fears and feelings of insecurity in some of the West European countries; such anxieties would not necessarily work in the Soviet Union's favor, because they might induce the Europeans to strengthen their defenses. In sum, participation by the United States in European security affairs had to be viewed as "logical and necessary," while the effects of a withdrawal by the US would be "destabilizing."[36]

It is on the basis of such considerations that—contrary to the time-honored rhetoric invariably contained in Warsaw Pact communiqués about the "dissolution of the blocs"—Gorbachev said to his German hosts during his June 1989 visit to Bonn:

[the Joint Declaration] does not demand that you, or we, should renounce our uniqueness or weaken our allegiance to the alliances. On the contrary, I am confident that the adherence to [the Declaration] in our policies will serve to consolidate the contribution of each state to the creation of a peaceful European order as well as to shape a common European outlook.[37]

Similarly, after the initial indications that German unity was going to be a major issue in European security affairs, Gorbachev told the visiting French foreign minister, Roland Dumas, in mid-November 1989: "*Now is*

[36]These arguments have been made, inter alia, by Sergey Karaganov. See his "America in the Common European Home," *Moskovskiye Novosti*, Nov. 13, 1988; and his statements at a conference held at the Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels, quoted in *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, Nov. 25, 1988, and at the 86th round of the Bergedorfer Gesprächskreis, in *Das Gemeinsame europäische Haus aus der Sicht der Sowjetunion und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (The Common House of Europe from the Perspective of the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany), protocol of the 86th round of talks of the Bergedorfer Gesprächskreis, held in Bonn-Bad Godesberg, Dec. 3–4, 1988, Hamburg, Körber Stiftung, 1989, p. 78. Similar or identical views on these issues have been advanced by Yuriy Davydov, "The Soviet Vision of a Common European House," paper delivered to the International Studies Conference (ISA) in London, Mar. 29–Apr. 1, 1989, (unpubl.), and by V. G. Baranovskiy, *Zapadnaya Evropa: voyenno-politicheskaya integratsiya* (Western Europe: Military-Political Integration), Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1988, pp. 180–84.

[37]M. S. Gorbachev's Visit to the FRG. Speech of M. S. Gorbachev," *Pravda*, June 13, 1989.

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not the time to break up the established international political and economic institutions. Let them be transformed, taking into account internal processes; let them find their place in the new situation and work together."[38] Finally, reporting to the Supreme Soviet on the results of the Soviet-American summit of early June 1990, Gorbachev conceded that the two alliances would continue to exist "for longer than might be imagined."[39]

How is one to explain then the fact that, officially, the Soviet leadership continued to advocate as late as June 1990 the "dissolution of the blocs" and to *oppose membership of Germany in* NATO? To take some representative examples, in February 1990 Valentin Falin stated bluntly: "If the Western alliance sticks to its demand for a NATO membership of all of Germany, then there won't be any reunification."[40] CPSU Central Committee expert on German affairs, Nikolay Portugalov, claimed in the same month that the idea of Germany staying inside NATO was a "joke."[41] And two weeks before the Zheleznovodsk accord, Col. Gen. Nikolay F. Chervov wrote that a united Germany in NATO would be "definitely unacceptable, both politically and psychologically, to the Soviet people. It would seriously upset the military balance of strength that has developed in Europe."[42] As for Gorbachev, in an interview with *Time* magazine in June 1990, he expected "major disagreement" with President George Bush on the issue of a united Germany's membership in NATO. He rejected as "just not serious" Western arguments to the effect that in the new phase of international relations, NATO would serve the interests of the Soviet Union. For the Soviet people, he continued:

NATO is associated with the cold war . . . as an organization designed from the start to be hostile to the Soviet Union, as a force that whipped up the arms race and the danger of war. Regardless of what is being said about NATO now, for us it is **a symbol of the past, a dangerous and confrontational past.** *And we will* **never agree to assign to it the leading role in building a new Europe.** *I want us to be understood correctly on this.*[43]

Being unwilling to assign the "leading" role to NATO did not preclude the possibility that Gorbachev might be prepared to assign to it an *important* role. Apart from that, it is precisely the "symbolic" significance of NATO that explains some of the extraordinary twists and turns in the Soviet position on the issue. For four decades, NATO was portrayed by Soviet propagandists as the most dangerous and most reactionary executive committee of "imperialism." How, then, in the official image, could one suddenly change the wolf into a lamb? This was obviously difficult to do without loss of face for the Soviet leadership and party. Furthermore, some segments of the political and military leadership were, and still are, genuinely and emphatically opposed to the idea of German membership in NATO. This problem will be discussed below. Last but not least, as suggested earlier, the Soviet contortions on the issue were probably related to bargaining tactics and to the price to be asked for Germany's remaining in NATO. Similarly, the Soviet troops in Germany represented a negotiating asset. But can they be expected to play a role in the transition period until they are finally withdrawn?

Abolition of the Soviet military presence in Germany. When Gorbachev announced the unilateral troop cuts in December 1988, a major portion of the cuts in "Eastern Europe" was to come from the Western Group of Forces in East Germany. The WGF, as Soviet spokesmen later clarified, was to be pared down by some 36,000 troops, representing almost 75 percent of the originally projected cuts.[44] In 1989, the first year of the two-year reduction period envisaged by Gorbachev, the USSR withdrew 24,509 troops, 11,416 coming from the GDR.

At the end of 1989 and the beginning of 1990, however, the timetable for the cuts and the Soviet position at the Vienna CFE talks were put in disarray. The East German armed forces, it became evident, would soon no longer be part of the Warsaw Pact. As noted above, Hungary and Czechoslovakia had asked for the complete withdrawal of Soviet forces from their territories. With an additional commitment to withdraw 5,000 troops from Poland, the Soviet General Staff now had to work on plans to pull back not just 50,000 troops from Central Europe, but more than 150,000.

The cuts in Soviet troop levels and the withdrawals from Central Europe were bound to be difficult. The already existing severe housing shortage for Soviet mili-

[38]Bill Keller, "Gorbachev Urges West to Show Restraint on Turmoil in Eastern Europe," *The New York Times*, Nov. 15, 1989 (emphasis added—H.A.).

[39]"M. S. Gorbachev's Speech at the Third Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet," *Pravda*, June 13, 1990.

[40]Interview with the Saarländische Rundfunk, the Saar state (*Land*) radio, quoted in "German Ties to NATO Opposed," *The Boston Globe, Sunday*, Feb. 18, 1990.

[41]*The Economist* (London), Feb. 10, 1990, p. 49.

[42]Col. Gen. Nikolay Chervov, "United Germany Should Not Be NATO Member," *Svenska Dagbladet* (Stockholm), July 1, 1990, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-SOV*), July 5, 1990, pp. 4–5.

[43]*Time* (New York), June 4, 1990 (emphasis added—H.A.).

[44]This account of the size and role of the WGF draws on Douglas L. Clarke, "Soviets Halt Troop Pullout from East Germany," Radio Free Europe Research, *Report on Eastern Europe*, June 1, 1990, pp. 28–30.

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tary officers and non-commissioned officers was worsening and having adverse effects on morale. This author was told repeatedly in Moscow in May of this year that the housing problem made it necessary for a number of the units returning "home" to stay in tents through the winter.[45]

Housing is not the only problem. Now that the main outlines of a settlement of the international aspects of German unification have been agreed upon, a more radical reform effort in the Soviet Union appears likely. This will almost certainly entail even more extensive troop cuts, which, in turn, will create the problem of finding jobs for more demobilized troops.

When the Soviet Union halted its partial troop withdrawal from East Germany in spring 1990, it could easily have justified this move by citing technical problems. However, Soviet foreign ministry spokesman Gerasimov stated that a decision on further withdrawals from the GDR depended both on the CFE talks and on "the *political* solution of the German problem."[46] The possibility existed, therefore, that the Soviet leadership would use the remaining 364,000 troops in Germany as a means to impose its will on the "two-plus-four" talks, by invoking existing occupation rights and four-power agreements. Such a move would have made a sham of the sovereignty of united Germany.

The Soviet leadership rejected this course of action, to repeat, not because it was forced to do so but because of its firm commitment to a comprehensive withdrawal of Soviet forces from Central Europe and its determination to come to a modus vivendi with Germany. In accordance with these political priorities, the former commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact armed forces, Marshal Viktor Kulikov, asserted, in late May 1990, that the partial withdrawal schedule would be met.[47] More important, at the 28th CPSU Congress, Shevardnadze explained that "it is not in our interests to drag out the resolution of the external aspects of German unity."[48] Finally, Gorbachev agreed at Zheleznovodsk that all the Soviet forces would be withdrawn from Germany "in three to four years."[49]

In addition to commitment and conceptual reorientation, there are practical political reasons counseling speedy withdrawal. As argued above, the *military* rationale for the presence of Soviet forces in the eastern part of Germany after the projected withdrawal of forces from Hungary and Czechoslovakia by June 1991 was being undercut. Their continued presence for *political* reasons would have been even more difficult. Notwithstanding Moscow's commitment to withdraw its troops, tensions and conflicts between German civilians and Soviet soldiers and their dependents have been rising.[50] There no longer is a communist government to silence open criticism of the Soviet troop presence. Attempts to hang on to outlived occupation rights would almost certainly cause even greater resentment among the Germans and, for the first time since the revolution of 1989, probably lead to widespread nationalist agitation. The damage done to a relationship yet to be built would be enormous.

Thus, the vitally important political function performed by the presence of the Soviet armed forces in Germany has come to an end after 45 years. The USSR has insisted nevertheless that the stationing costs be borne primarily by (West) Germany. In accordance with an agreement reached at the end of June 1990, the Federal Republic has consented to pay 1.25 billion Deutsche mark (US$780 million) by the end of December to defray the stationing costs, and will continue to do so in all likelihood until the completion of the troop withdrawals.[51] Somewhat euphemistically, the Zheleznovodsk agreement refers to a "transition treaty about the consequences of the introduction of the Deutsche mark in the GDR" that "shall be concluded with the Soviet Union."[52]

Finally, it seems almost certain that Moscow's allies in the Warsaw Pact would have failed to support any open-ended retention of Soviet forces and occupation rights in Germany.

Transformation of the military alliances. In fact, at the February 1990 "open skies" meeting of the foreign ministers of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Ottawa, nothing was said about this topic. The meeting, however, did reveal serious differences in the Warsaw Pact. Only two foreign ministers were calling for the neutralization of Germany: Shevardnadze and East German Foreign

[45]See also Stephen Foye, "Soviet Armed Forces Face Housing Crisis," Radio Liberty, *Report on the USSR* (Munich), Mar. 30, 1990, pp. 5–7.

[46]Tass (in Russian), May 17, 1990.

[47]In an interview with *Der Standard* (Vienna), Kulikov claimed that the troop withdrawals had been held up because of difficulties in reintegrating the officers and men in the Soviet Union. However, he stated that the USSR had committed itself to the withdrawal of 22,000 troops by July 1 and it would meet this deadline. Thus far, 11,620 soldiers had returned to the USSR; quoted in *Berliner Zeitung* (East Berlin), May 31, 1990.

[48]"Reports of Members and Candidate Members of the Politburo, and Secretaries of the CC of the CPSU, E. A. Shevardnadze," *Pravda*, July 5, 1990.

[49]"Press conference of M. S. Gorbachev and H. Kohl," ibid., July 18, 1990.

[50]See the extensive report in *Der Spiegel*, July 16, 1990, pp. 28–36; see also Craig W. Whitney, "Germans Who Want Russians Out vs. the Russians Who Want to Stay," *The New York Times*, July 31, 1990.

[51]"Moscow Receives 1.25 Billion Deutsche Mark for Troops in the GDR," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, June 30, 1990.

[52]*Pravda*, July 18, 1990.

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Minister Oskar Fischer. At the mid-March 1990 Warsaw Pact foreign ministers' conference in Prague, the USSR again found itself in a minority on the issue. At the closing news conference, Czechoslovakia's foreign minister, Jiři Dienstbier, said that neutrality would be "the worst alternative."[53] Polish Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski stated that a neutral Germany "would not be good for Europe." Neutrality would "foster some tendencies in Germany to be a great power acting on its own."[54] Only the East German foreign minister still supported his Soviet counterpart. When he was replaced a few weeks later as a result of free elections and the formation of a conservative-led government in East Berlin, the isolation of Moscow on this issue became complete.

Domestic and international politics would be less complicated for Gorbachev if the Warsaw Pact could be transformed into a viable institution. The impression of a semblance of reciprocity and equivalence existing between the two military alliances could then be maintained. Residual allegiances and commitments could also be more easily connected with the special, temporary military arrangement for the eastern part of Germany.

Moscow certainly appears willing to transform the Warsaw Pact from an instrument of Soviet domination and control to a political institution fully respecting the sovereignty of its six (without East Germany) member-states. The Soviet leadership clearly hopes that some aspect of this organization can be salvaged. It apparently bases its optimism on the idea that the "state interests" of the Warsaw Pact members have in essence remained the same. Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev put the matter as follows:

First of all, there's the stability of the territory and state boundaries. Second, there are the economic interests of the states. After all, they've been linked for many decades. That is why the military-political alliance remains. The state interests of both alliances still remain, and the contradictions remain. And a certain quantity of arms and armed forces will remain. But what matters is that it be such a quantity which would not permit the country to start a war, even if it wanted to.[55]

Such perceptions were put to the test at two meetings of the Warsaw Pact. One was the June 7, 1990, conference of the Political Consultative Committee (PCC) in Moscow; the other was the Military Committee's gathering on June 14–15 in Strausberg, near East Berlin. Despite the differences of view (Hungary predictably taking the most radical position), the trend that emerged from the final document adopted by the PCC and statements of the participants at both meetings was unambiguous. The "character, functions, and activities of the Warsaw Pact" were (and will continue to be) thoroughly reviewed.[56] The organization is (1) to change from a political and military alliance to a political alliance with military consultation; (2) the centralized, Soviet-controlled command structure is to be abandoned, which in practice will mean that a Soviet deputy minister of defense will no longer be the Pact's commander-in-chief, and may mean that the Joint Supreme Command will be dissolved; (3) the member-states will gain control of their own national forces in accordance with the principle of full national sovereignty; and (4) as long as the Pact's multilateral institutions continue in existence, representatives of the member-states will fill positions in them by rotation.

As for national differences over the Pact, mainly because of the reconstitution of a potentially powerful Germany at its western borders, Poland more than any other country has until now remained committed to cooperation with the USSR in a thoroughly revised Pact. Thus, the Polish prime minister, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, confirmed the validity of Akhromeyev's assessment by claiming:

We have passed in the alliance with the Soviet Union to the state level from the ideological level. But this does not mean that at the state level we do not see the importance of this alliance for the problem of security for our borders."[57]

Furthermore, he has argued that Soviet troops should remain in Poland as a guarantee because of "the German problem."[58]

Bulgaria has also supported the Soviet viewpoint. But Czechoslovakia and Hungary have insisted on speedy and complete Soviet troop withdrawals, and the Hungarian parliament has already voted to suspend Hungary's participation in the military organization of the alliance. Nevertheless, tendencies exist in Prague and in Budapest against *unilaterally* forcing the

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[53]Celestine Bohlen, "Warsaw Alliance Split on Germany," *The New York Times*, Mar. 18, 1990.

[54]Ibid.

[55]Interview with Bill Keller, "Gorbachev's Hope for Future: A Common European Home," ibid., Nov. 30, 1989. Marshal Sergey F. Akhromeyev is a former chief of staff of the Soviet armed forces and currently an adviser to Gorbachev on arms control issues. He is also a member of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

[56]According to the text of the final communiqué of the Political Consultative Committee meeting, *Pravda*, June 8, 1990.

[57]At a news conference in Warsaw, Associated Press, Feb. 21, 1990.

[58]Ibid.

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issue of a dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in addition to curtailing or abolishing its supranational military functions. The governments of both countries are aware that the transition to new security arrangements would be endangered by a collapse of the Warsaw Pact. The organization, they realize, has a role to play in conventional arms-control negotiations, in arms production, and in the coordination of regional military policies. But over the medium term, the Pact will probably be dissolved altogether or transformed into a merely political component of a comprehensive, all-European security system.

This seems even more likely in view of the changes in NATO. In fact, it is difficult to imagine the Soviet Union's consent to a unified Germany's inclusion in NATO without an appropriate response by the Western alliance. The PCC's call for "constructive cooperation" between the two blocs and a Europe "without artificial barriers and ideological hostility,"[59] found its equivalent in the declaration adopted by the summit conference of NATO leaders in London on July 6, which extended the "hand of friendship" to the countries of the East. NATO was ready, among other things, "to enhance the political component of our Alliance"; to intensify military contacts with "Moscow and other Central and East European capitals"; to field, after the conclusion of the CFE negotiations, "smaller and restructured active forces"; to move "away from 'forward defense' "; and to reduce its "reliance on nuclear weapons."[60] Clearly, the NATO declaration greatly facilitated Gorbachev's task of placating his domestic critics and, of gaining, if not their support of, then at least their acquiescence to, membership of Germany in NATO.

Curtailment of German military power. The prospect of the political unity of Germany immediately raised the issue of its potential *military* capabilities. In the new conditions of a reduction in the Soviet threat, none of Germany's future neighbors, east or west, could be expected to welcome the reemergence of a strong, perhaps even dominant, German army on the continent. The Soviet Union is no exception. Typical of Moscow's position was the demand, reemphasized by Shevardnadze at the "two-plus-four" talks in East Berlin in June 1990, that any final document on the international aspects of German unification include measures to limit the size of the future German armed forces, rendering them structurally "incapable of offensive operations."[61] From Bonn's viewpoint, however, it was important that numerical constraints on the German armed forces not be imposed in the "two-plus-four" talks but be included in an overall agreement at the CFE negotiations. A limitation agreement at the "two-plus-four" talks could have been interpreted as a continuation of international control machinery and, thus, singularization of Germany in the new Europe.

The solution found at Zheleznovodsk was to have the Federal Republic government declare its willingness "to give a binding declaration in the current Vienna talks to reduce the army of a unified Germany within three to four years to a personnel strength of 370,000." This commitment was made conditional on success at the CFE talks, since the reduction of German forces would start only "when the first Vienna agreement comes into effect."[62]

In anticipation of the accord reached at Zheleznovodsk, Shevardnadze asked the delegates to the 28th Party Congress, "What is better for us? To deal with a half-million strong *Bundeswehr* of the FRG, or, say, an army half that size of a united Germany?"[63] Although Shevardnadze's figures do not quite add up,[64] the Foreign Minister did have a strong argument: the overall reductions do amount to a significant constraint on Germany's conventional capabilities.

Furthermore, the future military potential of Germany, and of NATO on German soil, was limited by Chancellor Kohl's assurances that, for the transitional period when Soviet forces remain in eastern Germany, only units of German territorial defense would be stationed there. Moreover, even after the withdrawal of Soviet forces, no nuclear weapons or foreign troops would be stationed in the eastern part of Germany.[65]

If for the Soviet theoreticians and practitioners brought up on the "correlation of forces" credo these were still insufficient guarantees against the reemergence of a German military threat, there was yet anoth-

[59]Communiqué of the PCC's Moscow meeting, *Pravda*, June 8, 1990.

[60]Text of the London declaration of NATO, *The New York Times*, July 7, 1990.

[61]Quoted by Serge Schmemann, "Shevardnadze Seeks Curbs on Forces in New Germany," ibid., June 23, 1990.

[62]*Pravda*, July 18, 1990. "Army" in the accord clearly refers to all the three services, that is, to the total armed forces.

[63]Ibid., July 5, 1990. "To have against us" a half-million strong *Bundeswehr* is the FBIS translation of this portion of Shevardnadze's speech on Soviet central television. The translation implies an adversarial relationship (see *FBIS-SOV*, Supplement: *28th Party Congress*, July 5, 1990, p. 9). The *Pravda* version of *imet' delo* (have to deal with), however, does not convey such an adversarial impression.

[64]The size of the West German armed forces alone, at present, amounts to about 494,000 men, and the combined total of the armed forces of the two Germanys (discounting that the numerical strength of the East German *Volksarmee* has withered) would be 667,700. The 370,000 men for the future *Bundeswehr* are equivalent to about 55 percent of this total. At the joint press conference of the leaders of the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union, Gorbachev stated that the leadership of the FRG had committed itself to cutting the future size of the *Bundeswehr* "by almost half—42–45 percent—of the combined current number of the army of the two German states." *Pravda*, July 18, 1990.

[65]Ibid.

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er, crucially important safeguard. A terse, matter-of-fact statement in the Zheleznovodsk agreement codified that "A unified Germany will *refrain from producing, owning, or controlling atomic, biological, and chemical weapons,* and will continue to adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty."[66]

The last constraint can, in fact, be considered the ultimate reassurance. With its panoply of nuclear weapons —battlefield, tactical, and strategic—the Soviet Union will remain a superpower in Europe. Germany will have nothing to match it. In addition, current sentiment in both the Federal Republic and in East Germany is to get rid of all nuclear weapons on German territory, above all, the battlefield nuclear weapons (which could be used on German soil), and in all likelihood also the modernized, longer-range tactical air-to-surface missiles currently under discussion in NATO.

This ultimate reassurance will, of course, not be mentioned publicly in the Soviet Union. Reliance on nuclear weapons for security blatantly contradicts the "new thinking" and, more specifically, Gorbachev's ambitious program for ridding mankind of the scourge of nuclear weapons by the year 2000. In private conversation, however, the ultimate weapon will frankly be acknowledged as the supreme safeguard of Soviet security. Prohibition of German access to nuclear weapons was one inalienable precondition of the Soviet consent to German unification. Another was renunciation by Germany of any territorial claims in the east.

Territorial issues: finality of the Oder-Neisse border. Under the Potsdam agreement, "Königsberg and the adjacent area," i.e., the northern part of East Prussia (today the Kaliningrad oblast and Klaipėda, the latter now a bone of contention between Lithuania and the Soviet Union) were transferred to the Soviet Union. Even though the transfer was defined as provisional —pending "the final determination of territorial questions at the peace settlement"—the signatories also committed themselves "*in principle . . . to the ultimate transfer*" of these territories (section VI of the protocol). No such commitment existed in the section dealing with Poland. The German territories, extending from the Baltic (including Danzig) in the north to Czechoslovakia in the south, and from the Soviet portions of East Prussia in the northeast to the Oder and Neisse rivers in the west, were only provisionally "placed under the of the Polish state" (section IX of the protocol).

As for Soviet-German territorial issues, they did not really play much of a role in the negotiating process over the unification of Germany. There was nothing to discuss; new realities had been created since the expulsion of the German population and over the subsequent 46 years of Russian settlement. But even though such new realities had also been created in the formerly German areas "under Polish administration," and despite the close interconnectedness of all the eastern border issues (Stalin had compensated Poland for territorial losses in the east with gains in the west), there was considerable Polish sensitivity on the problem.

On the surface, there was not much reason for concern. The GDR had recognized the finality of the East German–Polish border in the Görlitz treaty in 1950. The Federal Republic had reaffirmed, in the Warsaw treaty of December 1970, "the inviolability of the existing frontiers now and in the future," and in the same treaty, the two countries had declared that "they have no territorial claims whatsoever against each other and that they will not assert such claims in the future."[67]

What remained was only Bonn's legalistic argument that (1) "Germany continued to exist as a legal entity in the borders of 1937" and that (2) prior to the establishment of the parliament of a united Germany, neither the Federal Republic nor the GDR could legally act in its name. What the parliaments in Bonn and East Berlin could do, however, was to give pledges that they would settle the border issue in accordance with the provisions of the Görlitz and Warsaw treaties. This they did in March and April 1990 respectively. Such assurances were also made part of the June 1990 treaty on German economic and social union; of the Zheleznovodsk agreement, which states that the unification of Germany "encompasses the Federal Republic, the GDR, and Berlin"; and, one day later, of the "two-plus-five" talks (with Poland included), which specified that the parliament of a united Germany will confirm the Oder-Neisse border with Poland "in the shortest possible time" after unification and remove from its laws any language suggesting that the border is provisional.[68]

Important as legal issues may be, the main reasons for Polish sensitivity are political and economic. They flow from the sheer size of the territories ceded by Germany, the significant number of the German expellees from these territories and their potential or actual political influence in the Federal Republic and the geographical proximity of a strong and powerful Germany to Poland. But there is also the fact that Poles and Ger-

[66]Ibid. (emphasis added—H.A.). The German term *Verfügungsgewalt* and the Russian *rasporyazheniye* are best translated in this context as "control."

[67]*The Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the People's Republic of Poland*, Bonn, Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, 1971, p. 8.

[68]*The New York Times*, July 18, 1990.

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Foreign ministers participating in the "two-plus-five" talks in Paris pose for a photo on July 17, 1990. From left to right are: Hans-Dietrich Genscher (Federal Republic of Germany), James Baker (the United States); Krzysztof Skubiszewski (Poland), Roland Dumas (France), Eduard Shevardnadze (the Soviet Union), Douglas Hurd (United Kingdom), and Markus Meckel (the German Democratic Republic). The presence of Poland expanded the talks on Germany from the original "two-plus-four" format.

—Reuters/Bettman.

mans are probably the least reconciled of all the antagonists of World War II.

Prejudices run deep: *polnische Wirtschaft* in Germany predates the war as a derogatory term for laziness, shoddy workmanship, and inefficiency in economic affairs. West Germans assert that successive Polish communist regimes (and the Soviet Union) have deliberately kept anti-German sentiment alive to justify Poland's allegiance to Moscow. They resent the influx of Poles into Germany under the false premises of being "ethnic German" and "asylum-seekers,"[69] and their allegedly ubiquitous presence in Berlin and East Germany as "black marketeers." And they charge that minority rights are denied to those Germans in Poland who are truly of German origin and want to retain their cultural identity.

Poles, by contrast, remember the partitions of their country among Imperial Germany and Russia (and Austria-Hungary), and between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. They have not forgotten Hitler's systematic attempt to eradicate the Polish intellectual, economic, military, and political elite so as to ensure long-term German domination of the country. They are unsure of the current loyalty of the German minority. They consider the German refusal to pay reparations and even compensation for the suffering of hundreds of thousands of Poles in German concentration and labor camps morally reprehensible. And while looking to German financial and economic assistance to rebuild their economy, they are also concerned about German economic power and Polish dependency.

Such complexities in German-Polish relations are matched by those found in relations between the Soviet Union and Germany.

Soviet-German Political and Economic Relations

It would be missing the point entirely if one were to focus exclusively on the elaborate technical machinery and on the constraints, guarantees, limitations, and safeguards that constitute the building blocks of Soviet

[69]About 200,000 Poles emigrated to West Germany in 1988; more than 250,000 emigrated in 1989. More than 1 million Polish citizens visit West Germany each year, many of whom are working there illegally in order to earn hard currency.

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security. The essence of the Soviet approach is a comprehensively revised conception of security. The "common interests of mankind" are to take precedence over "class struggle." "Dialogue, cooperation, and interaction," Shevardnadze told the delegates to the 28th Party Congress, "allow both ourselves and others to approach boldly a reevaluation of priorities in domestic and external policy, to give preference to peaceful needs and joint endeavors in resolving increasingly acute global problems."[70]

A vision of partnership and close interaction with Germany clearly emerges from the new images evoked by top Soviet leaders. At the press conference with Chancellor Kohl at Zheleznovodsk, Gorbachev spoke of the "great German people" (*velikiy nemetskiy narod*) and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, at the 28th Party Congress, similarly referred to the Germans as a "great nation" (*velikaya natsiya*). He also called for cooperation "on a broad, large scale of mutual advantage with a united Germany, both in politics and economics, and in all other spheres."[71]

To what extent is this merely rhetoric for the consumption of a domestic and international public? Is reality not much more simple: Moscow agrees to German unity and the withdrawal of troops in exchange for major economic commitments by Bonn?

There can be no doubt about the importance of Germany in Soviet economic affairs. As Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders have correctly pointed out: "Today, the FRG is our largest partner among the Western countries, and the GDR our largest partner among the East European countries."[72] Indeed, among the industrialized nations of the West, the Federal Republic has by far the biggest share in total Soviet foreign trade—between 4 and 5 percent. Machinery, industrial equipment, and electronic, electrical, and optical products constitute the biggest share of West German exports to the USSR. Approximately one-third of all the high-technology commodities imported by the Soviet Union from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries originate in the Federal Republic.

Among the Soviet Union's partners in the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance, East Germany has been similarly important to the Soviet economy. The GDR accounts for about 10 to 12 percent of the Soviet Union's total foreign trade. The commodity composition of Soviet–East German trade has closely corresponded to that of Soviet–West German trade—17 percent of the machinery and equipment imported by the USSR originates in the GDR, 20 percent of the metal-working machines, and about 40 percent of the tractors and agricultural machinery.[73]

Three trade agreements are in force between the Soviet Union and the GDR, and all three have a bearing on Germany as a whole. They are the April 1989 accord on the coordination of trade plans for the 1990–95 period; the April 1990 agreement covering commodity exchanges in the second half of 1990; and an agreement, concluded to the dismay of Bonn and the EC Commission in July 1990, regulating trade in 1991. East Germany by that time will be merged with West Germany, but the new German state (and the EC) will be bound by the agreements because, in the treaty on economic and social union with East Germany, the governments in Bonn and East Berlin committed themselves to fulfilling the contractual commercial obligations existing between the GDR and the USSR. All this may seem ominous—particularly inasmuch as East Germany (1) has contracts for the delivery of military equipment to Moscow amounting to about 2 billion Deutsche mark and (2) has been building up a considerable balance-of-payments surplus with the USSR—since many East German enterprises have begun to import from West German firms.[74]

The government of the Federal Republic has stated several times that it is fully committed to supporting Gorbachev's reform efforts, willing to make a substantial contribution to the modernization of the Soviet economy, and intent on expanding scientific and technological cooperation. At meetings of the European Community in Dublin in June 1990 and of the "Group of Seven" in Houston in July 1990, the German Chancellor campaigned for increased Western aid to the Soviet Union. As mentioned above, Bonn has announced that it will cover a major portion of the costs for the housing and retraining of Soviet officers and men returning to the USSR, and for the upkeep of the Soviet forces remaining in the eastern part of Germany.

In October 1988, a banking consortium led by the Deutsche Bank extended a 3 billion Deutsche mark ($1.8 billion) credit line to the Soviet Union to help Moscow modernize its food and consumer-goods industries. In June 1990, the Federal Republic announced that it would guarantee a bank credit, below commercial loan rates and without project conditionality, amounting to 5 billion Deutsche mark ($3 billion). Western experts expect these deals to be followed by oth-

[70] *Pravda*, July 5, 1990.
[71] Ibid.
[72] Ibid., July 18, 1990.
[73] Data according to various issues of *Vneshnyaya torgovlya SSSR* and calculations by Roland Schönfeld of the Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft, Munich.
[74] "GDR Contracts Cause Increasing Worry," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 21, 1990.

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ers, raising the total in immediate aid to prop up the Soviet economy to 20 billion Deutsche mark ($11.8 billion).[75]

Do all these Soviet–West German economic and financial agreements mean that (West) Germany has locked itself into a relationship of economic dependency on the Soviet Union? As in many other cases, politics and economics are linked. But to reduce the essence of the Zheleznovodsk and other bilateral accords to one of money in return for unification is to move from the sublime—and simplistic—to the ridiculous. The same applies to the idea of German economic dependency. The economic provisions are an important and inherent part of an overall accord but, indeed, only a part. To put matters in perspective, one should recall that the Federal Republic has established a special "unity fund" for the reconstruction of the East German economy amounting to 95 billion Deutsche mark ($55.8 billion) for the period 1990–94. Given the huge disparity in population, territory, and economic size between the GDR and the USSR, the 8 billion Deutsche mark ($4.7 billion) committed so far to the reform effort in the Soviet Union can be considered tiny, if not miserly.[76] The 1.25 billion Deutsche mark for the stationing costs of the Soviet forces are not a grant but will be exchanged for 225 million transferable rubles that, in turn, will be used to purchase Soviet oil and gas. As for the three Soviet–East German trade agreements, the first is too vague to establish binding obligations; the second is soon to expire; and the third does have some advantages for Germany since East German enterprises have had difficulty finding alternative Western customers for the commodities produced for the Soviet (and CEMA) market.

In the final analysis, success or failure of *perestroyka* will not depend on foreign aid, no matter what the scale. Success can only come through a comprehensive market-oriented reform program that takes root in the Soviet Union.

This plain fact has not prevented critics in the Soviet Union from voicing the suspicion that the new round of economic reforms envisaged by Gorbachev is "the subject of a political deal on the issue of the West's granting us the relevant aid."[77] Such suspicion is almost mild and polite in comparison to the often openly hostile and vicious attacks on Gorbachev, Shevardnadze, and Yakovlev that surfaced before and at the 28th CPSU Congress.

This raises important questions regarding the domestic criticism of the Gorbachev leadership's foreign and security policies. Will not a coalition of the military, party *apparatchiki,* and Great-Russian nationalists put a stop to Gorbachev's ideas on Soviet-German relations, forcing him to change course or step down?

The Soviet Domestic Dimension

There is little doubt that the developments in Europe have caused apprehension and anxiety in some sectors of Soviet society and politics. The reason for this apprehension is obvious. Twice this century, Germany succeeded in gaining a preeminent position in East-Central Europe. Twice, from that power basis, it came close to destroying the very existence of Russia as a sovereign state. At the threshold of the 1990's, it appears to these sectors of the Soviet public that history is about to repeat itself.

Typical of this mood is what one of Gorbachev's conservative party critics, Yegor Ligachev, told a party Central Committee meeting in February 1990.

> *I cannot but mention one other thing—the events in Europe. We should not overlook the* **impending danger of the accelerated reunification of Germany,** *or in fact, the engulfment of the German Democratic Republic. It would be unpardonably shortsighted, a folly not to see that on the world horizon looms a* **Germany with a formidable economic and military potential.**
>
> *Real efforts of the world community, of all democratic forces are needed in order to forestall the raising of the issue of the revision of the postwar borders and* **not allow a new Munich.** *I believe the time has come to recognize this new danger and to tell openly the party and the people about it.*[78]

The "new danger," in the minds of some Russians, is very much related with what they see happening in Lithuania and the other Baltic republics. Under the slogans of a "Nordic community of civilized peoples," they argue, an attempt is being made to isolate the "Russian State," the "Russian Empire," "the Soviet Union," or

[75]See the report by Ferdinand Protzman, "Bonn to Prop Up Kremlin Reforms with Loan Guarantee," *The New York Times,* June 23, 1990.

[76]Twenty billion Deutsche mark of the "unity fund" are considered savings due to the termination of special payments incurred because of the division of Germany; the rest is new money. See Ministry of Finance, Federal Republic of Germany, *German Unity: Fiscal Policy Will Keep to its Sound and Dependable Course,* Position Paper, Bonn, German Information Center, June 1990, p. 4.

[77]Question put to the Soviet foreign minister by a delegate to the 28th CPSU Congress, "Answers to Questions by Congress Delegates, E. A. Shevardnadze," *Pravda,* July 11, 1990.

[78]Ligachev's warning was published in the central press; see, for instance, "Speeches during Discussions of the Report. Ye. K. Ligachev," *Pravda,* Feb. 7, 1990 (emphasis added—H.A.).

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whatever the name given, and to "build a common European house 'without the dinosaur'."[79] Under such auspices, the secession of Lithuania from the Soviet Union would mean:

a step toward a return to the old political theater, to the classic collision between "Russia and Europe"—a collision heralded by the rapid increase in the weight of Germany and the simultaneous lowering of the weight of the USSR . . . .[80]

One of the assumptions underlying such fears is the notion that essentially neither history nor the Germans have changed. According to this perception, the Germans' "national character" has remained the same through the ages and continues to manifest itself in "their militarist spirit, and the racist ideology of superiority: *Deutschland über alles.*"[81] From this point of view, the "absorption of the GDR can be compared with the reoccupation in the 1930's of the demilitarized Rhine zone."[82]

Another fundamental assumption underlying the fears among some sections of the Soviet population and leadership is the idea that European politics must still be understood in traditional neo-realist "balance of power," or—much the same—traditional Marxist-Leninist "correlation of forces" categories. Such images are particularly prevalent among the military and the exponents of the "military-industrial complex." For them, the "new thinking" is but a different word for what used to be called "subjectivism" and "hare-brained scheming"; and the idea of the "common European home," which envisages the elimination of opposing military blocs on the continent, is but a "myth."[83] It is axiomatic to them that a mass pullout from Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary, let alone Germany, will upset "strategic parity with NATO":

We will lose ground and be that much closer to danger. If someone loses in parity then someone else naturally gains. Forthcoming changes in the Warsaw Pact of course mean losses for us from the military standpoint. All the theoretical discussions about changing from a military to a political pact are cold comfort. It's playing with words.[84]

To quote another adherent of such views:

we are leaving and NATO is staying and, as far as I can judge, growing stronger every day. I think that we should stop and look around for a moment to understand the disposition of forces in Europe; it is not tending toward parity.[85]

It is easy to understand that such assertions abound. What is difficult to assess, however, is the strength of such opinion and—even more important—its significance in the struggle over reforms and policy directions in the USSR. Will dissatisfaction and apprehension be channeled into political action? At the constituent conference of the communist party of the Russian republic (RSFSR) held shortly before the 28th CPSU Congress, it seemed that the hard line on domestic and foreign affairs was ascendant. If the 28th Congress had simply been a replay of that conference, it is difficult to see how Gorbachev could have agreed to the principle of a united Germany in NATO two days after the congress.

The main problem from the perspective of the conservative opposition is that it really does not have a realistic alternative to the course outlined by Gorbachev. This applies both to Soviet domestic and foreign policy. All the elections—to the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, as well as to the Moscow and the Leningrad city soviets—have shown a trend toward the radicalization of public opinion in favor of far-reaching changes, *not* to a return to the neo-Stalinist, bureaucratic one-party system. The measures, therefore, that Gorbachev is likely to adopt in the future are probably going to be radical and reformist rather than conservative or reactionary.

The point is that the old Leninist "left-wing" and the new Soviet "right-wing," i.e., the nationalist forces with their tendency to use jackboot and bayonet for foreign policy expansionism, have been thoroughly discredited. There is, to the extent that foreign observers are able to judge, a widespread conviction in the Soviet Union that the current economic predicament in which the USSR finds itself is largely due to the previous global military overextension and, domestically, to exces-

[79]Kseniya Myalo, "Lithuania: An Attempt at Breakup," *Novoye Vremya* (Moscow), May 16, 1990, p. 14.

[80]Ibid.

[81]Letter to the editor from Professor P. Kin, *Pravda*, May 20, 1990.

[82]Ibid.

[83]General Ivan Nikulin, chief political officer of the Southern Group of Forces, the troops stationed in Hungary, at one of the working groups on foreign policy at the 28th CPSU Congress, quoted in Paul Quinn-Judge, "Military Assails Concessions to West, Arms Cuts," *Boston Globe*, July 6, 1990. That such comments were made was confirmed by Shevardnadze who stated, "I was told that some comrades said at the section's session that the idea of a common European home is an illusion or a myth. Thinking like that means failing to notice what is going on around us and closing one's eyes to the facts . . . ." *Pravda*, July 11, 1990.

[84]Lieutenant-General Igor Sergeyev, deputy chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces, *Moskovskiye Novosti*, Feb. 21, 1990.

[85]Oleg Baklanov, the CPSU official responsible for military industry, *Rabochaya Tribuna* (Moscow), June 12, 1990.

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sive expenditures for military purposes. As for Soviet perceptions of Germany and the Germans, polls conducted in Moscow before unification indicated that only a small minority of the respondents felt threatened by the Federal Republic. To the extent that threat perceptions existed, they were of a "theoretical" nature or derived from the view that West Germany could be drawn into a war against the Soviet Union by the United States.[86]

For this and other reasons, the chances are reasonable that Gorbachev—even though he may be unable to change the opinion of his military, Russian nationalist, and ideologically orthodox critics—may at least be able to persuade them to accept the new realities. To try to turn the clock of history back in Central Europe would almost certainly no longer be feasible even if, as a result of a reassertion of power by the traditional Leninist "left" and the new nationalist "right," Gorbachev had to brake the momentum of change or step down.

Conclusion

For much of the last two centuries, the history of Russo-German relations has been characterized either by catastrophic clashes or by cooperation between two repressive regimes to stifle liberal aspirations at home and tendencies toward national emancipation and independence abroad. In the 19th century, Germans and Russians conspired to keep Poland partitioned and, in the spirit of the Alvensleben Convention, to crush Polish and other nationalist revolts in Europe. Reactionary cooperation was superseded by a disastrous war. In the wake of World War I, both Germany and Russia found themselves international outcasts. The "spirit of Rapallo" was born, only to be replaced by ideological hostility between the totalitarianisms of Hitler and Stalin, and the claim of racial superiority of the German *Herrenrasse* over the Slav *Untermensch.* A brief interval of contemptible and contemptuous cooperation under the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact gave way to another round of catastrophic war. This war led to Soviet domination over "Eastern Europe," including a part of Germany, for almost half a century.

In that last period, the record does not confirm the statement by CPSU Politburo member Aleksandr Yakovlev that "we always advanced the question of Germany's unification."[87] More accurate was Shevardnadze's admission that "we had grown accustomed to certain German realities. We saw in them a guarantee of our security. But let us think about this: Can a guarantee that is based on the artificial and unnatural division of a great nation be reliable? And how long can it last?"[88]

Perhaps the division could have lasted much longer. A vigorous reform program put in place in East Germany in the early or mid-1970's, supported by an early version of *perestroyka* in the Soviet Union, might have led to a viable and stable GDR. Such a development, however, was barred by Brezhnevism in both the USSR and East Germany.

Gorbachev's attack on orthodox ideological stereotypes, and his revision of images of enemy and threat, morally undermined both the system of Soviet control in East-Central Europe and the domestic regimes clinging to it. Their demise was thus only a matter of time and, in this respect, Shevardnadze was again quite right when he asserted: "Yes, we had in principle predicted all this. . . . In principle, we sensed this, we knew this. We felt that if serious changes did not take place, then tragic events would result."[89]

For the first time there is now, after more than two centuries, a realistic chance that tragic events will not recur in the relations between Germans and Russians, that the cycle of catastrophic clashes and reactionary cooperation at the expense of European neighbors will finally be broken; that a civil society will be built in both countries; and that the two nations will conduct their foreign relations in a civilized manner.

This expectation is based on the fact that 40 years after the successful introduction of democratic, liberal, and market-oriented principles in the western part of Germany, these very same principles are now being extended to its eastern part. This development coincides with the comprehensive revision of Soviet ideology, domestic politics, and foreign policy under Gorbachev. Its essence is a decisive shift toward European or, more broadly, Western civilization.

In the past two centuries, Russia was torn by a Slavophile and a Westernizing tradition. The Slavophile or Great Russian tradition was often characterized by missionary zeal for the extension of Czarist autocracy and

[86]Whereas 19 percent of the respondents felt most threatened by the United States, the equivalent figure was only 3 percent for West Germany; see "The Image of the German and the FRG in the USSR," *Moskovskiye Novosti*, June 18, 1989. The poll was conducted by telephone in Moscow, from May 12 to 14, 1989. The number of respondents was 851.

[87]*Pravda*, July 11, 1990. The examples that Yakovlev mentioned are "the end of 1945 or the beginning of 1946, and then repeatedly during the fifties." He said nothing about the ensuing 30 years. Even if one were to take his statement as being tongue in cheek, on the assumption that he was thinking of German unification under socialist auspices, his proposition is still questionable.

[88]Ibid., July 5, 1990.

[89]Ibid.

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Russian Orthodoxy to Europe and Asia, and this orientation seemed to reappear in the ideological ambitions of Marxism-Leninism. Under Stalin, it manifested itself in its most blatant form when "internationalism" was defined as "unquestioning and unwavering" support for the interests of the Soviet state; when Soviet ideology, science, and culture were declared superior to everything else; when Soviet hegemony was ruthlessly imposed on the Soviet Union's neighbors in East-Central Europe; and when the shadow of Soviet military power loomed over Western Europe. Brezhnev had merely continued this basic approach.

It is a change of truly historic proportions that Gorbachev has abandoned the tradition of Slavophile "uniqueness" and strongly denounced the previous ambitions of ideological and military superiority. Instead, he has demonstrated that he is firmly committed to cooperation with the existing institutions in Western Europe. If only for narrow economic reasons, this concerns the European Community, as its most influential entity, and the European Free Trade Association. But it extends beyond the economic dimension. It also includes exchanges between the Supreme Soviet and the European Parliament, the Soviet Union's desire for membership in the European Union, and a significant expansion of contacts at the scientific, technological, managerial, and cultural levels between the USSR and various European countries.

This opening toward the West, as noted, includes the United States and Canada. Equally important, it rules out the establishment or reestablishment of some kind of special Soviet-German relationship. Neither for Moscow nor Bonn (nor East Berlin) does Rapallo provide an appropriate frame of reference: German unification has firmly been placed, both by the Germans and by Gorbachev, into the European and Atlantic context.

Obviously, the tremendous obstacles which the supporters of "new thinking" and *perestroyka* are facing make the transformation of the Soviet Union to a civil society more difficult and worrisome than that which is taking place in Germany. Nevertheless, there is now in all likelihood a realization among the majority of the leadership and the population in both countries that they are facing historic changes and chances, and that their constructive cooperation is crucial for their own destiny and that of Europe.

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The 28th Congress of the CPSU

Giulietto Chiesa

The 28th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union undoubtedly represented Mikhail Gorbachev's most important political victory since he became general secretary of the party in March 1985. The 28th Congress constituted a crucial turning point, a watershed that definitively marked the irreversibility of the changes that have occurred in the Soviet Union over the past five troubled years. Of course, this does not mean that the Soviet situation is on its way to speedy normalization, or that the huge array of problems the Kremlin leadership faces has suddenly disappeared. On the contrary, the months and years to come will witness disruptive developments and great tragedies. But the 28th Congress will pass into history as the moment of the collapse of resistance by the most important and dangerous group hostile to change—the communist party apparatus. It is now virtually impossible for party conservatives to turn back the clock.

However, the party apparatus is not the only conservative force in the Soviet Union. Outside the party apparatus, a vast network of old cultural, political, and behavioral patterns persists against which the forces of change will have to compete. These patterns are the result of decades of "separateness" and "alienation," as well as centuries of Russian backwardness prior to the October Revolution. Forces for change must overcome, neutralize, and conquer the old ways with a weapon that is most unusual in Russian and Soviet history—consensus-building. But the "July turning point" warded off a greater danger: the attempt to grind *perestroyka* between an alliance of the conservatives in the party apparatus and the conservative and reactionary forces in Soviet society as a whole.

As I will try to show, the 28th Congress marked the culmination of a strategy aimed at neutralizing the hostile party apparatus in a struggle waged largely within the party and employing classic methods of party infighting. But it was also the first step in a new political era whose most essential characteristic is the existence of governmental institutions independent of the party and capable of bringing great pressure to bear on it. In other words, the congress confirmed an end to "the revolution from above," as it was clear by then that the communist party had lost its position as the main heir of *perestroyka*. The judgment of Boris Yel'tsin in his last public speech as a party member was shown to be correct: "This congress cannot decide *perestroyka*'s fate."

The 28th Congress concluded with a compromise, although in the end, this compromise was quite different from what the conservatives wanted. As the first party congress to be held since political circumstances had changed dramatically, the 28th Congress opened and proceeded in an atmosphere of the greatest uncertainty, with every indication that none of the participants knew on July 2 when the congress would end, or how. No one could be certain of having victory in his pocket. The time was long past when formal and "staged" debates hid ironclad agreements reached prior to the congress; this time the clash was open and violent. The opposing sides competed in public debate, under the eye of the television cameras, in the committees, and in the public statements of the leaders and delegates. This had never happened before in the entire history of the Soviet Communist Party. And from many points of

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

Delegates to the 28th Congress of the CPSU arriving at the Kremlin's Palace of Congresses.

—NOVOSTI from Sovfoto.

view it was a paradoxical clash, full of surprises, and—although dominated by *glasnost'*—full of mysteries that demand an explanation. The first and most important mystery is encapsulated in the question that many observers continue to ask: how could Mikhail Gorbachev emerge victorious from a congress that in large part was hostile to him?

The Mood of the Delegates

Symbolically, *Izvestiya* on July 2 began its coverage of the congress with a large page-one photo of the congress presidium, picturing Gorbachev at the center, very much alone. The situation was tense up to the breaking point, and it looked like anything could happen. About 2,800 of the 4,683 delegates made up the group that, in a genuine coup two weeks before, had transformed the Conference of the Communist Party of the Russian republic into a constituent party congress. As *Izvestiya* wrote, the 2,800 delegates still heard the echo of the stormy applause given on that occasion to representatives of the "initiative group" from Leningrad. They had imposed Ivan Polozkov, whom Yel'tsin had defeated for the presidency of the Russian republic, as head of the Russian party. They had been bold enough to attack Gorbachev strongly, face to face. They had applauded General V. M. Makashov. Now they had returned to Moscow with the intention of "getting back at" those they held responsible for the party crisis and for the "disorder" that reigned in the economy and the society. There were many—and no one knows how many—who wanted to "settle accounts" with Gorbachev in person, and they made no secret of their intentions.[1]

To understand the dominant mood of the Congress —and the difficulties of maneuvering politically to "lead it to reason"—it will be useful to cite some of the statis-

[1]Mikhail Gorbachev was re-elected general secretary of the party on July 10 with 3,411 votes in favor, and 1,116 cancellations. At that time, however, the fate of the congress had already been decided in favor of the Soviet leader, and it is rather likely that some of the delegates voted against their original intentions through a conditioned reflex or through simple political expediency, that is, lining up with the winner. Some days before, in fact, when the situation was still uncertain, Gorbachev had counted up more than 1,300 votes opposing him when he proposed himself as chairman of the Committee for the Reform of the Party Rules.

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tics furnished by Yuriy Manayenkov, chairman of the Credentials (*mandatnaya*) Commission. More than 49 percent of the delegates had joined the party before 1970, and a total of 47.9 percent had entered the party from 1971 through 1985, a period that encompassed the dreary years of stagnation under Leonid Brezhnev. Only 2.1 percent of the delegates had entered the party after 1985.[2]

Even more significant are the statistics on the social background of the congress delegates. More than 40 percent of the delegates were party officials.[3] The workers, in whose name the party apparatus was carrying on the merciless fight against the reformers, totaled only a very marginal 11.6 percent of the delegates (543). The peasants had only 255 delegates, or 5.4 percent of the total. All things considered, the situation seemed so anomalous (especially with respect to the traditions of the past, when "quotas" for workers and farmers were decided administratively by party committees) that it was decided in the end to "invite" 350 workers and give them the right to speak at the congress and to have a "consultative vote." This decision speaks volumes about the ruthlessness with which the selection of delegates was conducted.[4] The *apparatchiki* were quite aware that there would be a struggle at the congress, and they thought it expedient not to delegate to anyone the task of representing them.

It is clear that Gorbachev's supporters were not in a position to control the preparatory phase of the congress. That situation got out of hand, and on the basis of a new lineup of forces, the founding Congress of the Russian Communist Party in mid-June became the "dress rehearsal," a final "exercise" for what the conservatives hoped would be the decisive political offensive against the reformers. These party officials had come to understand that Gorbachev's program would put an end to the kind of society in which they had made their political careers and in which they—and only they—had flourished. They had no real alternative program, but they had singled out the main enemy, the author of their defeat: Gorbachev himself. Many of them—though not all—were under the illusion that if they could get rid of Gorbachev, they could save themselves. After two election campaigns that turned out disastrously for those in power, the administrators of the "party-state" finally understood that they had been "fooled." They came to Moscow with the firm intention of "demanding an explanation" from the top, of imposing a new leadership, and of reviving the party's lost authority at all costs. And they had only one kind of authority in mind. As Vladimir Volkov, one of the Leningrad "ultras," clearly stated prior to the congress, they sought to return to a "Marxist party of the Leninist variety."[5]

Political Strategies

But if this was the explicit and prevalent mood among the bulk of the delegates, behind the scenes a complicated series of feverish and convulsive maneuvers was being played out. The triumph of the party officials' "Vendée" at the founding Congress of the Russian Communist Party brought forth an avalanche of negative reactions throughout the party and the country. Numerous primary party organizations in Moscow refused to join the Russian party. Articles denouncing as illegal the decision to transform the party conference into a founding congress multiplied in the central press, and the voices threatening schism "from the Left" grew stronger.

In this setting, some of the more conservative elements became increasingly concerned that the 28th Congress might indeed include with a dramatic split. The conservatives warned of the risk that a victory would leave them to face the country's gigantic problems alone. They would have preferred to free themselves from Gorbachev, but they needed him. The most perceptive of the conservatives understood that the Soviet leader was untouchable. Gorbachev's defeat at the congress—despite his manifest fall in popularity throughout the country—would have had unforeseeable domestic repercussions. And the USSR's role in international affairs would in turn have been seriously undermined. Nevertheless, the conservatives did not intend to renounce the use of the powers they did have, and they were preparing to direct them toward a "realistic" political objective.

On the eve of the congress, the outlines of the conservative strategy seemed to be the following: Gorbachev had to remain leader of the party but with a man from the conservative ranks at his side who would take control of the party apparatus. A new Politburo and a new Central Committee, both elected by a sharply conservative congress, would make it possible to control the Soviet leader and, if necessary, to shackle him every time he tried to "have his way"—in the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, in the USSR Supreme Soviet

[2]*Pravda* (Moscow), July 5, 1990.

[3]Gorbachev was even more explicit. During the clash on the new party rules on July 9, he said to the delegates: "At least half the party officials are in here, and also 20 percent of the leaders. Yel'tsin said that ours is a congress of officials. It's true." *L'Unità* (Rome), July 10, 1990.

[4]Let one example suffice, that of Kuzbass. According to *Izvestiya* (Moscow), July 7, 1990, out of 52 delegates, 18 were party or district first secretaries, another 12 were secretaries of lower rank, and 13 were leaders. The working class of one of the most politically active regions was totally disregarded.

[5]*Rabochaya Tribuna* (Moscow), June 29, 1990.

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et, in the Presidential Council, or in the conduct of foreign policy. In other words, the objective was to "put a straitjacket" on Gorbachev and control his presidential activity via the party organs. This is not just speculation. The well-known publicist and political scientist, Andrey Nuykin, openly acknowledged this strategy on June 30, echoing an interview given by Andrey Grachev, deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee's International Department, to *Le Monde* on the preceding day: the Russian Party Congress was "the preparation for a silent coup by the party officials against *perestroyka,*" in the course of which "a new party was formed. It had no program and no bylaws, but it does have a central committee that is ready to go."[6]

At the same time, the leaders of the Right were vying with one another to present a moderate front. The head of the Leningrad party apparatus, Boris Gidaspov—who had distinguished himself the preceding months as the spearhead of the conservatives' revenge, the promoter and patron of the "united workers' fronts," and the sponsor of the "Russia Club"—suddenly defended Gorbachev in several public statements. Even the new leader of the Russian party, Ivan Polozkov, tried to present himself as a man of compromise ("whoever calls me a conservative wants to muddy the waters"), and announced that he had met Gorbachev and that he received "good advice" from him.[7]

More ominous, several signs pointed to how weak and indecisive Gorbachev's centrist group was in its response to the conservatives. Polozkov received immediate support from Yevgeniy Primakov, one of the most faithful of Gorbachev's allies, who suggested that Polozkov should not be written off prematurely as a "conservative."[8] A few days earlier, the first secretary of the Moscow party organization, Gorbachev supporter Yuriy Prokof'yev, had expressed the view that the 28th Congress would take place "in a completely different way" than the Russian Party Congress.[9] Boris Yel'tsin, by contrast, warned at a press conference on June 26 that the situation was extremely dangerous and strongly advised postponement of the congress.[10]

A plenum of the Central Committee confirmed on June 29 that only some of the conservatives were moving toward the center (more exactly to the center-right). The first secretaries N. I. Mal'kov from Chita, V. I. Potapov from Irkutsk, and G. A. Posibeyev from Mary, joined by V. I. Sitnikov, a former first party secretary from

Soviet party chief Mikhail Gorbachev confers with Ivan Polozkov, recently elected first secretary of the Russian Communist Party, during a break in deliberations of the 28th CPSU Congress on July 9, 1990.

—Wide World Photos.

Irkutsk,[11] were the first to demand and obtain "corrections" to the report that Gorbachev was to present to the congress the following Monday.

Meanwhile, Yegor Ligachev was brusquely relaunching his criticisms of Gorbachev. In an interview in *Pravda,* Ligachev said that there had been "improvisations" and "decisions not always thought through that are harming us." And as far as any judgment was concerned about the most controversial question, namely, the legitimacy of transforming the conference of Russian communists into a founding congress of the Russian Communist Party, he expressed the "certainty" that the "strong international traditions of the communists" will "show themselves, and more so be reinforced with the establishment of the Russian Communist Party."[12] This interview was the signal that Ligachev would not give up the struggle, that he intended to put himself personally at the head of the offensive against the party reformers.

For different reasons, neither Ligachev nor Yel'tsin, however, took part in the discussion in the plenum, reflecting the uncertainty that prevailed on the eve of the congress. Yel'tsin, meeting with about 400 delegates from the reformist faction, "expressed his con-

[6] *Komsomolskaya Pravda* (Moscow), June 30, 1990.
[7] *Pravda,* June 24, 1990.
[8] *Moskovskaya Pravda* (Moscow), June 29, 1990.
[9] According to what Pavel Gutiyontov wrote afterwards in *Izvestiya* on July 7, 1990.
[10] Press conference of June 26. *L'Unità,* June 27, 1990.
[11] Sitnikov—a follower of Yegor Ligachev—was dismissed from his position and sent to Mongolia as ambassador during the crisis of April 1988 that accompanied the famous "anti-*perestroyka*" letter of Nina Andreyeva, published in *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (Moscow), Mar. 13, 1988.
[12] *Pravda,* June 30, 1990.

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cern that the conservative forces, which are always more active, could find themselves in a position of superiority during the congress."[13] Yel'tsin, as has been seen, was anything but indifferent to the outcome of the battle that was about to begin. What he said in the press conference of June 26 is significant: "I have extended a hand to Gorbachev, and he too has made a step. Now our collaboration must continue to develop." The 28th Congress, he added, is the "last chance" for the party's fundamental renewal. Thus, Yel'tsin announced that he wanted to participate in the struggle and to postpone until after the congress the decision on whether he belonged inside or outside the party.

Gorbachev, for his part, was searching for a compromise with the moderate conservatives, and his introductory report reflected his desire to reach an accord with them. He was well aware that the situation was critical, but he seemed to think that he again could use the tactics that allowed him to win at the 19th Party Conference in the summer of 1988. His objective on the eve of the congress was to isolate the extreme Right using the moderate conservatives, even at the cost of "cutting off" the left wing of the congress, and giving it an opportunity to accuse him of having made a new pact of expediency with the party *apparatchiki*. And in fact, one of the leaders of the "Democratic Platform," Vladimir Lysenko, anticipated that every compromise with the Right, however disguised, would be a signal to his group to desert the party.[14]

If the Right was divided and still had not agreed on its tactics, the same could be said for the Left. The real power the reformers wielded was greater than the sum of their parts, but even the faction to the left of Gorbachev was divided into moderates and radicals and included all intermediate shades as well. The 400 or so delegates with whom Yel'tsin had met on the eve of the congress were much more numerous than the "Democratic Platform" group, and included many who were influenced by the call for action by 20 Komsomol delegates[15] protesting the outcome of the "Russian Congress," and several secretaries from the party's primary party organizations. But they were not fully convinced by Yel'tsin's tactics (still to be defined), and in part were looking for some indication—which was lacking—from the Gorbachev center. Only a fraction of the "Democratic Platform" group seemed to have decided in advance to leave the party. The others were waiting to see what Yel'tsin would do.

[13]Radio Moscow, July 1, 1990.

[14]Vremya (Soviet TV), June 29, 1990.

[15]The Komsomol delegates had stated that the founding Congress of the Russian Party was not legitimate, and published a joint statement in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* in the week before the congress.

Opening Salvos

The first skirmishing on procedural matters showed that the extreme Right was moving toward a split and that the moderate conservatives were not in a position to stop them. The clearest indication of this was given by a delegate from Magadan, who called for the congress to assume full power, the Central Committee to resign en bloc, and the entire Politburo to be excluded from the new Politburo to be elected by the congress. This motion—a direct attack on Gorbachev himself—was not put to a vote. However, the Soviet leader experienced defeat immediately thereafter when the report of each member of the party's leadership was placed on the agenda as the second item. This was act one of the "court trial" that was to dominate the first three days of the congress.

The overwhelming majority of delegates wanted Gorbachev to "stand trial." This "trial" would indeed take place, and under chaotic conditions. Agreeing on the demand for a "trial" were both the radical reformers and the reactionaries representing the party apparatus. The former intended to indict the conservative majority in the Central Committee and the Politburo, and to some extent Gorbachev himself, for slowing *perestroyka*. The latter worked for the opposite purpose: to condemn Gorbachev's closest collaborators and, if the situation allowed, Gorbachev himself, for pursuing reform too recklessly. Thus, the Soviet leader found himself in the center of a paradoxical situation: in order to defend himself and his followers he had to defend the organs that had constantly blocked his policies throughout the preceding five years. He defended himself and his followers by emphasizing that that all decisions had been taken jointly and that therefore the responsibility was collective. He was to repeat this main theme several times: "Today, when you read over the documents from the 27th Party Congress, you will see that reality has far surpassed even the boldest ideas we could have come up with then."[16] And later, in judging what the Central Committee had done, Gorbachev asserted that "decisions on all principal questions were taken unanimously in plenum," and then concluded, "we can say in all responsibility that the present Central Committee, elected at the 27th Congress, has carried out the tasks assigned it, in substance and on crucial questions."[17]

Gorbachev opened the congress with a report that raised the flag of prudence. He did not back off from

[16]*Pravda*, July 3, 1990.

[17](fn. follows on p. 29.)

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First Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev delivers the "Political Report" of the CPSU Central Committee to the 28th Party Congress.

—NOVOSTI from Sovfoto.

any of his principled positions; on the contrary, he reemphasized them in several places. But on many important questions, it was clear that the General Secretary sought a middle ground and tried to placate the conservatives. The "renewed communist party" that Gorbachev proposed to the congress was to "confirm the socialist choice and the communist perspective" and affirm "humane and humanistic ideals in general." It must exclude "chauvinism, nationalism, racism, and every other manifestation of reactionary ideologies."[18] At the same, time the party must free itself of "dogmatism," proceed with "persuasive methods," and be able to discuss matters and work "with all the progressive, social, and political currents of opinion in the country." Democratic centralism, in short, was again emphasized, although in terms more blurred than in the past. The party had to "respect the views of individual members," recognize "the right of the minority to have its own positions," and achieve "full freedom of discussion," although "the obligation on the part of all [to carry out] the decisions taken by the majority" remained.

Gorbachev also chose the middle ground in the hot debate over the "vanguard party" versus the "parliamentary party." "In advocating changes to articles 6 and 7 of the USSR Constitution," he stated, "the party has formally relinquished its roles of taking the place of government organizations and of carrying out administrative and managerial functions." In other words, it was to return "to the Leninist idea" of a political vanguard. But—and here Gorbachev made specific his polemic with the Right—both the claim for "a new privileged position" and the temptation to change terminology in order to leave things as they had been had to be rejected. In other words, the term "vanguard" was not a synonym for the old term "leading role." "We need clarity here," Gorbachev exclaimed to the assembly's hostile silence:

We believe that the [the party's] vanguard role cannot be imposed on society; this role can only be earned through an active struggle for the interests of the workers . . . . The CPSU will carry out its policies and will fight to preserve its mandate as a governing party within the framework of the democratic process, and via elections to the legislative bodies in the center and on the periphery. In this sense, the CPSU acts as a parliamentary party.

Thus, not only did the party organizations have to renounce the exercise of operative control of the govern-

[17]It is obvious that Gorbachev was replying to the attack Ligachev had made during the Russian Party Congress. In his speech on June 20, Ligachev had characterized the events in Eastern Europe as a defeat for the USSR. He had openly criticized the working methods Gorbachev had set up. Ligachev had also stated that "There is no collegiality in the Politburo," and had refused all joint responsibility for any decisions: "Nothing was ever said [in the Politburo] about Europe or Germany." He had opposed having a single person occupy the positions of president and general secretary: "You cannot direct the party without giving it all your time." Ligachev and the extreme conservative wing might seriously have thought of gaining control of the party's Secretariat and leaving Gorbachev as president, essentially for foreign policy considerations.

[18]Gorbachev here went so far as to make a statement that was entirely new, and pregnant with political implications: "In fact, what we have before us is a rebirth in the USSR of a workers' movement."

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Representatives of opposing tendencies within the CPSU at the 28th Congress: left, Yuriy Prokof'yev, first secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee and a proponent of reform; right, Boris Gidaspov, leader of the Leningrad city and oblast party committees and a voice for conservative forces within the party.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

ment's administrative bodies ("in fact, they no longer have such a right"), but also unacceptable was the party's use of social organizations as its "transmission belts."

Finally, Gorbachev distanced himself clearly from the Left's demands on one of the most important topics in the ideological and political dispute at the congress: the "depoliticization" of governmental bodies. Such depoliticization was rejected, he stated, but communists "must not claim exclusivity." The party's representation in the workplace, including the KGB, the Ministry of the Interior, other ministries, and the judiciary, "is a natural right of all parties registered by law."

This compromise did not ease pressure from the conservatives. The ovation that accompanied Ligachev's self-confidant report ostentatiously emphasized how cool the delegates were to the party's general secretary. Thus, when the most vulnerable speakers took the podium, most of the delegates unleashed their wrath. Secretary for Ideology Vadim Medvedev could hardly finish his speech. Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze had to defend himself from angry accusations that amounted to a rejection of all Soviet foreign policy over the last five years. Aleksandr Yakovlev—who, in spite of everything, managed to earn some noisy applause from an angry but confused and mercurial audience—spoke to a largely hostile congress that saw him as the main author of the country's crisis, of that "senseless radicalism" that Ligachev had denounced in his interview in *Pravda* on June 30.

As the congress progressed, it became increasingly clear that the delegates wanted to liquidate the "Gorbachevians" politically. Yuriy Prokof'yev—the leader of the Moscow party organization—also had to face the wrath of the delegates. Then it was the turn of Leonid Abalkin, vice-premier of the Council of Ministers. For almost five days, there was a "massacre" of the protagonists of change.

But the Gorbachev supporters did not take the podium in order to recite acts of contrition; on the contrary, they counterattacked. Yakovlev exclaimed that "You can shorten my life, but you can't prevent me from speaking."[19] Prokof'yev was not intimidated either; three times he started over again with a speech the unruly delegates did not want to hear. But it was Abalkin who threw the most unbearable fact in the face of the congress when he said that "What we have built up is not socialism."[20] Shevardnadze responded dryly to all critics: military parity with the West had been reached "by throwing the country into poverty"; the East European regimes were left to their fate because they were "totalitarian." To have acted differently, he continued, "would have meant giving up the principles on which we have reconstructed our foreign policy."[21]

Thus, the most "open" of Gorbachev's allies, the joint authors of "new thinking," showed no signs of retreating from their positions. They apparently even wanted to distance themselves from Gorbachev's effort to achieve a compromise with the moderate conservatives. But it was an ably constructed plot. The Gorbachevian reformers stated clearly what Gorbachev could not say. In fact, they were effecting a tactical withdrawal whose purpose was to avoid a vote in the congress against any one of them and to allow Gorbachev —once the pressure had lifted—full political recovery in the Presidential Council.[22]

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[19]*Pravda*, July 4, 1990.

[20]Ibid., July 7, 1990.

[21]Ibid., July 5, 1990.

[22]Yakovlev said in his first speech, "This is my last congress," leading many to believe that he was announcing his retirement from active politics. In his later meeting on July 4 with groups from the Left, Yakovlev specified that, on the contrary, he intended to continue full time as a member of the Presidential Council, and in fact he intended to return to the domestic issues (ideology, mass media) that he had been working on when he joined the Secretariat and the Politburo. Shevardnadze, for his part, thought he might not be reappointed to the Politburo. "It is not indispensable," he said, "that the Foreign Minister be a member." At the end of the congress, the extent of the reshuffle was to become crystal clear, as was the efficiency with which it was carried out. Pursuant to a plan made in advance, all full and candidate members of the outgoing Politburo had announced their intention not to succeed themselves. This was the case of Vitaliy Vorotnikov, Nikolay Slyun'kov, Lev Zaykov, and Aleksandra Biryukova. But Gorbachev placed all "his" men in the Presidential Council (including Vadim Medvedev, named (fn. continued on p. 31)

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But clashes at the congress revealed a split among Gorbachev's supporters. Some—either because they were not fully supportive of the Gorbachev line or perhaps because they were afraid of defeat—tried to open the way to further retreat, making it clear to the conservative delegates that they agreed with some of their criticisms. For example, when KGB chief Vladimir Kryuchkov, after a long review of the country's crisis, exclaimed that he did not feel at all a "happy man," everyone understood that this language was directed against Yakovlev.[23] Likewise, when Kryuchkov said, "Unfortunately we have to recognize that the danger of war continues to be a real one," and that "we should have no illusions on this subject, but they exist," everyone understood that this was a reply to Shevardnadze.[24]

But up to that moment, Gorbachev had no choice but to try to keep his heterogeneous group of supporters together, hoping that the fear of a dramatic split would also trigger concessions on the part of the Right. Some republic first party secretaries—who bitterly attacked the party leadership (as, for example, Nursultan Nazarbayev, the first secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan)—came out in favor of "consolidation" and for reconfirming Gorbachev in his "dual position." Many were enticed by hopes of enhancing their positions and therefore took the cautious approach of supporting Gorbachev while also criticizing him. Gidaspov delivered a thoroughly "Gorbachevian" speech, which recommended that the party recognize the "supremacy of the soviets." Even the speech by Polozkov was marked by moderation. After three days of noisy sessions that found the reformers on the defensive, the moderate conservatives thought they had victory in sight, and Gorbachev himself seemed ready to accept them both as a lesser evil and as a solution he was forced to accept. But all bets were not yet in, and Gorbachev was working feverishly on both wings of the congress in his efforts to change the course of events.

On the evening of July 4, Yakovlev agreed to meet with the four leftist groups[25] in an attempt to convince them not to break their ties to the party but to continue the struggle for its renewal from within. But he categorically rejected the naïve idea of presenting himself as an alternative candidate to Gorbachev as the party's general secretary. The Left understood neither the situation nor the strategies being used to confront it at the congress. But Yakovlev's gesture shed light on the intention of Gorbachev's followers not to burn their bridges to this section of the party. At the same time, Gorbachev —in a separate meeting—faced the first party secretaries from the districts and cities.[26] This group was the angriest among the nucleus of reactionary opposition, and the meeting turned into a dramatic clash. Far from the public eye, the first secretaries made no secret of their intentions.[27] Three days later *Izvestiya* referred to the event in the following manner:

During the meeting, there was a full-scale attack on perestroyka; *there was a total rejection of the policy of change; Gorbachev was openly asked to renounce [*perestroyka*], to "put things in order at last," and to return—in the words of one of the participants—"to the Andropov line." The clash between the President and the participants at the meeting became obvious. "If we do not agree on the political line," stated M. S. Gorbachev, "it means that we are not going in the same direction." He emphasized that as long as he was in command, the political line would not change.*[28]

The declaration of war was mutual. Any compromise with the extreme conservatives was impossible for two fundamental reasons. First, neither side wanted one. But this made the General Secretary's position even more precarious. It forced him to turn to the moderate conservatives, whose objective was not to get rid of the General Secretary, but "to turn back with Gorbachev." The likelihood of achieving that objective, given the tensions existing in the country, was very dim, but this strategy was the only one they could piece together, inasmuch as they had no credible leader to propose to

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by decree immediately after the conclusion of the congress), while the conservatives (and those who, like Georgiy Razumovskiy, did not show themselves to be trustworthy allies) disappeared from the upper reaches of the party.

[23]Yakovlev had said forcefully that he considered himself a "happy man," since he had pursued a policy that corresponded to his moral convictions. *Pravda*, July 4, 1990.

[24]Shevardnadze attributed to *novoye myshleniye* (new thinking) the merit of having eliminated from the international scene the indication of "a struggle between two opposing systems" and of having shown that the development of relations between nations "is not subordinated exclusively to the dynamics of the struggle between class interests." Ibid., July 5, 1990.

[25]These were: (1) the "Democratic Platform," (2) a group of delegates from the Komsomol, (3) the group of "secretaries of primary party organizations" who were trying to unite their forces within the context of the congress and put together a "Democratic Union" coalition, and (4) the "Marxist Platform" group.

[26]*Pravda*, July 5, 1990. Medvedev, Razumovskiy, Andrey Girenko, Yuriy Manayenkov, Yegor Stroyev, Ivan Frolov, and Ivan Polozkov also attended the meeting.

[27]The author learned from one of the participants that many delegates loudly demanded that newspaper and television representatives be sent away so they could "speak more freely." Gorbachev acceded to the demand after having objected that it contradicted the spirit of *glasnost'*.

[28]*Izvestiya*, July 7, 1990. The author of this comment, which was printed on page one, was Pavel Gutiyontov. The headline, "What Choice Will the Delegates Make?" expresses the prevailing uncertainty even among Soviet observers. No newspaper published a full report of this meeting.

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the congress, the country, or the world. Gorbachev, in his turn, knew perfectly well that the moderate conservatives could not make do without him. Their basic weakness was their inability to avoid this dilemma. Gorbachev hoped he could eventually overcome them as he had so often in the past.

Compromise with the extreme conservatives was also impossible for the General Secretary because it would have marked the end of his domestic popularity; it would have made permanent the break with the democratic Left. It would begin a period of dramatic confrontation between the popular movements that could no longer be put down with the old repressive measures and a party apparatus bent on revenge and regaining its power. This author has no reason to believe that there were direct talks between Gorbachev and Yel'tsin in this crucial period. However, it is certain that their respective supporters in the two opposing camps were talking to each other continually before and during the congress. It is equally certain that both groups understood the danger that would arise were the maneuvers of the moderate and extreme conservatives to succeed.

The Yel'tsin Card

A conservative success—even if under the appearance of a compromise—would have meant the defeat of Gorbachev. Yel'tsin could have profited from this defeat to clearly become the sole adversary of the party apparatus. But the price of such a victory would have been far too high for everyone, Yel'tsin included. The country, already suffering from a severe economic and social crisis, would have been overcome by an unsurmountable political crisis in the midst of an ongoing transfer of power from the party, which still controlled most of of the levers of power, to the new legislatures, which were incapable of absorbing power rapidly enough even if they wanted to. These considerations probably induced Yel'tsin to come to Gorbachev's aid.

The real turning point at the 28th Congress was the speech Yel'tsin gave on the afternoon of July 6. This speech showed a Yel'tsin very different from the crude provincial *apparatchik,* the impatient "populist," who had been expelled from the Politburo at the end of 1987. He had clearly been influenced by his experiences at the "Moscow Tribune" and in the "interregional parliamentary group," where he had exchanged ideas with Andrey Sakharov, Gavriil Popov, Yuriy Chernichenko, Yuriy Afanas'yev, Len Karpinskiy, and the other members of the reform-minded intelligentsia in the capital. He was now surrounded by more ex-



Boris Yel'tsin, president of the Russian republic, announces his decision to leave the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from the rostrum of the 28th Congress on July 12, 1990.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

perienced associates; he had enriched his political platform with democratic-liberal content that had been totally lacking before; and he had a more detailed plan for economic reform. But unlike the intellectuals with whom he had made common cause and who continued in part to mistrust him, he remained a professional politician, a profound student of the party's apparatus, tactics, and weaknesses.

His political astuteness was shown by the exceptional timing of his speech: it came at a juncture when Gorbachev's situation seemed to be seriously compromised, and immediately before the start of committee discussions on changes in the party rules and the new structure of the party's leadership.[29] Yel'tsin's acumen

[29]It is hard to believe that there was not a more or less explicit understanding on this timing with Mikhail Gorbachev or with one of the General Secretary's advisers.

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is also shown by his decision to address the congress in the midst of the conflict and not (as he could have done) at the end, when all bets had been made, and he would have been reduced to merely stating his disagreement and walking out, slamming the door. This choice was not without its dangers for Yel'tsin personally. He knew quite well how discredited the party was. The very fact that he was caught up in the battle could have harmed his personal standing in the country. But on this occasion, Yel'tsin was not thinking exclusively of his own personal interest. He realized that if his enormous political influence were thrown into the struggle, the outcome of the congress and Gorbachev's future could be changed. Moreover, he was aware that only his power was capable of changing the situation. He chose to act like a statesman and safeguard his country's overall interests.

Yel'tsin's speech was short, to the point, and even arrogant, in order to avoid giving the country the impression that he was too involved in a fight that millions of Soviet citizens (wrongly) believed was useless and hopeless.[30] It was a challenge to the Right, a challenge that Gorbachev could not have risked on his own. "The last few years," Yel'tsin declared, "have shown that we have not been able to neutralize the party's conservative forces." Why? "Because for too long, we have said that we are all on the same side of the barricade." This was the only criticism he directed implicitly at Gorbachev. The rest of his attack was aimed exclusively against the Right. "This congress," Yel'tsin continued, "does not represent the people, or even the party. It cannot decide *perestroyka*'s fate. At most, it can decide the fate of the party, or to be more accurate, the fate of the party's senior apparatus." If the congress were to conclude with the victory of the conservatives, who suffered from the illusion that they "were preserving the party's power and property," then the delegates should know what was awaiting them: "the struggle of all the people for total nationalization of the CPSU's property, a bankrupt party that will be called to compensate the country."

Then he made his last threat, which must have sent shivers up hundreds of spines already rigid with tension. He asserted that if the party apparatus, which arranged the congress in its image, were to win, there would be nothing to do but "begin the struggle to haul the party leaders of all levels into court for the damage they have done to the party." Yel'tsin concluded:

There are only two alternatives. Either there will be a party of the apparatus that inevitably will break up and sooner or later leave the only group of political forces that amounts to anything. Or a renewed party will be transformed into a union of democratic forces with some hope of keeping an active role in perestroyka.

The party must, he went on, change its name to the "Party of Democratic Socialism" and give up its positions in the army, the KGB, and all other government institutions. It must resolutely decide to become a "parliamentary party," competing on an equal footing with other parties and promoting dialogue "with all democratic and socialist forces" toward the creation of a "federation of national units."

There was a "way out," but it was a "very unlikely" one. Yel'tsin did not take the platform just to declare war, nor did he come to make deals. He realized that the country was watching him, and therefore he offered a difficult solution, one that was unacceptable to the extreme Right. But it opened up room at the center for Gorbachev and the moderates. The impressive silence that greeted his arguments and the fact that no one was bold enough to interrupt him showed that everyone understood the gravity of the risk. The siege by the anti-*perestroyka* forces had been defeated.

Gorbachev's Victory

From that moment on, the 28th Congress changed course. The powerful thrust of Yel'tsin's speech altered the balance of power, and Gorbachev himself could now take the lead. The flow of events accelerated rapidly. On July 7, the General Secretary succeeded in preventing the congress from considering a vote of no-confidence in the Politburo and Secretariat. In the morning, under the weak leadership of Saparmurad Niyazov, the first secretary of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan, a majority (2,557) had voted in favor of the motion. But in the afternoon, Gorbachev presided in person and, after having bitterly reproached the delegates, he called for another vote and won.[31]

July 9 saw another battle that Gorbachev led in person as head of the Committee for the Reform of the Party Rules. He arrived at the congress armed with an agreement obtained from the republic leaders, whose entry into the new Politburo he had ensured. The four

[30] *Pravda*, July 8, 1990.

[31] By now, the Soviet leader's attitude had greatly changed. "Are you aware of what you voted on this morning?" he said dryly. "Did you know what you were doing? . . . If you want to divide the party and bury it, you are on the right road." Gorbachev's proposal for a "collegial" decision was approved with 2,495 votes.

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Table 1: Composition of the Politburo and Secretariat of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, as of July 14, 1990

MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO

Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary, CPSU[1]
Volodymyr Ivashko, deputy general secretary, CPSU[1]
Mykolas Burakevičius, first secretary, Lithuanian CP[2, 3]
Aleksandr Dzasokhov, secretary for ideology, CPSU Central Committee CPSU CC)[1, 4]
Ivan Frolov, editor of *Pravda*[4]
Givi Gumbaridze, first secretary, Georgian CP[3]
Stanislav Hurenko, first secretary, Ukrainian CP[3]
Islam Karimov, first secretary, Uzbek CP[3]
Petr Luchinskiy, first secretary, Moldavian CP[3]
Kakhar Makhkamov, first secretary, Tajik CP[3]
Absamat Masaliyev, first secretary, Kirgiz CP[3]
Vladimir Movsisyan, first secretary, Armenian CP[3]
Ayaz Mutalibov, first secretary, Azerbaijani CP[3]
Nursultan Nazarbayev, first secretary, Kazakh CP[3]
Saparmurad Niyazov, first secretary, Turkmen CP[3]
Ivan Polozkov, first secretary, RSFSR CP[3]
Yuriy Prokof'yev, first secretary, Moscow City Party Committee[4]
Alfreds Rubiks, first secretary, Latvian CP[3]
Galina Semenova, secretary for women's affairs, CPSU CC[1, 4]
Oleg Shenin, secretary for organizational matters, CPSU CC[1, 4]
Enn-Arno Sillari, first secretary, Estonian CP[3]
Yafrem Sakalow, first secretary, Belorussian CP[3]
Yegor Stroyev, secretary for agriculture, CPSU CC[1, 4]
Gennadiy Yanayev, secretary for international affairs, CPSU CC[1, 4]

MEMBERS OF SECRETARIAT NOT ON POLITBURO

Oleg Baklanov, secretary for defense industry, CPSU CC
Valentin Falin, secretary for international affairs, CPSU CC
Boris Gidaspov, first secretary Leningrad city and oblast party committees
Andrey Girenko, secretary for nationalities, CPSU CC
Valentin Kuptsov, secretary, mass organizations, CPSU CC
Yuriy Manayenkov, secretary for RSFSR Communist Party, CPSU CC

[1]Member of the Secretariat.
[2]He heads the Lithuanian CP that is loyal to Moscow.
[3]Politburo member ex officio.
[4]Elected to Politburo on July 14.

paragraphs of the party rules regulating the structure of the new party leadership and the procedures for elections to it were approved by the congress after a voting battle that lasted more than three hours. It was decided that it would not be the congress, as the conservatives had wanted, but the Central Committee that would choose the Politburo and the Secretariat.[32] This defeat was the first for the Right. Furthermore, the new Politburo was to be much larger than the outgoing one. It would include all 15 first secretaries of the republics in addition to the General Secretary and his deputy, and according to Gorbachev, "four or five more people" chosen by the Central Committee (see Table 1). It was clear that this solution would significantly diminish the Politburo's role, inasmuch as most of its members did not live permanently in Moscow. So the Right failed to attain its second objective, which was to "surround" the General Secretary with an organ that could control his movements at close range.

But the Right was still trying to reverse the situation. Another change in the rules, proposed by Gorbachev, provided that in the interval between two congresses, party organizing conferences could replace up to one-third of the Central Committee's members. It was clear that Gorbachev considered the 28th Congress as an event to be put behind him as soon as possible and was already looking for more changes in the ruling organ of the party. He was particularly uneasy about the composition of the leadership body that could emerge from the coming final vote of the 28th Congress. It was equally clear that the Right meant to make use of its numerical strength at the congress to perpetuate its supremacy as long as possible. Thus, when Safargaliyev, a delegate from Alma-Ata, proposed a motion that if a party conference were called, the delegates "would be chosen from those attending the 28th Congress," Gorbachev reacted very harshly:

We cannot usurp power for five years. . . . If we do what Safargaliyev proposes we will put a stain on this congress that can never be erased. We would wipe out any good decisions that have been made here. It would be a very serious mistake. Think about it.[33]

The Right vacillated and split, so the motion was defeated with 2,582 votes opposed and 1,357 in favor.

The other two important innovations of the congress were the direct election of the general secretary and his deputy at the congress.[34] Gorbachev's reappointment was now a foregone conclusion, and an agreement on the party's "number two" had already been reached, in all probability, between Gorbachev and the first secretaries for the republics.

The speech that Gorbachev delivered on July 10, shortly before he was reelected general secretary, evinced a newfound confidence and confirmed a clear-

[32]The vote on this point shows the extent of the lineup against the General Secretary. The request by one delegate to reject the committee's motion was defeated by only 87 votes—1,959 in favor and 2,046 against.

[33]*L'Unità*, July 10, 1990.
[34]In the previous set of party rules, the position of "deputy general secretary" did not exist, and the general secretary was chosen by the Central Committee.

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cut change of alliances.[35] The difference in tone from his introductory speech of eight days before was enormous. Now Gorbachev directly attacked the delegates, denying any concessions to the Right. "Any return to the past is impossible," he said, "There is no dictatorship that can settle anything, but there are still people holding on to this stupid idea." In the harshest of his statements, the Soviet leader, often paraphrasing and almost quoting Yel'tsin, said that "if the party fails in its duty to renew itself thoroughly, it will lose its place in society." He did not pull any punches. "The main danger," Gorbachev said once more, "is that the democratic and progressive forces, which are now working toward radical transformation of our society, become divided." He concluded with an explicit challenge. "You should know, before you decide how to vote, that I will fight for a completely renewed Central Committee and Politburo." He also noted that this renewal "will be repeated at all levels."[36] The warning could not have been any clearer. After the congress, a battle would begin at all levels of the party, and many attending the congress would be defeated. They voted for him, nevertheless, confirming the apparent paradox of a conservative majority unable to win. The conservatives once again elected a person to guide them whom they regarded as their enemy, the main source of their troubles. Gorbachev seemed irreplaceable, as he was the only one who could protect them from a worse fate.

Yegor Ligachev's final and definitive defeat was in the last analysis the result of this insurmountable paradox. In a desperate attempt to overturn the results of the congress, he decided at the last minute to put himself up as Gorbachev's "controller" by seeking the position of deputy general secretary. Gorbachev had made it clear who his candidate was for this position. "It is my prerogative to appoint him, and I am choosing someone with my style and my opinions." Perhaps Volodymyr Ivashko was not exactly everything Gorbachev had claimed, but he was a candidate who calmed many of Gorbachev's moderate allies. He was also an experienced bureaucrat, sufficiently faithful to the General Secretary, and unlikely to take any rash action. Ligachev was well aware that an agreement on Ivashko had already been reached between Gorbachev and the republic first party secretaries. But he still decided to put his cards on the table, for the first time since beginning a long clandestine battle with the reform faction in January 1987. However, the time for mediation was past for Ligachev as well. His move to impose himself as Gorbachev's "controller" came too late, and his supporters were too disunited. It was a declaration of war against Gorbachev, openly proclaimed by a general who, perhaps because he knew he could still influence a large number of delegates, would not acknowledge his own defeat.[37]

A New Era

The 28th Congress of the CPSU changed the face of Soviet leadership against the will of the majority of delegates, defying the predictions of most observers and surprising critics on the Left who had given up on the General Secretary. There was no doubt that this victory was Gorbachev's, perhaps his most impressive and decisive of the entire five years of *perestroyka*. Confirmation of this victory, if there were any need for one, arrived on July 16, a few hours after the proceedings were over, at the end of Gorbachev's meeting in Moscow with West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl: the USSR accepted a united Germany's entry into NATO. The Soviet leader did not lose a minute in showing the West that he was entirely free of restraints.

But surely the congress represents something more than a political victory for Gorbachev. It was the beginning of a new stage in the difficult struggle to transform the party, which has dominated Soviet society since the Bolshevik Revolution, into "one of many parties" competing for power in the future USSR. The 28th Congress demonstrated the inability of party cadres to understand the psychological and political transformation that has taken place in Soviet society, where "politics have been restored" to millions of citizens, as Gorbachev had said at Krasnoyarsk in mid-September 1988.[38]

[35]Gorbachev made repeated references to Yel'tsin's proposals, explictly and implicitly. When meeting secretaries of local organizations the evening of July 6, he stated: "Many things in his speech are unacceptable. But I think we will find a way to an agreement with Boris Yel'tsin. The party's welfare is my first priority, and comes ahead of any personal disagreements." One of Yel'tsin's requests, however, was passed substantially by the congress. He asked to call a new party congress "within six months or a year." The motion that passed on the "preparation of the new party program" announced in item four a commitment to summon a "pan-Soviet conference, or a party congress no later than the first half of 1992." *Pravda*, July 14, 1990.

[36]The quotations from Gorbachev's speech are taken from ibid., July 11, 1990.

[37]Gorbachev, clearly disturbed at a possible change in battlefront, tried to the last to avoid a final vote on Ligachev's candidacy. Using the same procedure adopted during the USSR Congress of the People's Deputies in June 1989 to exclude the candidacy of Aleksandr M. Obolenskiy as president of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Gorbachev was first able to pressure the congress into excluding Ligachev as a candidate, with 2,293 in favor and 1,916 against. But the rigged result was too obvious, and a second vote put Ligachev back in the running, with 2,349 for and 1,846 against, showing how deep and dramatic the dissension among the delegates was. In the end, Ligachev lost in his bid to become deputy general secretary by a vote of 3,642 to 776.

[38](fn. 38 follows on p. 36.)

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This new phase also marked the end of the uncertainties that had paralyzed the Soviet leader over the previous year and a half. Perhaps forced by circumstances, Gorbachev seemed to have understood, right in the middle of a congress that threatened his downfall, that a "change of strategy" had become necessary. The difficulty of this undertaking, even during the hardest battles of the past, lay in the breakdown of the "relationship of trust" that Gorbachev nonetheless had been able to establish with his intended victims, the party *apparatchiki*. He had convinced them, sometimes flattering them and sometimes threatening them, that *perestroyka* was their "only" way out; that it was hard, painful, full of surprises, but inevitable. The unending change of leaders over the past five years represented an open wound in the troubled body of the disturbed and aggressive "ruling class," which lacked the means of analyzing the exigencies of the country's situation and could not formulate any alternatives to *perestroyka*. Furthermore, Gorbachev's strategy and tactics were ambiguous enough to lull them into the illusion of relative stability and, if necessary, of a peaceful exit from the scene, with the privileges for themselves and their families intact. It was not just a case of Machiavellian shrewdness on the part of Gorbachev. He himself came increasingly to understand that *perestroyka* implied a delegitimization of the ideological foundations of the communist party and the Soviet state.

The difference between Gorbachev and the party *apparatchiki* is that the Soviet leader is both part and parcel of their own history, sharing most of their ideology, and a "mutant," a product of the crisis history created, who has miraculously risen to the top of the party-state's hierarchy. Gorbachev's "dual nature" explains why he was able to surround himself with men like Anatoliy Luk'yanov, who epitomizes the stereotypical *apparatchik*, and Aleksandr Yakovlev, whose style is utterly alien to that of the classic party official. It was just these contradictions that allowed Gorbachev to appear "credible" to the party apparatus and induce its members to follow him on a path they did not understand. It finally became clear with the elections of March 1989 and the spring of 1990 that democratization was not just a superficial gloss over the socio-economic milieu in which the ruling class had lived and prospered, but a "change of regime." Ligachev had understood this from the time of the plenum in January 1987; in fact, the first great conflict within the "squad" created by Yuriy Andropov dates back to that period.[39] Many other *apparatchiki* came to understand later—too late—that Gorbachev's use of the word "revolution" as a synonym for *perestroyka* was no accident. The 28th Congress had begun under the sign of revolt simply because the political game was finally being played out in the open.

After five years of *perestroyka,* its essence has become clear. Gorbachev knew and knows well, and this congress confirmed it loudly, that many of his political opponents, because of backwardness, tradition, fear, conformism, lack of education, and the cupidity of the servile, did not know how to oppose the "chief." He knowingly played a role of great tragic import, that of one who won for himself a place in history and in the hearts of millions of desperate people by pointing the way to salvation, however difficult and uncertain that way is. The *apparatchiki* were still convinced they could issue orders without being held accountable by the people. But Gorbachev was obliged to use up his popularity day after day, in the tiring and dangerous task of dragging this backward, powerful, and belligerent party apparatus to reform.

Should Gorbachev have abandoned the party to its fate, as many have suggested? I believe his determination to serve as both president and general secretary, although he used justifications for his decision that might sometimes have seemed inconsistent—even laughable—to Westerner observers, derived from his awareness that any other way would have been catastrophic, with extreme human costs. His objective, which he defined over time as he became cognizant of the terribly complex political situation, is that of slowly dismantling the "monster" party-state built over the past 70 years. But his objective was not to engage in an all-out assault on this monster; its fall would have been and still would be traumatic for the Soviet people and for the rest of the world. His critics on the Left did not understand that Gorbachev's "sacrifice"—his position of permanent ambiguity, his need to engage in a seemingly infinite series of compromises that remained obscure and incomprehensible to the people—was indispensable in order to avoid a tremendous clash in the country and yet to "neutralize" the party apparatus. It may be that Gorbachev avoided telling "the whole

[38]Roy Medvedev and Giulietto Chiesa, *Time of Change*, New York, Pantheon Books, 1990, p. 226.

[39]In his speech to the Congress (*Pravda*, July 5, 1990) Ligachev referred indirectly to "two stages" of *perestroyka*. The first stage, he said, lasted three years. In that period, the Secretariat of the Central Committee, under his leadership, worked "with all its might." He places the beginning of the second stage in September 1988, when he—clearly against his will—was appointed chairman of the Commission for Agricultural Policy, and was deprived of his dominant position within the Secretariat. From that moment, he added, the Secretariat "did not meet for a long time," and that was a time of "lost opportunities." In reality, the struggle in the Politburo began with the launching of democratization, which had been decided upon at the plenum of January 1987. For a complete reconstruction of that phase, see Medvedev and Chiesa, op. cit., pp. 77–108.

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truth" to the party and the country for as long as possible. He did not even tell that portion of the truth he was familiar with, because to do so would have endangered his chances for winning a final victory. In this contradiction lay the source of Yel'tsin's popularity—in contrast to Gorbachev, he knew and could tell the truth.

Perhaps one criticism that can be made of Gorbachev is that he waited too long. But the course of the 28th Congress and the shocking cultural backwardness of the party suggest that he could not have proceeded any faster. In any event, the outcome of the congress firmly rebuts all predictions that Gorbachev had been overtaken by events. Once again, he showed that he could change as the situation warranted, even when circumstances required a radical alteration of strategy. For the first time since Lenin's day, the communist party faced an open controversy within its ranks. Not just 20 men in the privacy of the Kremlin, but hundreds of thousands of cadres made decisions in the open. For the first time, they directly felt the "liberation" that millions of Soviet voters had already experienced in the elections of 1989–90, when they dropped their ballots, with the names of party leaders crossed out, into the urns.

For the CPSU, the 28th Congress was the end of the period of "co-optation" decided from on high, of the filling of important party positions on the basis of rules set by an omnipotent apparatus. The failure of previous "renewals" was due to the absence of a true political struggle, the result of a system for promoting cadres that functioned as if in a bell jar, far removed from contradictions and social struggles. The party was left behind by new political elites that had been formed outside the party, in the vortex of democratization and *glasnost'*.

These new circumstances now impose a dramatic need for the acceleration of party renewal. The formal renunciation of its "leading role" already marks the end of one mechanism for the renewal of the apparatus. Important government positions have already been won by men who were brought to power by the new democratically elected soviets. These processes will rapidly spread throughout the country, and only where the CPSU clings to power with the old methods will they develop more slowly. But this move toward renewal is irresistible and in turn will bring forth a new wave of younger cadres as well as those more experienced in the new conditions of political competition.

Of course, these changes will not occur at the same pace as the processes taking place outside the party, where the forces set in motion are free from its control. But Gorbachev has stated clearly that the attempt to save the party has a deadline: the CPSU has two years to regain the trust of the people. At the end of this period, if it fails, it will have no choice but to abandon the helm to other forces.

Table 2: Composition of the Presidential Council of the Soviet Union, July 1990

Chingiz Aitmatov, writer and editor of *Inostrannaya Literatura*
Vadim Bakatin, minister of the interior
Valeriy Boldin, head, General Affairs Department, CPSU Central Committee (CPSU CC)
Aleksandr Yakovlev, former member, Politburo
Venyamin Yarin, former worker, member USSR Supreme Soviet
Dmitriy Yazov, minister of defense
Albert Kauls, chairman, Adazhi agric. society
Vladimir Kryuchkov, chairman, KGB
Yuriy Maslyukov, first deputy premier; chairman, State Planning Commission
Vadim Medvedev, former member, Politburo
Yuriy Osipyan, vice-pres., USSR Acad. of Sciences
Yevgeniy Primakov, chair., Council of the Union, Supreme Soviet
Valentin Rasputin, writer
Grigoriy Revenko, member Supreme Soviet, former first secretary, Kiev oblast
Nikolay Ryzhkov, chairman, USSR Council of Ministers
Stanislav Shatalin, economist, Academician
Eduard Shevardnadze, foreign minister

Gorbachev has now achieved most of his goals. Almost all of his keenest rivals have left the leadership bodies, and he has placed all his most dedicated supporters on the Presidential Council (see Table 2). Others who have obstructed him for years—Ligachev first among them—have left the field of battle. The groupings in the new Central Committee have yet to be identified. The composition of the Central Committee is certainly colored by the fact that it was appointed by a conservative congress, but like the new Politburo, it is too large and too disparate to be able to repeat the paralyzing maneuvers of the Central Committee elected at the 27th Congress, where 56 percent of the members consisted of the Brezhnev old guard. Furthermore, the current Central Committee represents a "clean slate" unprecedented in the entire history of the CPSU: only 59 of its 412 members were in the previous Central Committee.[40] A new generation of leaders has suddenly taken center stage; they are certainly better equipped than their predecessors to face the competition with other political forces that are now forming.[41]

[40]Forty-nine were full members, and ten were candidates, a category that has been abolished. This represents a turnover of about 85 percent of the Central Committee.

[41]According to Michel Tatu's careful analysis, more than one-third of the 412 members of the new Central Committee, 157 to be exact, were not on the list of the 22,000 "active" names in the SOVT computerized register. *Le Monde* (Paris), July 26, 1990. These data confirm that the 28th Congress caused not only a generational change in the political elite, but also a profound transformation of its outlook.

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Finally, the fact that all members of the government, including the head of the KGB, have remained outside the executive bodies of the party is another clear political signal: it confirms the importance of having state institutions remain independent of the party. Apparently this independence will be established gradually in the republics and throughout the periphery. The "double holding" of party and government positions, persists exclusively in the case of Gorbachev. But this is more a debt held by the government against the party than the reverse.

Another important feature of the new era is the development of a multiparty system. The 28th Congress eliminated the remaining obstacles, which were mostly ideological. This development will occur—and is already occurring—in ways and forms quite different from those imagined over the decades by Sovietologists around the world. This multiparty system will be different because it will have three main components. First, a "communist" multiparty system, which is already in place at the republic level, is destined to affect the entire CPSU. This multiparty system will take the form of a split in the communist party at the republic level (as in Lithuania, where two communist parties already exist), or as an increasing and unstoppable federalization of the CPSU, with the formation of many "republic" communist parties having different degrees of independence from the center. Second, with the formation of national fronts, a "national" multiparty system is already in place in nearly all the republics. Finally, a third kind of multiparty system will emerge from the social and class differentiation of radical economic reforms. This will produce the development of competing interests seeking "pan-Soviet" expression. This last type of multiparty system, similar to the European experience in the last century, seems destined to develop more slowly than the first two ones. The CPSU, provided that it is not swept away, will emerge greatly changed by these processes. It must learn to compete in the political arena with the only weapon Gorbachev (and Yel'tsin) have given it: that of building a consensus through the mechanisms of a government based on the rule of law.

A phase is beginning that will be characterized by a high level of political, social, and national turmoil. It would be naïve to suppose that great suffering could be avoided. The creation of a "civil society," which took several centuries in European countries, is taking place in the USSR at an accelerated pace. Conflict and tension are inevitable. The "radical" economic reform that Gorbachev and Yel'tsin are preparing to present to the country will emerge with the definition of a new "constitutional agreement" that will spell out relationships of reciprocal and collective sovereignty among the republics that will remain a part of the Union—or, more likely, the Confederation, or perhaps something else, with another name, given that already a certain number of former union-republics are neither "socialist" nor "soviet" anymore and will certainly insist on maintaining their present names. In light of the constitutional changes that will be made, republic parliaments most probably will have to hold new elections long before their five-year terms expire. It appears equally probable that a presidential election by direct and universal suffrage will take place within the two-year deadline set by Gorbachev. No one in the USSR doubts that if the election were to be held today, the country's new president would be Boris Yel'tsin. It is clear that he is already looking to hold that office. But to reach it unharmed, Yel'tsin needs Gorbachev just as Gorbachev needs Yel'tsin. For this reason, they have jointly battled and conquered the Right.

Boris Yel'tsin has kept faith with his role, and he made the gesture that millions of Soviet citizens had hoped and expected of him—he left the party. If he had not done so, he probably would have lost much of his popularity. But his move, which weakened Gorbachev, did not mean a traumatic break with the General Secretary. Yel'tsin does not propose himself, at least for the moment, as head of a competing party, but rather views himself as the representative and defender of the independence of democratic institutions above all parties. This position, which he has staked out for himself, is a calculated and shrewd decision that confirms his political development as a statesman. Looking back, one is reminded of what Gorbachev said when, as an apparent ally of the conservatives, he expelled Yel'tsin from the party leadership. "Perhaps there will be a time when Boris Nikolayevich will once more fill high-level positions."[42] And Yel'tsin himself wrote in his autobiography that "if there had not been a Yel'tsin, Gorbachev would have had to invent him."[43] They have fought each other for three years, and probably will fight again. But for now, circumstances force them to be allies.

[42]Medvedev and Chiesa, op. cit., p. 325, fn. 41.
[43]Boris Yeltsin, *Against the Grain*, New York, Summit Books, 1990, p. 203.

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A Colloquium

The Revolution of 1989: The Unbearable Burden of History

Jerzy Jedlicki

One of the primary concerns of the revolution in Poland, but also in the rest of Eastern Europe, is the past. Unmarked graves of the victims of the *ancien régime* are searched out; the remains are uncovered, scrutinized, honored, and then reburied in consecrated ground. Monuments are demolished; they will soon be replaced by new ones or by those that were removed half a century earlier. Former street names and, occasionally, names of towns, are being restored. Hated emblems are cut out of the national flag and portraits are knocked off the walls and trampled upon. The Polish White Eagle is regaining its lost crown. Leaders whose names are connected with a memorable national defeat or with a former national upheaval are welcomed back, dead or alive, as a covenant between the old and the new times. Other leaders hurry to rebuild their political parties, which were crushed and outlawed long ago. New statesmen are compared to the old ones: Václav Havel to Tomáš Masaryk, Tadeusz Mazowiecki to Ignacy Paderewski, Lech Wałęsa to Józef Piłsudski. An ousted king sends a message to his former and perhaps also his future subjects in Romania. The Polish president-in-exile in London awaits a solemn declaration of independence, after which he will return to the country he left half a century ago, only to vest the legal instruments of power in the hands of his democratically elected "successor."

The new republic in Poland will undoubtedly be regarded as a direct continuation of the prewar republic; what existed in between will be enclosed in historical parentheses as if the Poles had lived all that time in a coma or in a state of intransigent resistance to the Soviet-imposed regime. Contemporary history is to be rewritten, truth unearthed, children reeducated, responsibility established, and justice done. Newly emerging parties will no less fiercely argue about who is entitled to be the heir to the political legacy of Polish Peasant Party leader Wincenty Witos or National Democratic movement leader Roman Dmowski than about what is to be done here and now.

Unemployment is not going to threaten the historians in Eastern Europe, even if some of us will have to move to a research field closer to the interests of a larger public. These are indeed golden times for historians. But more seriously, what is the reason for this preoccupation with the past? Why are people becoming so excited when trying on this or that antiquated garb, or disposing of the debris of the past?

One answer is that all revolutions arouse historical

This article is based on a talk given by Professor Jerzy Jedlicki at a colloquium of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (Washington, DC) on June 20, 1990. Following the article, we present comments given on that occasion by Professor Roman Szporluk on Professor Jedlicki's talk. This essay, together with Professor Szporluk's comments, will also be published as an "Occasional Paper" of the East European Program of the Wilson Center.

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consciousness. A revolution implies a reevaluation of a nation's history. Moreover, however paradoxical it might at first appear, the bigger the leap forward, the more anxiously we look backward. We assimilate the unknown to the known and persuade ourselves that the unprecedented enterprise we have just embarked upon is but a repetition of an old and familiar pattern.

However, other factors also underlie this interest in history in East European societies. Under the communist regimes, a broad range of recent history had been so distorted or doomed to oblivion that the moment of revolution became a moment of revelation, a moment of truth. Nations are coming back into possession of their history, regaining their memory, discovering their soldiers' graves scattered all over the world, reconstructing their traditions, singing their sacred, long forbidden songs and, unavoidably, creating new myths and legends in the process. So our present revolution is no less conservative than it is radical, and its Janus-like face looks both ways—into the future and into the past.

The Labors of Sisyphus

But what if there is indeed a recurrence of historical patterns? After all, how many times in the last two centuries were the Poles (or the Hungarians or the Bulgarians for that matter) fighting, weapons or pens in hand, for their national independence? And how many democratic manifestos have been written by Central-Eastern Europeans (couldn't I just call them "Ceastropeans"?) at home or in exile? And how many times has censorship of the press been abolished? And how many times did each of the countries in this region take off on a new path of economic growth and modernization? Indeed, if all those peoples who live in the narrow space between the old Russian, German, Austrian, and Turkish empires share any basic experience and any common wisdom, it boils down to this: that no victory is ever final, no peace settlement is ever final, no frontiers are secure, and each generation must begin its work anew. There is no linear development in East European history, but rather a Sisyphus-like labor of ups and downs, of building and wrecking, where little depends on one's own ingenuity and perseverance. This sort of mild resignation—social psychologists call it "learned helplessness"—has been conditioned by a very real historical experience and has nothing in common with any fatalistic "Oriental metaphysics."

To be sure, this mood is by no means a general one. Resourceful, energetic people are certainly not lacking in either political or economic life. However, this passive attitude—resulting from the conviction that it is always "they" who decide our fate—is common enough to create a problem in the present period of revolutionary change.

Moreover, Poles have little confidence in the future. Some are not yet convinced that their nation is no longer a pawn in the hands of the big powers or an object of their patronage but has become an autonomous entity in both domestic and international politics. And yet, of the three main goals of each national revolution in Central Europe—independence, democracy, economic change—the first one, long regarded as the most distant and utopian, has been reached almost imperceptibly and with surprising ease, thanks to Big Brother's weakness and his newly acquired human face. Now that the Warsaw Pact's military control over the armies of its member-states is about to be formally renounced, one can safely say that the former "satellite countries" (unlike the seceding Soviet republics) are at last free of the Soviet grip, even if some of these countries grudgingly consent to tolerate the presence of Soviet troops on their territories for a limited period of time.

Still, the joy of regaining sovereignty is overshadowed by the feeling of insecurity. Some Poles fear the Russians: for does not history teach us that they never abandon what they have once conquered? Forced to withdraw today, they will return and retaliate at the first propitious moment. Poles also fear the Germans: for does not history teach us that their nature as ruthless imperialists will not change? And the specter of a new Rapallo agreement between the Soviets and the Germans appears to be the most threatening of all.

Some American commentators on East European events regard these fears as the irrational remnants of old prejudices created by circumstances that have long since passed into history; not so of course with their own worries and fears. For do they not warn that virulent nationalism in Eastern Europe is on the rise again, as it was in the 1920's? Is not Balkanization of the Balkans imminent? Will not 20 or so nationalities and ethnic groups, having broken the chains of enforced communist uniformity, rush at one another with their centuries-old grievances? Are not the Poles born and unrepentant anti-Semites? And does not history teach us that Eastern Europe, for all its admirable striving toward freedom, is always a red-hot caldron that one should stay clear of?

Of course, history teaches us all this and much more. History also teaches us that the Spanish are extremists inclined to slaughter themselves in bloody civil wars, that German patriots love their Kaisers and Führers and have no idea of democracy, and that the British cannot do without oppressing Ireland and the colonies. On top of this, however, history teaches us that historical

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conditions change, and national characters change with them.

A Return to Europe?

Yet, I cannot argue that Eastern Europe is now safe for democracy. As Bronisław Geremek has rightly said about Poland, "the prospects for freedom are secured, but those for democracy remain uncertain."[1] This is so, however, not because this part of Europe lacks a tradition of democracy. Even if this were true (and it is not), an argument drawn from history would provide a poor basis for prediction. Nations can learn democracy. They can also sometimes forget what they had once learned.

The drive to democracy seems strong in most of Central Europe, but there are still many people for whom this word means little, if anything. In the May 27, 1990, local government elections in Poland, for example, 58 percent of those qualified to vote did not go to the polls. This low turnout is disturbing: such a large mass of people alienated from politics could one day become prey to populist demagogues.

These demagogues are already on the spot. In Poland, freedom of association and of the press has brought a whole array of phantoms from the past to the surface of political life. Dozens of right-wing parties are trying to attract followers with the use of nationalist, populist, or slightly veiled anti-Semitic slogans. Their reappearance has alarmed enlightened public opinion: on May 7 of this year—on the initiative of Jerzy Turowicz, the widely respected editor of the Catholic weekly newspaper *Tygodnik Powszechny*—42 intellectuals prominent in Polish politics, journalism, and the arts and sciences met in Cracow, where they signed a statement against chauvinism, anti-Semitism, and the manipulation of Christian values for narrow political purposes;[2] the statement has found broad support among the Polish intelligentsia.

Understandably, Western experts and observers are sensitive to the undeniable threat that a resurgence of nationalism could pose to political stability and incipient democracy in Central Europe. One only wishes that they would pay equal attention to the resolute resistance offered to every public declaration of nationalist bigotry. After all, in Poland's recent local government elections, the right-wing parties won little public support. The Poles overwhelmingly voted for independent candidates or for those supported by the mainstream Solidarity citizens' committees.

"Of course," writes Adam Michnik, "the rejection of totalitarian communism must entail, to some extent, a return to the roots of national identity. This is precisely why one must ask what sort of roots they are and what sort of identity it is." Consequently, he distinguishes two intellectual or spiritual cultures that oppose each other in the 20th-century history of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. One is the tradition of xenophobia and intolerance based on social fears and resentments. This legacy can only lead to national isolation and stagnation. The other tradition is the one of liberalism and open-mindedness, the idea of a "return to Europe."[3]

A return to Europe! Every day the Polish press contains new articles about the conditions for our return to Europe. We return to Europe because we have just had our first free elections. We return to Europe because we expect Poland to become a member of the Council of Europe. However, we cannot return to Europe as long as our towns are dirty, our telephones do not work, our political parties are reactionary and parochial, and our mentality "Sovietized." Europe, then, is a measure, a goal, a dream.

A very old dream, one should add. It was dreamt as early as the second half of the 18th century when the Polish intellectual elite perceived that Poland had been left far behind the West European countries in every area, from agriculture and trade to the structure of government. It was precisely in that period that the geographical notion of the West acquired a special meaning as the center of a fast-changing world, of which such countries as Poland, Russia, Greece, and Spain became more or less remote and neglected peripheries. Similarly, at that time the notion of Europe began to shrink to the size of the few most advanced states, while for all others it remained more of an ideal than a reality.

The Ceastropeans responded in two ways to the challenge of modern civilization. Some acknowledged its superiority and eagerly learned from it; they borrowed its knowledge, ideas, institutions, technology, fashions, and customs, and they tried to imitate its achievements. At times, however, this response encouraged a contempt for their own national cultures as somewhat lower and less creative, or at least less mature, than those in Western Europe.

The other, defensive, response looked upon Western civilization as "false," cold, and morally corrupt, because it was seen to be materialistic, godless, mercan-

[1] *Gazeta Wyborcza* (Warsaw), May 8, 1990.
[2] *Nowy Dziennik* (New York), May 12–13, 1990.
[3] Adam Michnik, "Notes on the Revolution," *The New York Times Magazine*, Mar. 11, 1990, pp. 38–45.

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tile, and rationalistic. By contrast, our Slavic civilization, or our own native culture, even if less sophisticated, was seen as being organic, spiritual, humane, based not upon greed but upon true Christian values.

This dichotomous model is best known from the history of Russia, but to some degree it was omnipresent throughout East-Central Europe. Over the course of the second half of the 19th century, however, the Romantic apologists for native cultures gave way to those intellectuals with a strong sense of belonging to an all-European cultural community (which also embraced countries overseas that were settled by Europeans).

The intellectual elites of every East European country undoubtedly belong to the all-European family, even if they were frequently treated as poor cousins and often felt that they were. But what about their native countries, where did these belong? The Westernizers in the East European nations had to acknowledge their peoples' economic backwardness, civilizational primitivism, poverty, and illiteracy—the accumulated results of the slow peripheral economic development that began in the 16th or 17th century. In the early modern period the reinforcement of serfdom in most of Eastern Europe resulted in the petrification of feudal structures in these societies. The landlords who monopolized both international trade and political power did not allow the growth of the entrepreneurial and commercial classes, and hence they hampered the development of towns and industry. Consequently, the eastern part of the continent practically ceased to take part in the creative work of European civilization, by which I mean pioneering efforts in science, technology, medicine, social organization, the evolution of the theory and practice of law, political thought, etc. Polish scholars, for instance, lost touch with Western philosophy and science during the time of John Locke and Isaac Newton. And later it was very hard to make up for lost time. When closer relations were reestablished in the second half of the 18th century, there could only be one direction of influence: from the west to the east (or to the south) of Europe.[4]

There is no need here to recapitulate the efforts undertaken by the intelligentsias, entrepreneurs, and national governments to overcome underdevelopment of this part of Europe. Although this work was not in vain, the result was what is today called "semi-modernity": a peculiar blend of archaic and modern cultural traits that generates strong social conflicts and authoritarian temptations.[5]

Whatever the results of repeated campaigns to spur economic modernization and improvements in education in Eastern Europe, these efforts could not overcome the negative impact first of the centuries-long national and political dependence on outside imperial powers, then of the destruction caused by two world wars. Thus, there seemed to be no way of narrowing the gap between the two parts of Europe and healing the acute inferiority complex of the less advanced half.

Although imposed by force, a new order called "people's democracy" was introduced at the end of World War II as an apparently quick and efficient means of modernization. In Poland, the communists (then carefully avoiding this name) implemented a long overdue agrarian reform and nationalized industry, steps which at that time were generally regarded as preconditions for economic growth. They guaranteed everybody's right to work; organized free reading and writing courses for illiterate adults; founded new schools, universities, and theaters; built modern steelworks; and initiated the reconstruction of Warsaw, which had been destroyed by the Nazis. In sum, they made great efforts to be seen as a genuine party of progress, capable of mobilizing the nation's energy and making up for centuries of backwardness and social injustice.

No wonder that many of those who shared progressive and democratic ideals were attracted by this program, even if they had good reasons to fear and distrust the Polish, and more so the Soviet, communists. Once again there appeared the hope that Eastern Europe would be able to catch up with and even outrun the West as far as the material bases for civilization were concerned, and yet to create a new society, free of the exploitation of man by man.

The hopes soon proved illusory, and the price paid for this mirage was exceptionally high. The communist measures, instead of erasing the civilizational division of Europe, fixed it in all its dimensions. This is the crucial paradox of an extreme radicalism that began by bidding defiance to the world and ended up as an ossified system of thought and institutions that was impervious to change and reform.

So the communist countries in East-Central Europe came full circle. Measured by virtually every indicator of the quality of life, these countries were still at or near the bottom of the European scale. In the 1980's, they were even lagging behind those fast developing South European countries, such as Spain and Greece, to which they had previously been compared.

Statistics aside, every traveler coming to Poland from the West instantly perceives the difference between the

[4]For more on this subject, see Jerzy Jedlicki, *Jakiej cywilizacji Polacy potrzebują: studia z dziejów idei i wyobraźni XIX wieku* (What Kind of Civilization the Poles Need: Studies in the History of Ideas and Imagination of the 19th Century), Warsaw, PWN, 1988.

[5]Cf. Peter F. Sugar, "Ethnicity in Eastern Europe," in Peter F. Sugar, Ed., *Ethnic Diversity and Conflict in Eastern Europe*, Santa Barbara, CA, ABC-Clio, 1980, pp. 425–44.

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two; unfortunately, the difference is no less clear today than it was in the 18th century. Backwardness is not merely a result of poverty; nor can communists be blamed for everything, dirt, neglect, drunkenness, and bribery included. Rather, this backwardness is, in part at least, the legacy of the ages that neither capitalism, nor communism, neither "organic work," nor a revolution, neither economic incentives, nor evangelistic exhortations have as yet been able to overcome.

So now once again we Europeans on the eastern periphery are trying "to return to Europe," to the Europe of our dreams. These dreams are diverse. Many Ceastropeans dream about European (or for that matter American) wages, cars, and various other accoutrements of Western life; the " populace"—as the latest Central Intelligence Agency report on Eastern Europe informs—"is increasingly hungry for Western-style commodities."[6] Politicians and economists dream about our joining a united Europe, although Zbigniew Brzezinski is warning the impatient Poles about the dangers of creating a new myth: inequalities among nations, he argues, will not disappear in the common European home.[7]

For his part, the Polish poet and Nobel Laureate Czesław Miłosz, who has spent the last 40 years in France and America, is disenchanted. He simply cannot believe that the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe, who experienced nearly 50 years of totalitarianism, should now simply accept the supremacy of certain Western values: "Will the years of suffering under totalitarian rule be obliterated, erased and the people start from scratch? Should the thinkers, poets, and artists join their Western colleagues in the somewhat marginal role assigned to them in societies busy with selling and buying?"[8]

Other intellectuals—formerly in opposition and now in the government—have been dreaming, like Jiři Dienstbier and Václav Havel in Czechoslovakia, of a "better Europe," conceived of as "a friendly community of independent nations"[9] and the embodiment of certain values that we in the East have in short supply. Along a similar line, one Polish author wrote "that not so much our material or civilizational conditions, as the weakening or even loss of those values, which are a foundation of the European culture and tradition, have pushed us away from Europe."[10]

But from which Europe? "Europe"—reminds Adam Michnik—"is not only [François] Mitterrand, but also [Jean Marie] Le Pen; not only [Richard von] Weizsäcker, but also the German [neo-fascist] Republican Party. The idea of a return to Europe may carry with it a radical anti-Russian rhetoric . . . but it can also stand for faith in the Europeanization of the entire part of our continent, including Russia itself."[11]

So this guidepost, which points in the direction of Europe or the West, is rather ambiguous. All Ceastropeans want to leave behind, as soon as possible, the drab barracks of a "real no-longer-existing socialism." But the way to go is by no means clear. They know only one thing for sure: they must start from scratch.

Tadeusz Mazowiecki's government was the first to make the decision: back (or forward) to capitalism, free market, Europe, and the World Bank, as fast as possible, or even a little bit faster than possible. Many foreign advisers commend Poland for its valiant leap forward. First, say experts from Harvard, Chicago, and Oxford, it is generally agreed that denationalization of industry is the precondition for economic growth. Second, they say to the Poles, you have neither the time nor the resources to experiment, so you better choose a system that has worked elsewhere, and this system is free market capitalism. There is no viable alternative; go ahead and one day you will reach—so Jeffrey Sachs assures—an economy "very much in the style of the United States and even more closely in the style of Western Europe, [your] neighbors."[12]

By God, do not listen to the sirens' songs that lure you to the cliffs!—warns another group of advisers. You want capitalism? But what kind of capitalism? A free market? There is no such thing as a free market. In the 19th century, there used to be something close to it, but certainly "for Eastern Europeans," cautions John Kenneth Galbraith, "pure and rigorous capitalism would be no more welcome than it would be for us." Hence, this free market rhetoric betrays "a mental vacuity of clinical proportions." Nor should one listen to those "who see the promise of prompt economic betterment arising out of short-term shock and hardship." "This is a moment," Professor Galbraith continues, "of great and welcome liberty in Eastern Europe. It would be tragic indeed were liberty to be identified there with unacceptable economic deprivation."[13]

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[6]"Eastern Europe: Long Road Ahead to Economic Well-Being," a paper by the Central Intelligence Agency presented to the Subcommittee on Technology and National Security of the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, released May 16, 1990, mimeograph, p. 26.

[7]"Społeczeństwo rozważne" (A Prudent Society), a speech given at the Catholic University in Lublin, reprinted in *Przegląd Polski,* Weekly Literary Supplement to *Nowy Dziennik,* May 24, 1990.

[8]*Granta* (Cambridge), Winter 1990, p. 164.

[9]See President Václav Havel's speech to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, May 10, 1990. I used the Polish translation that appeared in *Gazeta Wyborcza,* May 11, 1990.

[10]Maciej Ilowiecki in ibid., Dec. 16–17, 1989.

[11]Michnik, loc. cit., p. 44.

[12]"A Conversation with Jeffrey Sachs," *Harvard Gazette* (Cambridge, MA), Mar. 2, 1990, p. 5.

[13]John K. Galbraith, "Which Capitalism for Eastern Europe?" *Harper's Magazine* (New York), April 1990, pp. 19–21.

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Others offer even more caustic appraisals. "Most of the free-market supporters in Eastern Europe would be utterly shocked at the poverty and social injustice imbedded in American society," writes Bogdan Denitch. In fact, the existence of a large underclass of outcasts living outside any civilization does not seem to enter into the calculus of those advocates of an unrestrained free market who like to see the world in black and white. "Nor does it help the prospects for democracy," to quote Denitch again, "that many of the reformist intellectuals in Eastern Europe have fallen in love with the idea of free market. From love of that idea almost as much suffering may be visited on Eastern Europe as has been for the abstract idea of centralized planning."[14]

Moreover, warn other critics, Ceastropeans have no chance to compete with any of the advanced modern economies. They cannot possibly catch up with the West. Poland, for all practical purposes, has fallen into the Third World and even lags behind many developing countries. And "as for the Third World," says Lawrence Weschler, "go ask Brazil or the Philippines or Mexico about the Triumph of Capitalism."[15] Indeed, the question of whether the economic reconstruction now under way in Poland would not bring its "Mexicanization" has started to arouse anxiety among the Poles themselves. In one recent discussion, two prominent Polish politicians even went so far as to wonder if the German-Polish border would become a European Rio Grande.[16]

This could easily happen. And if it does happen, we will again see the invincible Polish smuggler cross the "Oder Rio" under cover of night to barter butter for VCR's in the street dust of the Potsdamer Platz; or smart people of all ages and professions crossing that same river in order to seek some seasonal work so menial that it is despised by Turks or Moroccans. Crossing with them, however, will also be talented Ceastropean mathematicians, biochemists, and sociologists whom we export by the hundreds, free of charge, to European and American universities and laboratories.

Should the division of Europe not be overcome, there is no hope for stabilization and all the ghosts of the past will haunt the European home. There is no better breeding ground for parochial nationalism than economic stagnation, the feeling of helplessness, and the fear of tomorrow.

The Challenge

What future, then, can a skeptical Ceastropean intellectual predict for his country if he is to play the role of a prophet or a fortune teller (which he is so often expected to do)? Above all, he remembers what Edmund Burke and Alexis de Tocqueville knew so well: that there are many things—work habits, patterns of culture, beliefs, and prejudices—that revolutions cannot revolutionize. We carry the burden of the past on our shoulders, as both a gift and a curse. The historical legacy contains precious national values. But it also contains pernicious, non-functional traits that hamper progress. It is impossible to get rid of these traits at one blow, and one had better not try.

Yet, Ceastropeans should not yield to a historical fatalism that excuses all problems. If efforts aimed at modernization have failed so many times before, the only legitimate conclusion is that one must start again, especially now, when external conditions appear to be more favorable than ever before.

The task is by no means confined to economic recovery and transformation, important as they are. In order to keep pace with the more advanced part of Europe, Poland and its neighbors will have to develop their systems of communication, financial services, environmental protection, city management, health and welfare systems, education, scientific research, etc. All these areas badly need massive new injections not only of capital, but also of human energy, ideas, and skills. Both the enthusiasts of free trade and their opponents should have these civilizational needs in mind when they discuss the role of the state in the national economies of Eastern Europe.

Sole reliance on state initiative to solve pressing social problems has its own high costs, as the postwar era has shown. It is obvious that the communists' centralization of decision-making over the allocation of all resources prevented people from taking any initiative into their own hands, even with regard to their own neighborhoods. In Poland, only now are we witnessing the slow revival of voluntary associations to tackle public problems on the national and local levels. But it is still too early to say whether the new democratic government, particularly the city and commune councils elected in May, will be efficient and effective in sustaining this grass-roots initiative and public spirit.

But one must also beware of falling into the opposite extreme of the libertarian-conservative doctrine that wants to limit the state's initiative, means, and prerogatives to a minimum. In the conditions of poverty and un-

[14]Bogdan Denitch, "The Triumph of Capitalism?" *Dissent* (New York), Spring 1990, pp. 177–80.

[15]Lawrence Weschler, "Poland Takes the Plunge," ibid., pp. 211–12.

[16]An exchange between Minister Aleksander Hall (responsible for social organizations and political parties) and Sejm Deputy Adam Michnik during an international seminar in Pułtusk, Poland, May 29–June 1, 1990. See *Gazeta Wyborcza*, June 4, 1990.

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derdevelopment in Eastern Europe, such an approach could easily result in blatant social inequalities and a breakdown of the economic and cultural infrastructure.

If Ceastropeans really want to "return to Europe," they will have to first find and then maintain a balance between disruptive party politics and a strong, stable, constitutional government; between liberated market forces and corrective redistribution of wealth; and between national sentiments and an all-European identity. Even in optimal circumstances and with massive foreign aid, the entrapments on the way are many and success is highly uncertain. This challenge is great indeed, especially for the younger generation, which now rebels against the historical legacy it has inherited. Whether the best and brightest among them will choose to make something of this opportunity, and not try to escape its burden, remains to be seen. In any case, it may well be that raising our standards of civilization—both technological and moral—will take more wits, enthusiasm, and endurance than it took to cut barbed wire fences, pull down walls, and drive out dictators.

Comment

The Burden of History – Made Lighter by Geography?

Roman Szporluk

In his "The Revolution of 1989: the Unbearable Burden of History," Professor Jerzy Jedlicki argues that although the Poles and other East-Central European peoples won national independence during the revolutions of 1989, they still face very big challenges. They have yet to establish democratic systems that are effective and secure, and they still need to build modern, economically-developed societies.

In brief, says Jedlicki, what Poland and other nations of Central and Eastern Europe need to do, and want to do, is to "join Europe." Joining Europe is the key expression that sums up the totality of aspirations of the nations of post-communist Eastern Europe. But what does joining Europe mean? When did this goal first appear on the agenda?

All revolutions, says Jedlicki, are Janus-like: they look into the future and they draw upon the past. As evidence for this view, Professor Jedlicki reviews certain salient facts of East European history, and Poland's history in particular. He finds that the chasm between Western Europe and Eastern Europe existed prior to the 20th century. The rediscovery of national history—so strong a feature of all the revolutions in East-Central Europe—brings the realization that the problem of backwardness confronted the Poles and other East Europeans in the 19th century, and indeed also in the 18th and the 17th. The current agenda, therefore, for a post-communist Eastern Europe is an agenda of long standing.

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In the immediate postwar era, the communist authorities' great promise, and the most convincing argument for their legitimacy, was to overcome the historic backwardness of East European countries in relation to the West. After they seized power, the communists undertook a number of what one might call non-ideological, generally acceptable, tasks. They established schools, expanded publishing facilities, and provided opportunities to young people to find employment in the city and in industry. However, communist Eastern Europe, for reasons everybody knows by now, failed to catch up with the West. The fiasco of communism proved to be even more spectacular in the Soviet Union itself, turning the great promise of 1917 into a fraud.

It is the legacy of backwardness and underdevelopment that presumably constitutes the "unbearable burden of history" in the title of Jedlicki's essay. It has a pessimistic note because it suggests that the failures of the past may well be repeated in the future. Democracy is a very unstable form of government in the region, and this instability without doubt is related to the even more obvious weakness of Eastern Europe, namely, its economic, scientific, and technological backwardness. In a very real sense the nations of Eastern Europe are approximating a way of life that is generally associated with Third World underdevelopment.

Jedlicki's picture is very persuasive—but his recollection of history when it comes to Poland is both correct in what it includes and at the same time very one-sided. What he omits is the fact that Europe can have—and has had in the past—a different geographical dimension than the one he considers and that, he says, the Poles always aspired to join without ever fully belonging. By focusing on what today is generally understood under the term "Europe," Professor Jedlicki seems to forget about that part of Europe with which most of Polish history has been intertwined.

Poland and the East

When we look at the main phases of Polish history, we find that its most important milestones were those relating to Poland's eastern ties. It was one of the main goals of the communist regime in Poland after 1945 to remove from the nation's collective memory this basic fact of Polish history: that from the middle of the 14th century to the middle of the 20th century, Poland was living in a most intimate relationship with the peoples of the East, that is, with Lithuanians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians (and, to a somewhat looser extent, Russians). It is also worth noting that Poland's national character could not but have been influenced by the fact that the homelands of the Poles and of the three East European nations that formed the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were also home to an overwhelming majority of the world's Jews. In other words, the Europe in which the Poles lived, or perhaps we should say the world in which the Poles lived, was never confined spatially to a Europe that ended on present-day Poland's eastern border—the river Bug. One might further argue that the modern Polish national identity was formed precisely in those centuries when the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was a multi-ethnic state with large holdings in the eastern part of Europe.

In trying to make the Poles forget all of this, the communists were pursuing two goals. First, they wanted to shape Polish historical consciousness in an anti-German direction. The whole meaning of Polish history as taught under the communist regime was to amount to the story of an age-old Polish-German conflict and confrontation. Second, this concept of history and politics suggested that Poland's eastern neighbor was Russia, and that Russia would from now on be the guarantor of Poland's security vis-à-vis the Germans.

But we know that things are different. The Poles never forgot their historic ties to the East. We are witnessing, especially since the mid-1980's, a virtual mass phenomenon—an explosion of an emotional, sentimental, and partly academic interest in the East. Having been forbidden to think about Lwów and Wilno for decades, the Poles are now indulging in that interest in ways that sometimes might appear excessive. Many Ukrainians and Lithuanians are nervous about this reemerged enthusiasm. No doubt there are Poles who do harbor revisionist aims in the East. But this newly released awareness can be turned to constructive uses. The Poles could channel this renewed interest to restore their old historic ties with the peoples of the East. This does not mean that they should seek to recover those territories for a "greater Poland." What it really does mean, however, is that they would be wise to reestablish social, cultural, and especially economic relations with their eastern neighbors. If Poles establish such ties, they would surely be more in accord with the pattern of their history. That history shows them to have been in some, though by no means all, respects behind the major West European states; but at the same time, it convincingly shows them to have been relatively advanced in relation to the East. Let us also not forget that while throughout most of its history Poland was a country less advanced economically than the West, there were also many periods when its political and legal ideas and institutions were among the most advanced anywhere.[1]

Perhaps a mission for Poland now, at the end of the 20th century, might be the same mission that Poland

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successfully performed 500 or 600 years ago, namely, to serve as an intermediary between the West and the East, as an area in which certain new political, cultural, and social relations are being worked out. Thus, the unbearable burden of history for Poles could be made less unbearable by a revision of their image of geography. A new geographic consciousness concerning Europe might make the plight of the Poles easier and inspire them to active work. The Janus referred to by Professor Jedlicki should look not only to the past and the future. He should look as well not only to the West but also to the East.

Poland's Opportunity

The Poles could transfer their current relations with Lithuania, Belorussia, and Ukraine from what is mainly an attachment on an emotional plane to the sphere of practical economics and systematic, institutionalized relations in the fields of education, research, the arts, and popular culture.[2] The Polish minorities in those eastern republics could play a valuable role in that process. Similarly, the Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Lithuanian minorities in Poland could acquire a mission that would enhance their role within Poland itself and would also make it possible for them to help their co-nationals in the East.[3] Inasmuch as the Soviet union-republics are now energetically claiming the right to maintain their own foreign relations, perhaps it would be fitting in view of its history if Poland were to be the first not only to establish its missions in their capitals but also to allow the reciprocal establishment of Lithuanian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian missions in Warsaw.

Poland could also be useful as an economic modernizer in the East. Of course, compared to the newly reunited Germany, Sweden, Belgium, or even Spain, Poland is a weaker partner. But Poland has a great potential for change. In order to facilitate Poland's own progress, its own catching up with the Europe that it admires, it is necessary for Poles to see themselves in a larger context and not simply as a nation that needs to catch up with more advanced nations. If Poles widen the circumference of their European imagination to extend from the river Bug to beyond the Dnieper and Volga up to the Urals, perhaps they will feel less depressed. They will then discover that in relation to that half of Eastern Europe they are centrally located.

There are already indications that some Polish enterprises are establishing joint ventures in Ukraine.[4] Polish companies, perhaps with the support of Western capital, certainly could operate in Odessa or Donetsk. In his remarkable book, Professor Jedlicki asks "What kind of civilization do the Poles need?" and recalls the history of the late 19th–early 20th century, when Polish capitalists and entrepreneurs were penetrating even the eastern areas of the Russian Empire as far as Siberia.[5] Why could the Poles not take up similar efforts—and do so on a larger scale—now that Poland is united and independent, unlike in the 19th century, when it was both partitioned and ruled by foreigners?

Admittedly, among the big questions the Poles are now facing remain those about their place in Europe and those about their relations with a united Germany. These issues will not be solved by a new Polish *Ospolitik* alone. But a Polish engagement in the East, in addition to tangible economic benefits, is likely to provide psychological relief by alleviating the tensions and fears caused by this preoccupation with the West. One would hope that a realization that Poland not only needs to learn from others but in fact can also be an example and a teacher will provide the necessary climate for a more healthy state of the nation's collective mind. Perhaps the burden of geopolitics can be made lighter by psycho-geography.

Some might argue that this multi-dimensional en-

[1]Two important studies by Andrzej Walicki inform us how original and significant the contribution of Polish political, social, religious, and philosophic thought was when viewed in a broader, all-European context. See *The Enlightenment and the Birth of Modern Nationhood: Polish Political Thought from Noble Republicanism to Tadeusz Kosciuszko*, Notre Dame, IN, University of Notre Dame Press, 1989, and *Philosophy and Romantic Nationalism: The Case of Poland*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1982.

[2]In so doing, they would build on work already done by such pioneers as the Catholic intellectual milieux of the Cracow weekly *Tygodnik Powszechny*, the monthly review *Znak*, and the Warsaw journal *Więź*, which covered Polish ties with the East even under the most unfavorable circumstances. (In 1984, *Znak* was threatened with outright liquidation because it planned to publish a special issue devoted to Ukraine and Polish-Ukrainian relations. See *Tygodnik Powszechny*, Feb. 25, 1990.)

In the West, the Paris-based *Kultura* and its editor Jerzy Giedroyc made the "Eastern problematics" one of their central concerns. See Robert Kostrzewa, Ed., *Between East and West: Writings from "Kultura,"* New York, Hill and Wang, 1990.

[3]It is worth noting that the Warsaw-based Ukrainian-language periodical for students and the young intelligentsia, *Zustrichi* (Encounters), has just established a Polish-language version while retaining its Ukrainian name in Polish spelling. *Zustriczi*, No. 1, 1990, edited by Mirosław Czech, has just appeared.

[4]In addition to technical economic publications, much interesting material on Polish efforts to penetrate the Soviet market may be found in the popular Warsaw magazine, *Wschód-Zachód* (East-West), which, interestingly enough, also publishes items on Polish business ventures in pre-1914 Russia.

[5]Jerzy Jedlicki, *Jakiej cywilizacji Polacy potrzebują: studia z dziejów idei i wyobraźni XIX wieku* (What Kind of Civilization the Poles Need: Studies in the History of Ideas and Imagination of the 19th Century), Warsaw, PWN, 1988.

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gagement of Poland in the East would be a threat to Russia. Furthermore, would not Polish ties with Kiev, Minsk, and Vilnius damage Poland's relations with Moscow, on which, after all, Poland has to rely in order to contain a potential German threat, which many Poles still genuinely fear? Today, however, Poland's eastern engagement should be compatible with the security of Russia and, indeed, it should also extend to the Russian republic. A Poland engaged in the East need not in any way pose a threat to Russia; on the contrary, it might be an additional factor helping the "Westernization" of Russia itself.[6]

Conclusion

One of the deepest conflicts within the Polish psyche in the post-communist era, as I have tried to suggest, was not simply the conflict between a communist system—a politically, ideologically, and socially alien system—and the desires and preferences of the nation. Communism sought to destroy the core of Polish identity as it had been shaped by history—to wit, to deny, to obliterate, to amputate from the national consciousness Poland's historical, religious, political, and cultural engagement in the East. A Poland restored to real independence, a Poland trying to build a democracy and a healthy modern economy, needs to establish a compatibility between its practical, concrete, and specific needs, which can be summed up in the word "Westernization," and its deep and conscious (and unconscious) memories of those Eastern connections. A Poland that harmonizes its past memories with its present needs and future prospects will be a happier nation, one less burdened by its condition. Such a Poland will be able to take care not only of itself but also help others—just as it did in the great periods of its history.

[6]Without going into the very distant past to support this claim, let us note the undeniable Polish impact on intellectual and social developments in Moscow and Leningrad during the post-Stalin thaw. See the essays of Zvi Gitelman, Leon Smolinski, Zygmunt Bauman, and Deming Brown in Roman Szporluk, Ed., *The Influence of East Europe and the Soviet West on the USSR*, New York, Praeger, 1975.

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The Islamic Influence on Nationalism in Soviet Central Asia

Yaacov Ro'i

With the attention of Soviet authorities and of the outside world focused on nationalist awakening in the Soviet Baltic, Transcaucasia, and Moldavia, there is a tendency to ignore another active spot on the troubled Soviet periphery—Soviet Central Asia. Yet, nationalism has become a major force there as well. Indeed, the first nationalist disturbances of the Gorbachev period took place in Alma-Ata in December 1986, and although Soviet officials do not define Kazakhstan as part of Central Asia, to all intents and purposes the Kazakhs, who are concentrated in the southern part of the republic, are a Central Asian people no less than the Uzbeks, the Kirgiz, the Turkmen, and the Tajiks. And while Mikhail Gorbachev sought at one time to attribute this manifestation of Kazakh nationalism primarily to socio-economic causes,[1] just as some Soviet commentators and officials tended to attribute the 1989 disturbances in Dushanbe, the Fergana Valley, and Novyy Uzen'[2] solely to such issues, particularly unemployment and the dearth of housing, this analysis is not borne out by serious examination. It seems rather to emanate from an intentional oversimplification of an extremely complex situation.

The main issue this article will address is the connection between Islam and nationalism in Soviet Central Asia. Religion has been a force that has worked hand in hand with nationalism throughout the USSR, not least among the Great Russians themselves, and also markedly in Lithuania and Ukraine.[3] The late Alexandre Bennigsen wrote extensively on Islam as the central force of opposition to the Soviet regime in some of the traditionally Islamic regions of the USSR, particularly the Caucasus.[4] And there is a tendency to equate the two forces in Central Asia as well, especially since portraits of Iran's late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni were carried in all the above-mentioned disturbances.[5] At the same time, some of the leading Central Asian nationalist figures have consistently and adamantly denied any such influence or link. Certainly, the issue is one that is not clear-cut and demands careful investigation, perhaps especially so because it seems not to be an academic discussion but rather one that has political connotations, reflecting distinct vested interests.

The specific questions this article addresses are: What is the measure of influence of the region's traditional religion on the development of local nationalism, or local nationalisms? Has the nationalism of the Central Asians been meaningfully shaped by Islamic teachings and customs, or have nationalists adopted these

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[1]In discussing the Alma-Ata disturbances at the January 1987 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, Gorbachev insisted that nationalism in the Soviet Union in general and in Kazakhstan in particular was aroused by apparent discrimination in cadre policy and budgetary allocations. See *Pravda* (Moscow), Jan. 28, 1987.

[2]We shall return to these events in the course of this article.

[3]Not all Russians, Ukrainians, or Lithuanians have been or are believers, let alone are motivated in their nationalist activity by religious tenets or feelings. Yet there have been among them not a few people, some of them actual religious figures, who have seen in their nationalism a necessary outcome of their religious adherence and in their belief an expression of their national allegiance. I have written on some aspects of this connection in my article "Religion as an Obstacle to *Sblizhenie*: The Official Perception," *Soviet Union* (Atlanta, GA), No. 2, 1987, pp. 163–79.

[4]See, e.g., "Mullahs, Mujahidin, and Soviet Muslims," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November-December 1984, pp. 28–44.

[5]For the influence of the Iranian revolution on the Soviet Muslim population, see my chapter, "The Impact of the Islamic Fundamentalist Revival of the Late 1970's on the Soviet View of Islam," in Yaacov Ro'i, Ed., *The USSR and the Muslim World,* London, George Allen & Unwin, 1984, pp. 149–77, and a further chapter "Iran's Islamic Revolution and the Soviet Muslims," in David Menashri, Ed., *The Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World,* Boulder, CO, Westview, forthcoming.

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in order to increase their own sway and popularity with a population that has remained fundamentally Islamic in its way of life? Is Islam a factor that might bring the various nationalisms together? And, finally, why has the connection between Islam and nationalism become a political issue in the region itself and among certain clearly defined interest groups in Central Asia and in Moscow?

Islam in the USSR

To answer these questions, it is first necessary to examine the face of Islam in the Soviet Union over the past decade or so. This in itself is no simple task, since Soviet Islam really comprises at least three main trends: official, or establishment, Islam; various forms of unofficial Islam, in particular the Sufi brotherhoods; and Islamic tradition and folklore as preserved by the population as a whole. Moreover, in many places, the Islam that is practiced is a curious admixture of all three, so that in some ways the categorization is more of an intellectual exercise than a depiction of reality.

Official Islam. Establishment Islam—in the form of the four Spiritual Boards or Directorates set up in Tashkent, Baku, Makhachkala, and Ufa in 1943—has unquestionably presided over what one may well call the secularization of Islam in the Soviet Union. Established in part to prevent the creation of a single umbrella organization for the entire Muslim population of the country, these boards were given administrative authority over different areas, the one headquartered in Tashkent overseeing Central Asia and Kazakhstan.[6] Like the institutions representing other religions in the USSR, official Islam has sought its own ideological and existentialist compromise with the officially atheistic state to which it owes its creation and sustenance. It has insisted that Islam is not opposed to, but rather is capable of coexisting with, Marxism-Leninism, and has devoted considerable attention to expounding the possibilities of reconciling what would seem to be two inherently contradictory doctrines. It is also responsible for maintaining those mosques and seminaries (*madreses*) whose existence the Kremlin is prepared to condone, and for printing Korans and other religious literature when authority is given.

As part of the inevitable tightrope-walking of the official Muslim clergy (like that of the clergy of other religions), official Islam has tended to show considerable moderation in its requirements for the faithful's conforming to the five pillars of Islam—the forceful imposition of three of which (the *zakat,* the obligatory alms-tax; the *haj,* the pilgrimage to Mecca; and the fast of Ramadan) has been officially illegal since the 1920's—and the practice of religious rites. This flexibility has engendered compromise formulas that have ensured the continued adherence to at least a semblance of Islamic tradition. Thus, as is generally admitted by Soviet observers, virtually all Central Asians buried their dead and married in accordance with Muslim custom, and circumcised their sons, even prior to the 1980's, when many young Muslims in particular began seeking their cultural roots. Instead of being part of a gradual process of abandoning religion and embracing total secularization, then, the modernizing or updating of Islam[7] has enabled even those Muslims who are integrated into the Soviet system to observe Islamic practices as they understand them without sensing any fundamental contradiction between communism and Islam.

Although the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) has at times totally rejected the basic hypothesis of a possible compromise between the official religious establishment and its own political ethos,[8] there has, under Gorbachev, at least since early 1989,[9] been a tendency to attribute to Islam a generally positive role and to co-opt it in implementing some of the social goals of *perestroyka,* such as combatting crime, corruption, alcoholism, and drug abuse.[10] In a deteriorating moral situation manifested by the serious growth of social ills and malaise, this perception of the usefulness

[6]At the very beginning of 1990, a separate board was set up for Kazakhstan. See *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda* (Alma-Ata), Jan. 13, 1990.

[7]The idea, of course, did not originate in the Bolshevik period. The secularization and modernization of Islam were the basis of the reformist movement of the Jadidists in the late 19th and early 20th century. For some of the political ideas, activities, and dilemmas of one such person, Ismail Gasprinskii, see Martin Kramer, *Islam Assembled,* New York, Columbia University Press, 1986. For Jadidist activity in Central Asia, see Edward Allworth, Ed., *Central Asia: 120 Years of Russian Rule,* Durham, NC, and London, Duke University Press, 1989.

[8]A great deal of the CPSU's antireligious propaganda in the Muslim areas was directed specifically against the official Muslim establishment. See, e.g., Yaacov Ro'i, "The Task of Creating the New Soviet Man: 'Atheistic Propaganda' in the Soviet Muslim Areas," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), January 1984, pp. 26–44.

[9]The early Gorbachev period had been marked by not a few anti-Islamic statements, not least by Gorbachev himself, who on a trip through Tashkent in November 1986, demanded "a resolute and uncompromising struggle against religious phenomena" and reprimanded Communists who "pander to obsolete views and personally participate in religious rituals." *Pravda Vostoka* (Tashkent), Nov. 25, 1986. *Pravda* had commented several weeks earlier, on October 7, on the "complex religious situation" prevalent in Uzbekistan, while Tajik First Party Secretary K. M. Makhkamov had contended in August that "cases of teaching young people and adolescents the dogmas of Islam have become more frequent." See *Kommunist Tadzhikistana* (Dushanbe), Aug. 31, 1986.

[10]See, e.g., *Sovet Turkmenistany* (Ashkhabad), Mar. 30, 1989, quoted in Joint Publications Research Service, *USSR: Political Affairs* (Washington, DC—hereafter *JPRS-UPA*), Aug. 22, 1989; N. Usmanov, "Useful Points of Collaboration," *Kommunist Uzbekistana* (Tashkent), June 1989, pp. 47–48.

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Mukhamadsadyk Mamayusupov, the Mufti of Central Asia, at a 1989 press conference.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

of religious belief has been displayed with regard to other faiths as well, above all the Russian Orthodox Church.

One consequence of this change in regime perspective has been a certain improvement of the position of official Islam in Central Asia, such as the reopening of old mosques that had not operated as mosques for many years and even the building of new ones;[11] the reinstating of festivals like the Kurban Bayram (the Id al-Adha);[12] the publication of a religious journal in Uzbek that gives useful information concerning Islam;[13] and the appearance on the radio and television of Islamic dignitaries, who have talked about Islam as a whole and about its manifestations in Soviet Central Asia in particular. On April 25, 1990, the mufti of Central Asia, Mukhamadsadyk Mamayusupov, appeared on Moscow television and talked about the vitality and dynamism of Islam in the USSR, the general misunderstanding of Islam in Moscow, and the obstacles put in the path of establishment Islam by the USSR Council of Ministers' Council for Religious Affairs. These and other factors are conducive, he argued, to giving undue influence among a poorly educated public to charlatans who do not differentiate between faith and superstition.[14]

A few Muslim dignitaries, notably Mamayusupov, won seats to the Congress of People's Deputies in spring 1989 as delegates of social organizations, as did representatives of other religions.[15] Mamayusupov was also a member of a delegation dispatched by the Uzbek republic's party first secretary to the Fergana Valley to help placate the population in the wake of the ethnic violence that broke out there in May-June 1989.[16]

Perhaps Mamayusupov's most interesting action to date (early 1990) was his January 1990 article, or rather sermon, in the weekly organ of the Uzbek Union of Writers on the role of the husband in the family, certainly a sensitive issue in an Islamic society. In it, the new mufti used traditional Muslim rhetorical flourishes in referring to the Prophet and the Koran, and cited as sources Muhammad, the Koran, the hadiths, and the Caliph Umar. Mamayusupov depicted the family as a microcosm of society as a whole and discussed the role of the husband in patriarchal terms, pointing out that just as every society has a head, so too must the family, although the

[11]Thus, 15 new mosques were registered in Kazakhstan in 1989, and a number of mosques that had been closed down were returned to the community, bringing the number of officially functioning mosques in the republic to 63. See *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda,* Jan. 13, 1990. In the first six months of 1989, the number of working mosques in Uzbekistan grew from 84 to 144. See T. Osipova and T. Iskanderov, "Constitutional Guarantees of Freedom of Religion," *Kommunist Uzbekistana,* November 1989, p. 64.

[12]The imam of Ashkhabad, discussing the new attitude of the authorities toward the Kurban Bayram, said on Moscow TV on July 11, 1989, that for many people, the festival had lost its religious meaning and would now be celebrated as "a festival of the good union of Muslims." The imam's comments were translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-SOV*), July 26, 1989, p. 89.

[13]The first issue of *Islam noori* was published by the Religious Board for the Muslims of Central Asia in March 1990. The journal is to appear twice a month in two alphabets, the Arabic and the Cyrillic. Since 1968, the Board has published another journal, *Muslims of the Soviet East,* in six languages, including Uzbek (but only in the Arabic script, in which Soviet Muslims are not trained to read); moreover, the journal was distributed only abroad. On the new journal, see Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty (hereafter, RFE-RL), *Daily Report* (Munich), Mar. 5, 1990.

[14]See, e.g., Paul Goble, "The Mufti on Moscow TV," RFE-RL, *Radio Liberty Reseach* (Munich), Apr. 26, 1990; and *Ozbekistan adabiyati va san"ati* (Tashkent), Dec. 28, 1989, quoted in RFE/RL, *Daily Report,* Jan. 23, 1990. Mamayusupov was offically elected at the Fourth Kurultay (Congress) of the Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, held in Tashkent on March 14–15, 1989, after a public demonstration in February against the ineffectiveness of his predecessor. In his inauguration speech, he spoke of the reopening of old mosques and the construction of new ones, the need to improve the training of the clergy, an enhanced publications program, cultivation of ties with Islam abroad, and the elimination of superstition, fetishes, and the differences that had recently taken root among the faithful. See *Muslims of the Soviet East* (Tashkent), Nos. 2-3, 1990, pp. 2–7.

[15]*Financial Times* (London), May 16, 1989.

[16]James Critchlow, "Islam in Public Life: Can This Be 'Soviet' Uzbekistan?" *Radio Liberty Research,* Mar. 2, 1990.

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husband must, of course, not misuse his position.[17]

Unofficial Islam. The limitations traditionally placed by the Soviet authorities on the practice of orthodox Islam, and particularly perhaps the persistent dearth of mosques, on the one hand, and the strong social, cultural, and psychological tendencies prevalent among large sections of the Muslim population (especially in the countryside) that reject secularization, on the other, have led to the flourishing of a non-establishment, non-orthodox Islam.

A significant portion of this unofficial Islam is a by-product or offspring of Sufism. The traditionalist, conservative Sufi brotherhoods, which focus not on the mosque but rather on private prayer in the home or in unofficial houses of worship and on pilgrimages or other devotions at holy places, are basically *murid* or *dervish* and communitarian. By its very nature, Sufism propounded its own system of rites and rules for spiritual training, empowering the master (the *shaykh, murshid,* or *ustad*) to help the individual mystic reach higher levels of spiritual knowledge, as a result of which the master comes to command total obedience and fealty. Centers of opposition to Russian conquest and rule since tsarist times, the brotherhoods played an important role in the Basmachi movement that defied the Bolshevik regime in Central Asia in the 1920's.

Forced underground for several decades, the brotherhoods have reemerged with a strength, vitality, and dynamism that are manifest in their acceptance of large numbers of women adepts and their increasing attraction for the younger generation and the intelligentsia. As early as the late 1960's, the Long-Haired Ishans, the largest Sufi group in Central Asia, were said to be opposing the Soviet socialization of the younger generation, encouraging them to refuse Komsomol membership, to attend illegal religious schools, and to evade the military draft.[18]

The proselytizing achievements of the Sufis are evident from Soviet antireligious propaganda, which has continued even in the late 1980's to condemn the holy places of pilgrimage—often the tombs of mythical or real heroes, many of whom died fighting the Russians—where large numbers of adepts meet, perform the litany (the *zikr*), and are taught prayer, the Koran, Arabic, and the rudiments of Islamic theology. The brotherhoods are sometimes able to dominate the *jamat,* the village popular assembly, and other sectors of the population's private and collective existence. They seem, too, to be responsible for putting out a considerable Muslim *samizdat*—unofficial publications, both in print and in the form of audio cassettes (known as *magnitizdat*)—which propagates Islamic teaching, and for organizing religious study courses that are attended by teenagers and even younger children.[19] The Soviet media attack these "false mullahs" for various "malpractices," such as the practice of local traditional medicine and "sorcery."

The numbers of active Sufi practitioners or holy men and women involved are not known and do not seem to have been systematically estimated, but one may assume that they are fairly numerous. All the evidence seems to point to the conclusion that the adepts of this movement are much more numerous than the establishment clergy in Central Asia as well as in the Caucasus.[20] Moreover, although their natural sphere of action is the countryside, there are said to be numerous unofficial mullahs even in some urban centers.[21] At least some of the Sufi groups have specifically been described by the authorities as manifesting "a blend of religiosity and nationalism."[22]

In some areas of Central Asia, particularly but not exclusively in central and southern Tajikistan, there has also been a resurgence of Wahhabism, a Sunni fundamentalist movement that seeks to return to a pristine Islamic purity. Wahhabi mullahs are said to have accused the Soviet regime of pursuing a negative policy toward Islam, to have denounced the official Muslim establishment, and to have criticized the war in Afghanistan, charging Moscow with having invaded that coun-

[17]*Ozbekistan adabiyati va san"ati,* Jan. 5, 1990, p. 5, quoted in ibid. "If acceptable to the multitude," the mufti offered to provide further articles on other family matters. On March 16, Mamayusupov reviewed in the same journal the achievements "made with the help of Allah" in improving religious facilities in Uzbekistan, such as the opening of mosques and pilgrimage sites and admission of students to religious schools. He also discussed efforts to increase publishing activities and to import Korans. The Kirgiz literary weekly *Kirgizstan madaniyati* has similarly started a series on religion, entitled "Lessons of the Faith." See RFE/RL, *Daily Report,* Jan. 19, 1990.

[18]Saltybeldy Mambeltaliyev, *Perezhitki nekotorykh musul'manskikh techenii v Kirgizii i ikh istorii* (Vestiges of Certain Muslim Tendencies in Kirgiziya and Their History), Frunze, Izd. Mektep, 1969, p. 21, quoted in Allen Hetmanek, "Islamic Revival in the USSR," *Religion in Communist Dominated Areas* (Keston, UK), Summer 1968, pp. 83–86.

[19]On *samizdat* activities in the pre-Gorbachev period, see H. B. Paksoy, "The Deceivers," *Central Asian Survey* (London), Vol. 3, No. 1, 1984, pp. 123–31.

[20]In 1987, there were reported to be less than 30 registered mosques in Tajikistan as against no less than 1,000 illegal mosques. Some of the latter were explicitly built to serve as mosques; others were clubhouses, tea houses, or libraries; and still others were private homes, where believers came together to worship. See *Kommunist Tadzhikistana,* Feb. 28, 1987; also Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, "Sufi Brotherhoods in the USSR: A Historical Survey," *Central Asian Survey,* Vol. 2, No. 4, 1983, pp. 1–35.

[21]See Muriel Atkin, "The Survival of Islam in Soviet Tajikistan," *The Middle East Journal* (Washington, DC), Autumn 1989, pp. 605–18.

[22]See E. Filimonov, "The Ideological and Social Essence of Religious Extremism," *Nauka i Religiya* (Moscow), No. 8, 1984, p. 18.

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At left, an Islamic funeral procession passes through the streets of Samarkand, Uzbekistan, in March 1983 as Soviet soldiers look on; at right, mullahs at lunch in Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan.

—Photos by Stephen R. Burant and by Abass/MAGNUM.

try in order to turn the Afghans into infidels.[23]

Folk practices. These activities of what Bennigsen has called "unofficial Islam" bring us to the third category of Islamic activity—folk practices. Indeed, the dividing line between the two is often blurred. In addition to the ceremonies connected with the life cycle, which are definitely traditional in character,[24] and the celebration of the most important Islamic festivals, which is also widespread, especially in the countryside, where the majority of Central Asia's indigenous population still resides, a number of other religious or quasi-religious activities have become a common feature of Central Asian life.

For example, as elsewhere in the Soviet Union, local citizen committees dedicated to the preservation of historical and cultural monuments have restored not a few mausoleums of religious and quasi-religious historical figures.[25] The importance and attraction of these and other holy places are again evident from the descriptions in the media of pilgrimages to them as one of the most widespread "religious survivals" among Central Asian Muslims. These visits, together with associated activities of the Sufi *ishans,* are denounced.

Certainly, one of Central Asia's most famous holy places, the Shah-i Zindeh complex in Samarkand, has turned Qusam ibn Abbas, whose tomb is purportedly located there, into an Uzbek national figure, even though the site is visited by pilgrims from other republics as well. Similarly, the Kazakhs have embraced Ahmad Yasava, the first great Turkic saint and mystic and founder of the Yasaviyya Sufi order, whose tomb is in the town of Turkestan, as a Kazakh national saint, although the Kazakhs only appeared on the historical scene several centuries after his death. And in Turkmenistan, where the Turkmen tribal system has been largely preserved and is still headed by the so-called holy tribes, the cult of holy places has come to be intimately connected with the cult of ancestors.[26]

Official propaganda depicts women and youths as being the most closely linked with this folk Islam. The former have been traditionally singled out in this connection, especially since they are thought to exercise considerable influence over their numerous children—the proportion of women employed outside the home being much smaller in the Central Asian countryside than in most other areas or sectors of Soviet society. The young, on the other hand, have only recently been portrayed in Soviet sources as having a particular pen-

[23]*Kommunist Tadzhikistana,* Jan. 31 and Feb. 12, 1987. An Uzbek public figure, the writer Mukhamed Salikh, has said that Wahhabism is also taking root in Uzbekistan. From a lecture at Georgetown University (Washington, DC), Mar. 5, 1990.

[24]Certainly, for most young, urban educated parents who regard the circumcision of their sons as their duty, it is a social, ethnic tradition, a symbol of respect to the family and the community, rather than a strictly religious act. The celebration given by the family on the occasion of a circumcision or wedding is, indeed, a community affair, a sumptuous "happening" in which many, if not all, inhabitants of the town district (or village) take part, both in the strictly economic burden involved in housing and feeding the guests and in the planning and organizing.

[25]See, e.g., *Muslims of the Soviet East,* No. 3, 1980, p. 16. Once such monuments are designated part of the republic's historical heritage, they cannot be destroyed and the state is responsible for their maintenance. See Articles 27 and 68 of the Soviet Constitution of 1977 in Robert Sharlet, *The New Soviet Constitution of 1977: Analysis and Text,* Brunswick, OH, King's Court Communications, Inc., 1978, pp. 84–85, 96.

[26]Maria Eva Subtelny, "The Cult of Holy Places: Religious Practices among Soviet Muslims," *The Middle East Journal,* Autumn 1989, pp. 593–604. See also Annette Bohr, "Turkmenistan under Perestroika: an Overview," Radio Liberty, *Report on the USSR* (Munich), Mar. 23, 1990, p. 18.

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chant toward religion and religious practices. One such source, for example, claimed early in 1989 that in Tajikistan, 70 percent of the young (aged 18 to 30) are believers.[27] Since the establishment religion is virtually closed to them, or at least it was until *glasnost'* and *perestroyka* brought religious leaders around to trying once more (as of 1989) to provide for them, young people have tended to become involved in the more extreme, non-establishment forms of Islamic belief.

This interest on the part of the younger generation is attributed by some to the political events that have taken place in recent years in "other countries" of the Muslim world, notably Iran. It has also been suggested that the crudity and arbitrariness of Soviet antireligious propaganda, and specifically its stress on internationalism and its disdain for national customs and traditions, have merely added to the number of believers. This refers in particular to the period 1984–87 in Uzbekistan, when Rana Abdullayeva was the republic party organization's ideological secretary; she was particularly vociferous in denouncing idealization of the past and attempts to portray Islam as the custodian of national culture.[28]

Whatever the reason, the local media give the impression that there is a religious revival, an enhanced religious activism, in Central Asia,[29] even if Islam means different things to different people in different places throughout the region.

Nationalism in Central Asia

The collective consciousness of the Central Asian peoples seems to be simultaneously subnational, national, and supranational. In other words, they identify themselves at one and the same time, although apparently in different contexts and on different levels, as Tekke, Laqay, or Manghyt (just to mention some of the region's ethnic groups and tribes); as Uzbeks, Kirgiz, and Turkmen; and as Central Asians or (with the exceptin of Tajiks) as "Turks."

The tribal or clan consciousness seems to be particularly important in the area's economic, cultural, and political existence: collective farms are often based on clan kinship, while cadres are frequently selected for local party and government positions, as well as posts in scientific and higher educational institutions, by virtue of their tribal affiliation.[30] This tendency seems to be especially salient in two of the Central Asian republics, namely Kirgizia and Turkmenistan,[31] although one senior scholar from the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies has stated that the background to the disturbances in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, was a power struggle among different clan groups.[32]

Apparently, the broader, Central Asian, identity comes to the fore for the most part when Central Asians are in other areas of the Soviet Union or when they are in all-Union frames of reference. Central Asians in the armed forces, for example, when situated outside their own region are seen and see themselves first and foremost as Central Asians, rather than as Tajiks or Kirgiz.

At the same time, quite a few members of the intellectual elites among the Turkic peoples are beginning to refer to themselves as Turks and see their Turkic identity as a potential rallying point. That Pan-Turkism has perhaps some appeal for the local population may be inferred from the anti-Armenian slogans that have appeared in some of the Central Asian disturbances, for example, in Ashkhabad and Nebit-Dag in May 1989, and from the general feeling of solidarity with the Azeris in their quarrel with the Armenians.[33]

Nonetheless, the basic unit of national identity of the Central Asians continues to be the national ethnic group as defined by the Soviet authorities, in the sense that every Soviet citizen is identified by nationality in his documents. Within these units, it was the local intelligentsias that first developed a strong consciousness of national self-identity. These groups were largely urban and impregnated with the values of the Soviet system, under whose aegis they had received their entire edu-

[27]L. Bashirov, "Islam in Our Times," *Slovo Lektora* (Moscow), No. 1, 1989, pp. 30–40.

[28]*Pravda Vostoka*, May 10, 1986; also Murad Mukhammad-Dost, "Competitors for 'Indulgences'," *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (Moscow), Feb. 8, 1989.

[29]See, e.g., *Sovet Turkmenistany*, Feb. 16, 1990.

[30]In this section, I have borrowed from an article I have written, based on a lecture I gave at the III European Seminar on Central Asian Studies in June 1989 in Paris. This article is to be published in the *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique*. The author is grateful to Dr. Rémy Dor, who was coordinator of the seminar and is responsible for the publication of the papers given there, for permission to draw upon this article here.

[31]See, e.g., Annette Bohr, "Turkmenistan under Perestroika."

[32]Yuriy Gankovskiy, answering a question during a public appearance at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC, on April 9, 1990, said that for the last 60 to 65 years, all leading positions in Tajikistan have been occupied by leaders from the Leninabad area in the northern part of the republic, which has made leaders from the south "unhappy," and that this competition between local elites is the backdrop against which social and political unrest in Tajikistan must be seen. He was referring in particular to the disturbances of February 12–14, 1990, in which demonstrators called for the resignation of the republic leadership. According to the official figures, the casualties (including 23 deaths) totalled 565, of which 226 were Tajiks; 202, Russians; and the rest, of other nationalities.

[33]See Annette Bohr, "New Information on May Riots in Ashkhabad and Nebit-Dag," *Report on the USSR*, July 21, 1989, pp. 40–41. The non-Turkic Tajiks, by contrast, have tended to show sympathy for the Armenians. This fact highlights the cynical and provocative nature of rumors surfacing in February 1990 that Armenian refugees from the violence in Azerbaijan were to be given scarce housing in the Tajik capital of Dushanbe.

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cation and within which perforce they were endeavoring to operate. Secularism came to be an essential part of their credo, as did a fundamental loyalty to the Soviet Union, even as the local elites sparred to strengthen their own position and that of their republics vis-à-vis each other and vis-à-vis Moscow. The goal was basically to consolidate the power base of the local elites in their own republics and to receive budgetary allocations from the center that would facilitate local economic and social development.

In reviving and highlighting their respective national cultures, Central Asian intellectuals have seemed intent on demonstrating the fundamental human values embedded in these cultures against the backdrop of the cultural values prevalent among their peers throughout the USSR and particularly in Moscow. One such Central Asian figure assured me personally that insofar as Islam played any role in his nation's culture, it was as a guardian of ethical values, by which he probably meant that Islam could, on the one hand, be used to fight alcoholism, drugs, crime, and corruption and, on the other hand, take up the issue of the very serious ecological problems with which Central Asians—both the nationalists and the establishment officials—are grappling.[34]

Yet, even for intellectuals in Central Asia, as for their counterparts in other Soviet republics, the search for national traditions inevitably leads back to religious motifs.[35] In this context, Central Asians dwell on the progressive and creative aspects of Islamic thought and philosophy over the centuries, resent any apparent discrimination against Islam as compared with other religions, and present themselves as the heirs of Islamic tradition.[36] Current Central Asian writers and scholars are demanding a more positive evaluation of Islam. They insist that their ancestors lived in a religious environment and that the region's great scholars (al-Biruni, Ibn Sina, Ulughbek) were influenced by the Koran in the formulation of their world views. Both the Uzbek writer Nadir Narmatov and the literary scholar Azad Sharafaddinov object to dismissing classic Uzbek poets or works of art as reactionary because of their positive depiction of Islam or because they propagated Sufi ideas.[37]



The Shah i-Zindeh complex of mausoleums in Samarkand, the object of Islamic pilgrimages and historic national identifications.

TASS from Sovfoto.

Central Asian nationalism has not to date been solely, or even mainly, Islamic in nature. It has a number of other components. It has long been and remains today on the whole xenophobic, above all anti-Russian, as was made quite clear at some of the recent demonstrations.[38] The Central Asian elites have been jealous of any infringement on what they see as their due rights or perquisites with regard to appointments to local official positions, and have resented their lack of authority in decision-making on internal republic issues, including

[34]The Kazakh writer, Olzhas Suleymenov, for instance, initiated the Nevada-Semipalatinsk Movement to protest nuclear sites and testing in Kazakhstan and has had great success in his endeavors. For some of the principles that contribute to an Islamic environmental ethic, which has become an issue in a number of Islamic forums in recent years, see S. Parvez Manzoor, "Environment and Values: the Islamic Perspective," in Ziauddin Sardar, Ed., *The Touch of Midas*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1984, pp. 150–69. For some of the ecological problems that have been troubling Central Asians, see "The Greening of the Soviet Moslems," *The Middle East* (London), November 1989, p. 23.

[35]See, e.g., Chingiz Aitmatov, *The Day Lasts More Than a Hundred Years*, Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1983.

[36]See, e.g., an article by the Uzbek writer Adyl Yakubov in *Pravda Vostoka*, May 6, 1988; N. Usmanov, loc. cit.; and *Ozbekistan adabiyati va san"ati*, cited in Critchlow, loc. cit.

[37]William Fierman, "*Glasnost'* in Practice: The Uzbek Experience," *Central Asian Survey*, No. 2, 1989, pp. 10–11.

[38]As early as 1969 at the so-called Pakhtakor riots in Tashkent, slogans had been brandished saying "Russians, Go Home!" See Boris Kamenetskiy, *Rusifikatsiya i natsional'noye vozrozhdeniye v Uzbekistane* (Russification and National Rebirth in Uzbekistan), Tel Aviv, private edition, 1987. The xenophobia was manifest not only in the Fergana Valley pogroms but also in Novyy Uzen', where Kazakhs lacking housing and employment turned against unidentified Caucasians who had allegedly been given both homes and work at the expense of the indigenous population.

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education, art, literature, and religion.[39]

The dissatisfaction of the central party establishment and Gorbachev personally with the practice of assigning office based on nationality,[40] which was widely discussed in the media and at political forums in the wake of the Alma-Ata demonstrations that were precipitated by the replacement of Kazakh Communist Party First Secretary Dinmukhamed Kunayev by the Russian Gennadiy Kol'bin, was inevitably resented, especially since Gorbachev has made unmistakably clear his gut preference for Russians in top positions at the center. Moreover, in the late 1980's, Moscow conducted large-scale purges of bureaucracies in Central Asia, especially in the Fergana Valley, accusing those dismissed (and by implication Central Asian party *apparat*s in general) of xenophobia, nationalism, corruption, and tolerance for Islam.

The activities of the Uzbek Popular Front, *Birlik* (Unity), established in November 1988, are indicative of the trends of present-day Central Asian nationalism, although Uzbek nationalism has some unique characteristics, for example, a desire to attain a leadership position in Central Asia as the region's largest indigenous nationality and the one whose language and culture seem most identifiable with those of pre-Soviet Turkestan. Apart from the struggle for its own legitimization, *Birlik*'s main activity from March through October 1989 centered on legally establishing Uzbek as the republic's official state language. This was probably the main issue for nationalists in most Central Asian republics as the 1980's drew to a close, and in all of them, the language of the titular nationality has been recognized, or seems on the verge of being recognized, as the state language. In Kirgizia and Turkmenistan, however, the period of implementation is to be drawn out. Given the acculturation to Russian of the local intelligentsias and the recognition on the part of the Kirgiz and Turkmen elites that their republics still needed their nonindigenous inhabitants, an extended period for acquiring the use of the local language seemed essential.[41]

A closely related issue is the study of the Arabic script. One of the Soviet leadership's reasons for switching from the Arabic to the Latin and then to the Cyrillic script for Central Asia was to break with a literary tradition that had had a strong Islamic influence and with literary activity in other Islamic countries. As a result of Soviet policies, in the second half of the 1980's reportedly most of the students graduating from language and literature departments in Uzbekistan's universities and scientific institutions could not read the Arabic script and were ignorant of their literary heritage—which had been written in Arabic, Persian, and Chagatay.

To remedy this situation, it was first suggested that Tashkent State University train specialists for the study of Central Asia's classical literature. By the summer of 1987, it was further advocated that study of the Arabic script be introduced as a subject in the high-school curriculum.[42] (Interestingly, the Uzbek poet Mukhamad Salikh preferred to urge the study of the ancient Turkic, or "runic," script used in Turkestan prior to Arab rule, insisting that the Uzbeks' cultural heritage really had its origins in Turkic culture.[43] The writer Nadir Narmatov argued that if the Arabic script were taught in schools, its surreptitious use in teaching religion would decrease. The link between Arabic script and religion apparently takes place when believers accept as pupils young people interested in learning the Arabic script and proceed to teach them religious practices as well.[44]

At least some of the activity connected with making the language of the respective republics' titular nationalities the state language broached the issue of the Arabic script as well. Thus, at a nationalist demonstration held in Dushanbe early in 1989, demands included not only recognition of Tajik as the republic's official language, but also a return to the Arabic script.[45] By the school year 1989/1990, the Arabic script was indeed being taught in some schools in the Tajik republic.[46]

Another such issue is the translation of the Koran into the local tongue, which seems to be proceeding in all the Central Asian republics. This has aroused considerable interest. The editor of the Uzbek-language

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[39]The best known of the campaigns initiated by the center against Central Asian republican leaderships and the one that has perhaps led to the most ill feeling among indigenous elites has been in Uzbekistan, where USSR Procuracy investigators Telman Gdlyan and Nikolay Ivanov, together with a group of fellow investigators, brought criminal charges against 70 people who had been connected with former first secretaries Sharaf Rashidov and Inamdzhon Usmankhodzhayev. The procedures adopted by Gdlyan and Ivanov led to counter-charges by many Uzbeks that the investigators had violated the norms of socialist legality, and some of the accused were exonerated. For details, see TASS in Russian, May 19, 1989, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, May 22, 1989, pp. 56–59. See also Timur Pulatov, "Corruption Is Being Uprooted," *Moscow News*, Jan. 7, 1990.

[40]See, e.g., *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda*, Jan. 18, 1987.

[41]Throughout the region, too, the proclamation of the language of the various republics' titular nationalities as their state language seems to be a cause of concern for the nonindigenous, particularly the Slavic, inhabitants, many of whom have been in Central Asia for all their lives without having learned the local tongues. See, for example, *Komsomolets Turkmenistana* (Ashkhabad), Oct. 7, 1989, quoted in Bohr, "Turkmenistan under Perestroika." In Tajikistan, it is reported to be the cause of an increasing outmigration of Russians, a trend that has been noted regarding the region as a whole in the decade between the 1979 and 1989 censuses. See Ann Sheehy, "1989 Census Data on Internal Migration in the USSR," *Report on the USSR*, Nov. 10, 1989.

[42]*Ozbekistan adabiyati va san"ati*, Dec. 5, 1986, and July 10, 1987.

[43]See Annette Bohr, "Restoring the Uzbek Cultural Heritage: Uzbek Literary Journal Proposes Study of Ancient Turkic Script," *Radio Liberty Research*, Dec. 5, 1988.

[44]Ibid., Jan 1, 1988, and May 18, 1988.

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Sharq yulduzi, replying to numerous inquiries regarding the delayed appearance of the translation in his journal, explained that this was due not to official interference, but to the complexities of the task and the need for every word to be confirmed by both religious officials and linguists, and yet to be comprehensible to ordinary people.[47]

National movements have been active on a number of other social, economic, and political fronts. For example, *Birlik* has protested the outmigration from the region of Central Asians, the inmigration of Russians, the bureaucratic practices of the republic's leadership, the hazing of Uzbeks in the Soviet armed forces, and the neglect of ecological problems.[48] It has also taken issue with a number of aspects of the cotton monoculture, which was imposed on Uzbekistan in the 1920's and is considered largely responsible for many of the republic's ecological and socio-economic problems.[49]

At least one rally organized by *Birlik* condemned the Moscow-initiated military intervention in Azerbaijan in January 1990. The gathering, which was attended by some 600 people, was addressed by *Birlik* leaders and the imam of a Tashkent mosque, and prayers were read from the Koran for the souls of Muslim Azeris who had been killed during the events in that republic. The *Birlik* leadership has also held talks with its counterparts in the Azerbaijani Popular Front.[50]

Significantly, a number of the causes advocated by the local nationalists were actually taken up by the Uzbek republic leadership under the new party first secretary, Islam Karimov, who seems to be intent on proving his own credibility in the eyes of the Uzbeks and especially their intellectual elite.[51] Both the Uzbek and other Central Asian leaderships have received concessions from Moscow concerning the size of the cotton quotas their republics were expected to deliver in the coming years, and the price to be paid for this commodity.[52]

There is throughout Central Asia a growing sentiment that the area's relative backwardness is due, in large part, to a Moscow-initiated policy of exploiting the region's natural resources and neglecting the development of its industry, in what orthodox Marxists would surely call the best colonial tradition. According to the Turkmen SSR's first party secretary, Saparmurad Niyazov, enterprises and organizations under all-Union (rather than republic) jurisdiction received nearly 60 percent of the capital invested in the republic.[53] The percentage of the population with an income that is below the country's official subsistence level is much higher in Central Asia than elsewhere in the country, a situation that the rapid increase of the population only exacerbates.[54] Clearly, there is an incentive to try to redress some of these inequities.

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[45]This had already been in the offing for several months at least; see, e.g., *Tajikistan-i soveti* (Dushanbe), Nov. 25, 1988, trans. in BBC, *Summary of World Broadcasts I,* Jan. 4, 1989; and *Kommunist Tadzhikistana,* Jan. 7, 1989. The commission set up by the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet to prepare the draft law on the status of the state language in the republic also received letters requesting the introduction of the study of the Arabic script in general (*obshcheobrazovatel'nyye*) schools. See *Kommunist Tadzhikistana,* Feb. 25, 1989. The official report of the demonstration (ibid., Feb. 26, 1989) did not speak of this specifically, but mentioned the equivalent slogan: "We demand the revival of the old Tajik culture."

[46]Eden Naby, "Tajiks Reemphasize Iranian Heritage as Ethnic Pressures Mount In Central Asia," *Report on the USSR,* Feb. 16, 1990.

[47]*Ozbekistan adabiyati va san"ati,* Feb. 23, 1990. In the first 1990 issue of the Kirgiz literary journal *Kirgizstan madaniyati,* the Kazi of the Muslims of Kirgizia, Sadikdzhan Kamalov, applauded the initiative of the Kazakh newspaper *Qazaq adabiyeti* in publishing chapters from the Koran and noted that the Kirgiz, too, have expressed a growing interest in publishing a Kirgiz translation of the Koran. See Azade-Ayse Rorlich, "Islam in Kirgizia: the Making of a Conscious Believer," *Radio Liberty Research,* Apr. 26, 1990. In Turkmenistan, a special group of experts is already preparing a Turkmen translation of the Koran. See Bohr, "Turkmenia under Perestroika," p. 17.

[48]*Birlik* staged demonstrations in Tashkent on March 19, April 9, and October 1, 15, and 19, 1989; for the first two, see Timur Kocaoglu, "Demonstrations by Uzbek Popular Front," *Report on the USSR,* Apr. 28, 1989. For the complaint about hazings, see James Critchlow, "Uzbek Army Recruits Believed Murdered to Avenge Fergana Killings," ibid., Nov. 3, 1989.

[49]The most serious of the ecological problems, the drying up of the Aral Sea, which has already had and is continuing to have dire consequences from the point of view of health, agriculture, and climate in parts of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, was largely brought about by the construction of the Kara Kum Canal, used to sustain the cotton monoculture.

Another major health problem has been the extravagant use in the cotton fields of pesticides, which have contaminated the atmosphere, the soil, and water resources. See, e.g., Annette Bohr, "Health Catastrophe in Karakalpakistan," ibid., July 21, 1989.

[50]RFE/RL, *Daily Report,* Jan. 26, 1990.

[51]Thus, at the Uzbek party Central Committee Plenum on November 24, 1989, Karimov complained that enterprises—many of which are subordinate to all-Union ministries—were not hiring local workers despite the severe unemployment in the republic; instead, the firms preferred to "recruit ready-trained employees from other regions of the country." According to Adyl Yakubov, secretary of the board of the Uzbek Writers' Union, both the Central Committee and the Tashkent City Party Committee had adopted restrictions on hiring workers from outside the republic. Poetess Gulchera Nurullayeva in an interview published in the magazine *Mushtum* also pointedly called for an end to inmigration of nonindigenous workers. See James Critchlow, "Uzbeks Demand Halt to Russian In-Migration," *Radio Liberty Research,* Feb. 29 ,1990.

[52]See, for example, *Turkmenskaya Iskra* (Ashkhabad), Aug. 20, 1989.

[53]*Izvestiya* (Moscow), Apr. 18, 1989. The Turkmen SSR exports to other republics virtually all its raw materials, including more than 95 percent of its cotton and gas, and 70 percent of its silk. See *Turkmenskaya Iskra,* Aug. 20, 1989. Only 42 people per 1,000 population are employed in the industrial sector as against an all-Union average of 140 per 1,000 (ibid., Dec. 15, 1989), and surely Slavs are disproportionately represented among the 42.

[54]See Bohr, "Turkmenistan under Perestroika." These problems connected with the low standard of living in Central Asia have been evident for some years. See Alastair McAuley, "The Soviet Muslim Population: Trends in Living Standards, 1960–1975," in Yaacov Ro'i, Ed., *The USSR and the Muslim World.* For a more current assessment of some of Central Asia's economic troubles that are largely the result of the subordination of the local (fn. continued on p. 58)

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Other objectives of national leaders and public figures in the Central Asia of the 1980's have been the rehabilitation of writers and political personalities condemned in the 1920's and 1930's as bourgeois nationalists and/or counterrevolutionaries and of national epics condemned by the party in the early 1950's. They have met with considerable success in these efforts. Similarly, they have endeavored to fill in some of the blank spots in their history (such as the dimensions of human losses incurred during collectivization in Kazakhstan) and to rectify a number of distortions (such as the presentation of their conquest by the Russians in the 18th and 19th century as a voluntary joining of the Russian Empire).[55] Central Asian intellectuals are also concerned about the numbers of their nationals who do not even know their native language, the situation of fellow nationals who live outside their titular republics, and the education of the younger generation.[56]

In February 1990, *Birlik* itself split, the new splinter group calling itself *Erk* (Independence), the name of a political party that in the 1920's had sought full independence for Turkestan. The new organization seeks "real independence" (*podlinnaya samostoyatel'nost'*) for Uzbekistan within the framework of a renewed Soviet federation. It also criticizes *Birlik* for not using the political opportunities created by the processes of *perestroyka* and democratization, insisting that "national problems" cannot be solved by "spreading false rumors," making false accusations against people, instigating them to disturbances, and stimulating animosities among nationalities.[57] In other Central Asian republics, calls for sovereignty have also been heard, although this sovereignty is apparently to be exercised within the confines of a Soviet federation or confederation.[58]

Central Asian nationalism has not turned its attention exclusively against the external enemy or threat. Traditional hostilities between local nationalities, long nurtured by the Soviet regime, have remained strong.[59] Hostility is blatant between Tajiks and Uzbeks, the former regarding two towns belonging to the Uzbek republic—Bukhara and Samarkand, in both of which a considerable Tajik population remains—as primarily Tajik cities.[60] Indeed, there is said to be little love lost between *Birlik* and the Tajik popular front, *Rastokhez* (Resurrection), which emerged in late 1989.[61] At the same time, *Birlik* has apparently been the inspiration for the creation of similar popular fronts in Kazakhstan, which boasts large numbers of informal groups, and in Kirgizia and Turkmenistan. However, *Birlik* appears to have been markedly cautious in encouraging the formation or activities of other popular fronts in Central Asia, presumably so as not to expose itself to charges by Moscow that it is subverting the status quo.[62]

Islam and Politicization of the Movements

The general tendency of Central Asian elites to focus on secular matters and play down issues of religious significance seems to be coming under pressure in the

economy to the needs and plans of the central authorities in Moscow, see Leslie Dienes, "Central Asia and the Soviet 'Midlands': Regional Position and Economic Integration," in Milan Hauner and Robert L. Canfield, Eds., *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union: Collision and Transformation,* Boulder, CO, Westview, 1989, pp. 61–100.

[55]See, e.g., Azade-Ayse Rorlich, " 'Adilet'—The Kazakh Chapter of 'Memorial'," *Report on the USSR,* Jan. 26, 1990; also, interviews with the Turkmen writers Rakhim Esenov and Tirkish Dzhumagel'd'yev, *Turkmenskaya Iskra,* May 5 and July 7, 1988, and Oct. 6, 1989.

The issue of the Russian conquest is not a new one; indeed, it has pervaded historiographical debates since the early 1930's. In the words of Adyl Yakubov, "For decades, we have been arguing whether we joined Russia or were conquered." Loc. cit. For a pre-Gorbachev work by an Uzbek writer that presented the Russian conquest of Central Asia in a negative light, see Mamadali Makhmudov, "Immortal Cliffs," which first appeared in 1981 in the Uzbek literary journal *Sharq yulduzi.*

[56]*Qazaq adebiyeti* (Alma-Ata), Feb. 23 and Mar. 2, 1990; and *Leninshil zhas* (Alma-Ata), Mar. 3, 1990.

[57]*Komsomolets Uzbekistana,* Mar. 2 and 30, 1990, and lecture by one of *Erk*'s leaders, the Uzbek poet Mukhamed Salikh at a lecture at Georgetown University on Mar. 5, 1990. On differences between *Birlik* and *Erk,* see RFE/RL, *Daily Report,* Apr. 23, 1990. It is not clear to me whether the latter source added its own interpretation to *Erk*'s program, which may conceive of independence the same way Gorbachev does—within the framework of, for example, a confederation—or whether the dynamics of the situation brought about a change in the position of *Erk* as a group and of Salikh personally.

[58]See, e.g., an article in *Qazaq adebiyeti,* trans. in *JPRS-UPA,* Jan. 11, 1990.

[59]For the way these animosities were promoted and preserved by the Soviet authorities, see, e.g., Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, *The Dilemma of Nationalism in Soviet Central Asia: The Case of Tadzhikistan,* Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970.

[60]The central authorities have several times stated that should they give in to the Armenians on the issue of the control of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, they would have other similar border questions on their hands, mentioning specifically Tajik demands vis-à-vis Uzbekistan.

Perhaps in order to reduce tensions, the various republics have conceded cultural rights to their inhabitants of other Central Asian nationalities. Thus, e.g., Tajiks in eight oblasts of the Uzbek SSR can now send their children to schools that either give Tajik language lessons or have classes with Tajik as the language of instruction. See RFE/RL, *Daily Report,* Jan. 31, 1990.

[61]The head of the organization, Bagir Abduljaber, said that it had members in a number of Tajik cities; that, like *Birlik* in Uzbekistan, it was open to people of all nationalities; and that it sought to be involved in all aspects of the republic's political, social, and cultural life, to help solve the republic's ecological problems, and to advocate its economic autonomy. Ibid., Jan. 24, 1990.

[62]In Turkmenistan, the sister association is actually called *Agzybirlik,* also meaning unity, which was founded in September 1987 but was not sanctioned by the local authorities. Its main demands centered on promotion of the Turkmen language, history, and art, and on ameliorating the republic's health conditions and ecological situation. See *Komsomolets Turkmenistana,* Oct. 7, 1989; also, *Turkmenskaya Iskra,* Jan. 21, 1990.

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Gorbachev era. The national movements have become increasingly politicized and have attempted to broaden their base. As *glasnost'* has developed and taken on new dimensions, the local intelligentsias have increasingly had to bear in mind the aspirations and needs of their constituencies, now essential if these elites are to make their clout felt at the center. Their adaptation to populism has entailed aligning themselves with the sentiment of their fellow nationals, most of whom reside in the countryside and from whom they have become largely isolated.

One of the most blatant and profound differences between the programs of the intelligentsia and the population they were claiming to represent seems to have been over the question of Islam. Nonetheless, the intellectuals, too, sense that they belong to the *'umma,* to *dar al-Islam,* as a result of which they take a growing interest in the political and spiritual evolution of the Muslim world outside the USSR. The Central Asians, and particularly the intellectual elites among them, who have been the most vocal in asserting national rights, are rediscovering the region's traditional culture. This attaches them further to Islam, which is the leitmotif in traditional Central Asian literature and philosophy. (This movement back to traditional culture is known as *mirasism,* from the Arabic word for patrimony, *miras*.)[63]

If in the view of Central Asians being a Muslim means being a member of the original indigenous population of the region, rather than, for instance, a Russian, Ukrainian, or even Volga Tatar settler, then it denotes a symbiosis between a religious and a national identity. Indeed, it is commonly said in these parts that a non-Muslim cannot be a Kazakh, or Tajik, or Kirgiz.[64] However, there is nothing to preclude an atheist from identifying himself as a Muslim. In other words, the Islamic component has become a fundamental facet of all Central Asian nationalisms or national consciousness—as part of the national heritage—without it necessarily signifying religious practice.

As noted above, most of the prominent intellectuals in the towns—people, say, in their 40's and 50's, at the height of their influence and careers—seem generally not to be believers or at least not to be persons for whom religion is an anchor and framework for social and political activity. The rural population and probably also the urban student body, grown to political consciousness under the influence of the Iranian revolution and the war in Afghanistan, appear, on the other hand, to see in religion an excellent instrument for making their demands felt. (The increasing religiosity of the younger generation and the enhanced sway of religion upon it is not a characteristic only of the Soviet Muslim population; it is true for virtually the entire country.)

As a result, Islamic slogans, green banners, and pictures of Khomeyni seem to have appeared whenever and wherever there have been disturbances in Central Asia (and also in Azerbaijan),[65] even though they have not been part of the program of the leaders and initiators of those particular demonstrations that were organized, for instance, by *Birlik*. Indeed, the leaders have consistently tried to play down the Islamic factor in the disturbances and demonstrations of the Gorbachev era.[66]

Conversely, the Soviet authorities, including Mikhail Gorbachev himself, at times have sought to link the disturbances that have taken place in Central Asia and Kazakhstan with Islam.[67] The objective seems to be to discredit Central Asian nationalist movements as backward, primitive, reactionary, and therefore inimical to *perestroyka*. The message is, among other things, that their grievances are hardly worth attention. There

[63]Bennigsen has written extensively on these topics. See, e.g., Alexandre Bennigsen and Marie Broxup, *The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State,* London, Croom Helm, 1984.

[64]In the words of an Uzbek Communist Party journal, "One of the socio-psychological reasons for the preservation of obsolete ritual is the identification of religious and national, following the traditional stereotype according to which every genuine Uzbek, Turkmen, Tajik, Chechen, etc., must be a Muslim." See Osipova and Iskanderov, loc. cit.

[65]This may not include the disturbances in Ashkhabad and Nebit-Dag (also in Turkmenistan) on May 1 and 9, 1989.

[66]The disagreement over the role of religion in the demonstrations and disturbances that have occurred in Central Asia concerns other issues which are not directly connected with the topic of this article, such as the phenomenon of female suicides, which has apparently grown markedly over recent years (the latter half of the 1980's). Thus, some Soviet observers have insisted that the suicides have resulted from the extravagant use of pesticides in the fields in which women, often pregnant women, are employed, causing serious health problems and not infrequently the death or deformation of newborn babies. Another school attributes the suicides to the persistence of behavioral norms and marriage customs that have become intolerable to the new, more educated generation of young women. See, for example, *Sovet Turkmenistany,* Feb. 4, 1989, translated in *JPRS-UPA,* June 8, 1989. One article on the issue of the enhanced incidence of suicides in Central Asia questions the generally accepted view that they are a largely female phenomenon, insists that self-immolation is not the most frequent form of suicide, and attributes the suicides to a variety of factors, including general despair over the low standard of living and problems between parents and children. See *Komsomolets Tadzhikistana* (Dushanbe), May 7, 1989. I am indebted for this information to Professor Muriel Atkin of George Washington University.

[67]On June 13, 1989, referring to the disturbances in the Fergana Valley, Gorbachev said in Bonn that Islamic fundamentalism had "bared its teeth." See *Central Asia and Caucasus Chronicle* (London), July 1989, p. 3. On January 19, 1990, Gorbachev similarly accused Muslim extremists of causing the disturbances that were shaking the Azerbaijan Republic. Interestingly, Tehran has also attributed the Azerbaijan events to local Islamic feeling—although for different reasons (it certainly is not interested in stressing Azeri nationalism, which might have repercussions in Iran's northern province of Azerbaijan, with which some more radical activists in the Soviet Azerbaijani Popular Front are known to be desirous of reuniting). See *Financial Times,* Jan. 4 and 20, 1990; RFE-FL, *Daily Report,* Jan. 8, 1990; and *The New York Times,* Jan. 19 and 21, 1990.

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seems even to be the implication that the Central Asian nationalists are of doubtful loyalty to the Soviet Union as a whole and that the use of force in putting down manifestations of discontent is justified.[68] (It is precisely this sort of official formulation that has led the leading figures of the national movements to downplay manifestations of Islamic populism; they wish to show that they are indeed still playing the political game according to the rules laid down by the center.)

Igor' Belyayev, who seems to be a well-placed and influential observer of these topics, in an article entitled "Islam and Politics," accused "Muslim fanatics, Sufis who penetrated the ranks of the students, of manipulating the young people who participated in the well-known December events [in Alma-Ata] . . . and even [manipulating] a professor."[69] Soviet officials claimed that the anti-Meskhetian riots in Fergana Valley in May-June 1989 were caused by the Meskhetians' refusal to join a movement designed to unite the Central Asian population under the banner of Islam,[70] and that the slogans brandished at the disturbances were: "Smother the Turks! Smother Lenin's degenerates—the Russians! Glory to the Banner of Islam, the Islamic religion and Ayatollah Khomeyni!"[71] The Uzbek SSR party First Secretary Rafik Nishanov also mentioned "the appearance of green banners within the columns of those committing excesses [and] the distribution of fliers containing religious symbolism and signed by a previously unknown religious organization called the 'Holy Uzbeks'."[72]

Some local elements also characterized the actions against the Meskhetians as a *jihad* or holy war. The fact that they took place in the area of Kokand in the Fergana Valley—a stronghold of traditional Islam, the location of important holy places (e.g., the Shah-i Mardam), and one of the main areas for Basmachi operations in the 1920's and early 1930's—illustrates the powerful potential of national and political demands that find expression in Islamic religious terms.

A *Moscow News* appraisal of the disturbances in Dushanbe of February 12–14, 1990, raised the possibility that "Islamic fundamentalists who are allegedly closely linked with Afghan and Iranian co-religionists" were the "guiding hand" behind the demonstrations, although others ascribed this role to "corrupt elements" or even the republic leadership, who, it was suggested, "provoked the bringing-in of troops to retain control."[73]

The effort of the Soviet regime to discredit the nationalism of the country's Muslim peoples by associating it with Islam is not new.[74] By the late 1980's, however, as it became clear that the regime was going to have to make its peace with both national feeling and religion, this approach had become a less prominent feature of antireligious propaganda, which preferred now to distinguish between the two. In fact, this propaganda now tries to show that many of the attributes associated by nationalist writers and intellectuals with Islamic practice preceded the advent of Islam in the region and are connected with earlier, pre-Islamic customs.[75]

Thus an Uzbek doctor of philosophy, presumably part of the antireligious propaganda apparatus, has stressed the need to differentiate between religious customs and national customs that have nothing to do with religion. He accused those who were modernizing Islam of endeavoring to falsify the reactionary role Islam has played in Uzbek history and to conceal the fact that it had seriously impeded national progress. While those "modernizers" sought to link the Uzbeks' high ethical qualities to Islam, these ethical qualities had, in his view, survived over the centuries not thanks to Islam, but because they were innate to the Uzbeks prior to Islam's advent.[76] Even under *glasnost'*, the Uzbek party leadership, in a resolution on improving internationalist education, disparaged continuing "attempts to identify religious-patriarchic customs as national traditions and local characteristics."[77]

Some manifestations of Central Asian nationalism have, indeed, displayed a specifically Islamic and ex-

[68]It is perhaps a measure of Gorbachev's "success" that well over one-half of the RSFSR population is said to be actually afraid of a possible Muslim insurgency. *New Times* (Moscow), No. 16, 1990. This includes not only conservatives, but, for instance, so liberal a figure as USSR Supreme Soviet deputy and deputy mayor of Moscow, Sergey Stankevich. This is according to Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, from an address at Georgetown University, Washington, DC, Apr. 25, 1990.

[69]*Literaturnaya Gazeta*, May 13 and 20, 1987. In 1989, following the appeals to the Congress of People's Deputies by Kazakh writer Mukhtar Shakhanov, an investigating commission of people's deputies was set up to evaluate the Alma-Ata events objectively. Although Shakhanov delivered a report in the commission's name to the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet in November 1989, it was not even summarized in the press, and no full report of the commission's findings has as yet appeared. See *Report on the USSR*, Feb. 9, 1990, pp. 25–27.

[70]See my essay, "Iran's Islamic Revolution and the Soviet Muslims," loc. cit.

[71]This was the testimony of Lt.-Gen. Vyacheslav Pankin, head of the Interior Ministry Main Directorate of Criminal Investigation, reported by TASS, June 14, 1989, trans. in BBC, *Summary of World Broadcasts I*, June 16, 1989.

[72]*Pravda Vostoka*, June 17, 1989.

[73]*Moscow News*, Feb. 28, 1990.

[74]See my articles, "Religion as an Obstacle to *Sblizhenie*: The Official Perception," loc. cit., and "The Task of Creating the New Soviet Man: 'Atheistic Propaganda' in the Soviet Muslim Areas," loc. cit.

[75]This was very clear in the captions at the exhibition "Nomads, the Masters of the Eurasian Steppe," which was displayed from November 17, 1989, to February 18, 1990, at the Natural History Museum, the Smithsonian Institution, Washington, DC.

[76]*Sovet Ozbekistoni* (Tashkent), Jan. 15, 1987, quoted in *JPRS-UPA*, June 4, 1987.

[77]*Pravda Vostoka*, Apr. 12, 1989.

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Tajik demonstrators face Soviet troops on February 15, 1990, outside Tajik Communist Party headquarters in Dushanbe.

—Novosti via Wide World Photos.

tremist coloring. For example, a Wahhabi mullah, Abdullo Saidov, was said to have urged his followers to petition the 27th CPSU Congress (in 1986) to establish an Islamic state in Tajikistan (an idea he had been nurturing for some time). Failing in this, he allegedly asked his followers in April 1986 "to virtually take up arms" to achieve this goal. The authorities were openly concerned about Saidov's popularity, especially among the younger generation (when Saidov was arrested, a group of his supporters held a demonstration to demand his release).[78]

The situation in Tajikistan was so serious in 1986–87 that according to the chairman of the Tajik republic KGB, V. V. Petkel', there had been dozens of trials of "ringleaders—supernumerary Muslim clerics who not only fanned religious sentiment but also called for a *jihad* against the existing system."[79] Petkel' said these people sought to "infiltrate party, soviet, and law enforcement organs in order to facilitate the implementation of hostile designs." Indeed, he linked "the overt, organized, hostile activities of religious extremists" with foreign ideological centers and their anti-Soviet deeds. The secret police official also raised the problem of draft dodgers. Some of them, in his view, were simply afraid of being sent to Afghanistan; others did not wish to leave the republic from "religious and parochial (*mestnicheskiy*) motives," under the negative influence of relatives. "Unfortunately," Petkel' continued, "there is no reduction in the number of young men susceptible to religious prejudices," and some of the draft dodgers simply went to other regions in their own oblast or to other parts of the republic, "where they began to study the dogmas of Islam, and thus avoided military service."

In 1989, a person working at the philosophy department of the Tajik SSR Academy of Sciences, Mirbobo Mirrakhimov, reportedly told voters in one district not to elect a Russian to the post of people's deputy, because that individual would bring in more Russians, build large houses for them, and squeeze out the Tajiks. Mir-

[78] *Kommunist Tadzhikistana*, Feb. 12, 1987.
[79] Ibid., Dec. 30, 1987.

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rakhimov predicted that within a decade not a Russian would remain in Tajikistan, at which point Tajiks would "build our Islamic republic." According to the KGB source that published the report on Mirrakhimov's activities, "certain strata of the population" were particularly responsive to his argumentation.[80]

Two American correspondents who happened to arrive in Dushanbe in the course of the February 1990 riots were clearly impressed by the Islamic element, even though they were told by a Soviet journalist that religion was "just a pretext" and that the young people pay "no attention to the mullahs." They saw one mullah take the microphone in the square, which was packed with 10,000 men—there was "not a woman in sight"—and sing out the Arabic call to prayer. According to this account:

Mesmerized, the Tajiks as one man . . . raise their hands in the traditional Muslim posture of worship. . . . Except for the wail of the mullah, a total hush has descended upon the gathering. After the prayer call, the mullah reads a sura *[chapter] from the Koran honoring the dead. Three minutes later, the prayer and reading are over, but there is an unmistakable new militancy in the air.*[81]

The crowds called for the resignation of the republic leadership, an end to the sale of pork in public markets, the punishment of soldiers and militia responsible for shooting civilians, and the departure from Tajikistan of all who are not Tajiks. The correspondents were told that elections in the square had brought in new leaders, people's representatives, who were "unmistakably Islamic in orientation . . . and some of them want Islam to be declared the national religion of the republic." Others at the gathering called for open borders with Afghanistan; and still others, total economic independence from the USSR.

While extremist expressions of Islamic nationalism seem to be more common in Tajikistan than in other parts of Central Asia, they must not be seen as pertaining solely to that republic, even if, when they appeared elsewhere, they were thought to draw their inspiration from Tajikistan. Two people from the Tajik SSR were said to have distributed in 1988 in one of Ashkhabad's *kolkhoz* markets a book entitled *Jihad,* by the 20th-century Muslim thinker and polemicist Syad Abu al-A'la Mawdudi, which reputedly hurled "slander" and "the darkest accusations . . . against [the] socialist structure."[82] The two, who visited frequently in both Ashkhabad and the republic's border regions, had given the book as a gift to enthusiasts and preached that their "new acquaintances should educate their children in the spirit of Islam and stop at nothing for its sake." They were also reported to have "tried to create nationalistic tendencies among the people." The apparent goal was not Turkmen nationalism, but rather a general Central Asian or Turkestani nationalism directed against Russians, Europeans, and the powers that be in Moscow. Indeed, to counter the arguments of the visitors from Tajikistan, the Imam-kazy of the Muslims of the Turkmen SSR, Nasrulla Ibadullayev, and Imam of Ashkhabad Khezretguly Khanov were quoted as saying that Islam never incited believers to fight against their own government or to disregard the laws of their country.[83]

Another important factor that has to be mentioned here is religious propaganda from abroad, particularly from Iran. An article in a Turkmen newspaper told of "a certain group of individuals" who were said to be "trying to promote the rights of Muslims and their own nationalistic interests . . . making an effort to slander our building of socialism, to harm our international reputation, and to shake the supports of the historic solidarity which has come into being among the Soviet peoples." These people were said to be "calling religious believers to holy war," preaching the need for believers to save Islam in all its aspects. The situation was not totally unexpected in view of the "alarming events . . . in some neighboring states" and the "direct offensive influence" inside the USSR of "foreign representatives of countries following an Islamic ideology." Iran was not mentioned by name, but the allusion was unequivocal, especially when the authors of the article emphasized that "significant factors in these countries are making a major effort to stress holy war as the basic way to conduct a struggle with religious nonbelievers and to spread this concept among the adherents of Islam who live in the Soviet Union."[84]

One-third of Turkmenistan's young people are

[80]Ibid., Sept. 16, 1989. The article, which was authored by a KGB "press group," pointed out that Mirrakhimov, who spelled out his plans at the "Ru-ba ru" discussion club, used methods reminiscent of the Black Hundreds under the tsars and of the Nazis, blaming the "non-Tajiks" for all the ills that had befallen the republic: the growth of crime, the pollution of the atmosphere, the high infant mortality. He also spoke against the Uzbeks, who were next on his list for expulsion after the Russians.

[81]*Time* (New York), Feb. 26, 1990. The correspondents were also told that the Tajiks were directing their ferocity against those of their own women who were not sufficiently "Islamic."

[82]The reference seems to be to Mawdudi's *Al-jihad fi'l-islam* written in the 1920's. For the thought, activity, and writings of Mawdudi, see Leonard Binder, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan,* Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA, University of California Press, 1961.

[83]*Sovet Turkmenistany,* Apr. 7, 1989, trans. in *JPRS-UPA,* Aug. 22, 1989.

[84]Ibid.

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thought to listen to Turkmen-language broadcasts from Iran and Afghanistan. The Turkmen authorities regularly complain of the negative influence of Iranian radio and television; no less than 38 radio stations that "discuss Islam and the exporting of the Islamic revolution" are said to be active along the Soviet-Iranian border. Since the Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, Afghan *mujahedin* are reported to have doubled their efforts to smuggle subversive materials and weapons into the Soviet Union.[85] These broadcasts, cassettes, and written materials are said to encourage religious and national sentiment among the Central Asians. They are allegedly "aimed primarily at completely falsifying the USSR's nationality policy, more precisely, at promoting the theses that the Turkmen national culture and language have been 'destroyed' and that the Turkmen people are being 'Russified'."

The same source stresses that Iranian propaganda also seeks to awaken interest in Islam "and other antiquated traditions," mixing "the national feeling of the Turkmen people with religious remnants," and leading "listeners to overestimate the value of the Muslim way of life." Iran had also mounted a letter campaign, purportedly originating from relatives of Soviet Turkmen citizens, propagandizing the Muslim way of life.[86]

Conclusion

It was Soviet nationalities policy that first fostered in Central Asia the idea of separate national cultures and identities based on ethno-linguistic criteria. Among other considerations, this effort was motivated by Moscow's fear of Pan-Islamism, which had been used as a slogan in the Muslim areas of prerevolutionary Russia. As in other parts of the Soviet Union, Moscow played upon and perpetuated the region's traditional intertribal and intercultural animosities. This policy inadvertently laid the basis for a fusion of Islamic sentiment with the nascent national consciousness, which in the words of one Western commentator might perhaps be called "Islamic in form and national in content."[87]

In the late 1980's, local elites were struggling with renewed accusations from Moscow that their expanding national movements were tainted by Islam, even as these elites were finding it increasingly fruitful to enlist traditionally Islamic local populations to their political causes. In a sense, Soviet officialdom is playing with fire when it raises the bogey of Islam to reject legitimate political demands of Central Asian nations.

Does this mean that Islam will cement the various Central Asian national movements? So far, the answer is no. The effect has rather been to split them from the inside. The sole national movement of the region in which at least some of the intelligentsia are apparently definitely Islam-oriented is the Tajik, where, indeed, calls have been heard for the actual establishment of an Islamic state; though even here, of course, this does not necessarily mean an Islamic state based on the *shari'a,* but one oriented on the Tajik national heritage and culture rather than the Russian one.

The reason for the enhanced Islamic sentiment in Tajikistan is perhaps because the Tajiks alone of the main Central Asian nationalities are of Persian rather than Turkic stock and culture, and naturally prefer to emphasize a factor that stresses their belonging to the region. Some of the Tajik intelligentsia give expression to their apprehensions concerning the predominance of a Turkic culture in Soviet Central Asia by reaching out to and seeking increased ties with Afghanistan and Iran.[88] At the same time, it cannot be ruled out that under the influence, albeit oblique, of the Iranian revolution and of the growing perception of the utility of Islam as a political weapon vis-à-vis Moscow, the Islamic component will become strengthened at all levels of Central Asian national consciousness and activity.

It is well-nigh impossible to know what the future holds for Central Asia. There seems, however, to be no doubt that at least some of the younger generation are looking simultaneously to Islam and to nationalism. For Moscow, the potential danger of this combination is all the greater inasmuch as Islam, which is, in the words of a Western observer, "the basis of a communal identity sanctified by history," is really known only vaguely and hence "can be reconstructed at will."[89] Therefore, although Central Asians do identify themselves as Muslims, the political implications of this identification are not clear in the present political circumstances beyond the fact of clearly separating the collective Muslim "we" of the Central Asian periphery from the Russian or Slavic "they" at the center.

Despite the long history of problems among various groups in Central Asia—problems that have, moreover, been consciously exacerbated by the Soviet central

[85]Bohr, "Turkmenistan under Perestroika," p. 19; and *Sovet Turkmenistany,* Mar. 4, 1989, trans. in *JPRS-UPA,* Aug. 22, 1989. As late as February 1990, Chairman of the Turkmen SSR KGB Petr Arkhipov was talking of attempts by the Islamic Party of Afghanistan to penetrate into the republic. See *Sovet Turkmenistany,* Feb. 25, 1990.

[86]*Sovet Turkmenistany,* Mar. 4, 1989, trans. in *JPRS-UPA,* Aug. 22, 1989.

[87]Subtelny, loc. cit.

[88]See Naby, loc. cit.

[89]Martha Brill Olcott in *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), Jan. 29, 1990.

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authorities—Islam, which today seems to be actually an impediment to the formation of a homogeneous society among all the Central Asian republics, may in the future serve as a unifying factor.[90] Indeed, notwithstanding efforts of certain Uzbek nationals to present their nation as the legitimate leading group of the area and their basically secular program as the rallying point of the Central Asians vis-à-vis the Kremlin—as is manifested by the platform of *Birlik*—Islam is probably the only cause or factor that can so unite them.

There seems as yet to be little coordination among the various Islamic activists or cells that exist in many parts of Central Asia—a few of whom specifically advocate the establishment of an Islamic state. Yet the unfavorable socio-economic conditions of the region, particularly the large-scale unemployment among its youth and the lack of housing, as well as the general atmosphere of frustration and resentment at what the Central Asians consider an unjustified economic and social discrimination, provide an easily inflammable situation, as has been shown in Alma-Ata, Ashkhabad, Dushanbe, Nebit Dag, the Fergana Valley, and Novyy Uzen'.[91]

The entry of Soviet troops and tanks into Baku in January 1990 and the ensuing struggle of Azerbaijani Muslims against the Russian conqueror, which the media have brought to public attention, cannot but have provided food for thought, or perhaps seed for passion, among the Central Asians. Yet, it did not prevent the outbreak of violence in February 1990 in Dushanbe. In the words of a Soviet specialist on Islam, Moscow's lack of understanding for the peculiarities of the Muslim world, the distortion over decades of all information concerning Islam "by . . . ideological dogma," and a persistent Soviet Islamophobia only heighten the danger of an Islamic explosion.[92]

[90]For a study of Islam in Tajikistan that reached a similar conclusion regarding the present divisive impact of Islam in that republic, see Muriel Atkin, *The Subtlest Battle: Islam in Tajikistan,* Philadelphia, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1989.

[91]It is not to be excluded (a) that some of the disturbances were not initiated by the local population but were the result, rather, of provocation on the part of the local, republic, or even central authorities, or some arm thereof, such as the Ministry of Internal Affairs; and (b) that we do not know of all the disturbances that take place in Central Asia. Both suppositions are supported by an article entitled "An Order to Shoot in Parkent [in Uzbekistan]," *Moscow News,* Apr. 22–29, 1990, p. 5.

[92]Quoted in Paul Goble, "Islamic 'Explosion' Possible in Central Asia," *Report on the USSR,* Feb. 16, 1990.

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Perestroyka in Kazakhstan

Martha Brill Olcott

For nearly a quarter of a century the political life of the Soviet republic of Kazakhstan was dominated by the first secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan (CPK), Dinmukhamed Kunayev, who ruled the republic from December 1959 until December 1986, with a brief interruption.[1] However, despite Kunayev's removal and the removal of his close protégés, his legacy and the manner of his dismissal have influenced the political agenda of most Kazakhs in the post-Kunayev period.

The Alma-Ata demonstrations of December 1986, which were a response to Kunayev's dismissal, helped unify the people of Kazakhstan and created a new political agenda for the republic's political elite and masses alike. However, Kunayev's political legacy—the remnants of his own "command-administrative" system—and Moscow's slowness in redressing inter-ethnic grievances have hindered progress toward the political and economic restructuring of Kazakhstan.

New elite groups are emerging only slowly, and are having trouble gaining real access to leadership positions in the "reformed" political system of Kazakhstan. But the new government of Kazakhstan, led by the republic's president and party first secretary, Nursultan Nazarbayev, has been receptive to some new ideas. Nudging from official "gadflies" such as Olzhas Suleymenov, the first secretary of Kazakhstan's Writers' Union and president of the Nevada-Semipalatinsk Anti-Nuclear Movement, has prompted Kazakhstan's leadership to support popular causes.

But the flexibility of the Nazarbayev government, combined with the vast popularity of Suleymenov's movement, has made it more difficult for more radical informal groups to popularize alternative political agendas. Thus, in contrast to the high level of popular disaffection in many other Soviet republics, the government of Kazakhstan is doing a fairly good job placating its people.

The current government has not yet ensured Kazakhstan's economic autonomy, nor has it found a way to resolve rising inter-ethnic tensions within the republic. Unless it does so, the government will face a serious political challenge from both Kazakh and non-Kazakh political opponents who believe that not just the "old guard" but also its current heirs must be removed from office before real reform can come to the republic.

The Alma-Ata Demonstrations

On December 16, 1986, the Central Committee of the CPK convened to accept Kunayev's request for retirement and then unanimously chose Gennadiy Kol'bin, the first secretary of the Ul'yanovsk *obkom,* as his replacement. Nazarbayev subsequently reported that this plenum lasted *18 minutes.*[2] In a February 1990 interview, he characterized the meeting as "in the worst tradition of stagnation (*zastoy*)," and he admitted that it led to the serious demoralization of the CPK and the Kazakh people.[3] News of the tight orchestration of this CPK plenum, to which the Central Committee members were summoned with no advance warning and where

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[1]Kunayev's fortunes rose and fell with those of Leonid Brezhnev, and as a result, he was ousted as first secretary in 1962 and reinstated in 1964. For details of Kunayev's career, see Martha Brill Olcott, *The Kazakhs,* Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1987.

[2]*Kazakhstanskaya Pravda* (Alma-Ata), June 8, 1990.

[3]*Pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 23, 1990.

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Turnover in Kazakhstan's leadership: left, Dinmukhamed Kunayev, Kazakh Communist Party first secretary for a quarter of a century; center, Gennadiy Kol'bin, a Russian provincial party official appointed by Moscow to replace Kunayev in December 1986 (in June 1989, he was transferred to the chairmanship of the People's Control Committee of the USSR); left, a 1984 photo of Nursultan Nazarbayev, then chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Kazakh SSR, who in 1989 was named to replace Kol'bin as republic party first secretary.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

they were denied the right even to question Kol'bin's nomination, was concealed for more than three years.

Nevertheless, word of Moscow's harsh treatment of Kazakhstan's party elite quickly spread throughout Alma-Ata and its environs. The next day thousands of disenchanted young Kazakhs—and Russians as well—gathered in Brezhnev Square to protest their discontent with Moscow's decision to appoint someone from outside the republic to head the CPK. Communist parties throughout the country were being purged, but only in Kazakhstan was an outsider brought in to head the republic.

Suleymenov, in his maiden speech to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies in June 1989, characterized this demonstration as the first peaceful mass protest brought on by *glasnost'*. But, he lamented, Moscow was not yet ready for peaceful protest and so reacted as it had for the past 30 years: first, troops used force to break up the protest, and then Moscow wholly misrepresented both the reasons for its actions and the course of events.[4]

According to the official explanation, the "riots," as Moscow still terms them, were the result of nationalist excesses on the part of Kazakh youths—inspired by ringleaders who were drunk or on drugs—who attacked Soviet militia that were trying to control an ugly, unruly crowd through peaceful means. The source of the young people's disaffection was alternately depicted as greed, on the part of the children of the old elite who realized that they could no longer count on a life of privilege, and as a manifestation of anti-Russian sentiment. Moscow has always maintained that members of the crowd, and not the militia, attacked first. Kazakhstan's law enforcement establishment continues to endorse this claim.[5]

Those who actually witnessed the events in Alma-Ata present a wholly different account. The size of the crowd varies from eyewitness to eyewitness, from thousands to tens of thousands, but all agree on two points: that the protest was a peaceful one, and that the crowd, although overwhelmingly Kazakh, included numerous Russians.

[4]*Kazakhstanskaya Pravda*, June 10, 1989.
[5]Ibid., Aug. 18, 1989.

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The reasons for the gathering in Brezhnev Square varied; most were shocked by Moscow's choice of Kol'bin, and many Kazakhs were deeply troubled by the manner of Kunayev's removal. As one young Kazakh historian put it:

We are a traditional people who deeply respect age and authority. Many were simply shocked that a Kazakh who had ruled so long, and who, despite his flaws, had done much that was good for his people and their homeland, should be removed in disgrace. To insult Kunayev in this way was to insult the entire Kazakh people.[6]

Moreover, although public judgments about the virtues of Kunayev vary considerably, not only between Kazakhs and Russians but among the Kazakhs themselves, all unanimously hold that the authorities' treatment of the crowds on December 17 and December 18 was an insult to all who live in Kazakhstan. Official accounts list two deaths and more than 200 hospitalized.[7] Bystanders, however, report dozens, and sometimes even hundreds, of deaths, and several hundred seriously injured.

As a result of Suleymenov's address to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, and an even more impassioned speech by another Kazakh writer and deputy, Mukhtar Shakhanov, an official investigative commission was appointed by Kazakhstan's Supreme Soviet.[8] However, the final report of the commission is unlikely to end the controversy. Kazakhs displeased with official responses to the demand for full disclosure of all the records relating to the December "events" have created their own informal organization, *Zheltoksan* (December), to continue to press their case.

The Kazakh activists in this organization have dedicated themselves to securing the release of the last three "political prisoners" serving time for killings linked to the December demonstrations.[9] The violent repression of the peaceful demonstration is seen as but another manifestation of official Russia's long history of harsh retaliation against the Kazakhs' efforts at political self-expression. Moreover, these Kazakhs, and many others—activists and non-activists alike—are suspicious of how the party and the official Kazakh elite remained silent for more than two years about Moscow's mendacity and mistreatment of the Kazakhs.

In their own way, the Alma-Ata riots had to have been a painful and disaffecting experience for Kazakhstan's political elite. Bystanders recall how Suleymenov went to Brezhnev Square in an attempt to convince the crowds to disperse to avoid further injuries, but was booed off the podium. Supposedly because he addressed the crowd in Russian, he was seen to represent "them" and not "us."[10] But Suleymenov himself admits that the Alma-Ata demonstration forced him to rethink his own political and personal goals, and led him to become a public advocate of Kazakh national rights.

Nazarbayev has been even less forthcoming about his thoughts during those December days, but his comments make it clear that he saw Moscow's response to the demonstrations as in part a political rebuff by the center to Kazakhstan's reformers in general and to his leadership in particular. Although Nazarbayev, like all of Kazakhstan's political leaders, had enjoyed Kunayev's political patronage,[11] by 1984, he had clearly allied himself with the reformist elements in the CPK. Since his appointment as chairman of the Council of Ministers of Kazakhstan in March 1984, Nazarbayev had been the "point-man" in Moscow's attack on Kunayev. Yet, not only was Nazarbayev passed over for appointment as first secretary of the CPK, he was not even informed in advance of the Politburo's decision to select Kol'bin.[12]

While we do not know the course of Nazarbayev's own political evolution, the political agenda of the Nazarbayev of today little resembles that of the man of three years ago. Although Gennadiy Kol'bin made some changes in Kazakhstan, especially with regard to the language issue, there has been a fundamental redefinition of the political goals of the CPK since Nazarbayev took over as first secretary in June 1989, after Kol'bin's appointment to head the People's Control Committee of the USSR in Moscow (he has since been replaced by Boris Pugo).

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[6]Personal communications with the author, Alma-Ata, May 29, 1990.

[7]*Literaturnaya Gazeta* (Moscow), Dec. 20, 1989.

[8]Shakhanov's address is found in Moscow Television Service in Russian, June 6, 1989, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Supplement—Washington, DC), June 7, 1989, p. 26.

[9]One Kazakh has already been released; another committed suicide while in jail.

[10]Suleymenov's published works are all in Russian. Kazakh critics report that he speaks only colloquial Kazakh, and is said to be unable to read and write literary Kazakh. However, in a recent interview, Suleymenov details his formal Turkological training. See *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, July 18, 1990.

[11]Prior to 1979, Nazarbayev's career had been confined to Karaganda oblast. A trained metallurgist, he began full-time party work in 1969 and, by 1977, he had worked his way up to being second secretary in the oblast. From 1979 until 1984, Nazarbayev served as a secretary of the Central Committee of the CPK.

[12]For details of the attack on Kunayev, see Martha Brill Olcott, "Gorbachev's Nationality Policy and Soviet Central Asia," in Rajan Menon and Daniel N. Nelson, Eds., *Limits to Power*, Lexington, KY, Lexington Books, 1989, pp. 69–91.

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The Political Agenda of the CPK

As is true throughout the Soviet Union, in Kazakhstan the communist party has been struggling to retain its authority over the population and so has tried to project a new public image. To this end, the party has changed its position on a number of key issues, and now advocates making Kazakh the state language in the republic, eliminating the "blank pages" of Kazakh history, supporting the revitalization of Islam, preserving the republic's natural resources, and instituting economic autonomy for Kazakhstan.

Language policy. In the aftermath of the Alma-Ata demonstrations, First Secretary Kol'bin appointed a commission to study how inter-ethnic relations could be improved in the republic. One of this commission's earliest recommendations was to expand both the teaching of Kazakh and its role within the public life of the republic. During the 1960's and 1970's, the language of instruction in thousands of elementary schools throughout the republic had shifted from Kazakh to Russian. By the mid-1980's, as Suleymenov has repeatedly reminded audiences, approximately 40 percent of Kazakh youth were unable to read their native language.[13]

In March 1987, in an effort to reverse this situation, the Central Committee of the CPK and the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers passed a resolution calling for the expansion of Kazakh-language education throughout the republic. Shortly thereafter, the republic's Supreme Soviet passed other legislation designed to increase the use of Kazakh in state institutions. In areas that were predominantly Kazakh, basic services were to be provided in both languages.[14] But as critical press reports quickly made clear, local governments did not have the capacity to provide bilingual services. Most oblasts lacked two sets of typewriters, not to speak of simultaneous translators, and more often than not petitioners to the government writing in Kazakh continued to receive responses in Russian.

Such problems further convinced Kazakh intellectuals that only if Kazakh were made the official language of the republic would it be protected and sufficient resources be found for Kazakh-language education on a mass scale. Following the lead of the Baltic republics, intellectuals throughout Kazakhstan began to push for making Kazakh the republic's state language. Initial drafts of the legislation, written when Kol'bin was still first secretary, called for two official languages. In pushing for Kazakh to become the official state language, Kazakhs argued that despite the fact that they were now a plurality in the republic,[15] more than twice as many children were being educated in Russian as in Kazakh.[16]

The final legislation, which was put forward by Nazarbayev in August 1989, named Kazakh as the state language but afforded Russian nearly equal legal protection as the language of inter-national communication. Earlier legislation passed in 1987 increased the number of hours of Kazakh-language instruction through grade 12. The 1989 law, which took effect on July 1, 1990, makes proficiency in Kazakh a prerequisite for receiving a high school diploma beginning in 1992. It also mandates that Kazakh will gradually become the language of official business in all of the local governments of the republic over a five-year period, beginning in 1989–90 in regions where more than 70 percent of the population is Kazakh.[17]

Kazakhstan's academic elite is putting a great deal of effort into trying to make the new language law effective, and many are active in *Qazaq tili,* the new Kazakh language society. New language texts either have been written or are in preparation. In September 1989 and June 1990, two all-republic conferences on the practical problems of greatly increasing the teaching of Kazakh within the republic were held in Alma-Ata, with the latter session serving as an occasion for a well-televised celebration of Kazakh culture. Kazakhstan's television and radio services have increased their Kazakh-language broadcasts,[18] and pressure has been building on them to introduce even more programming in the Kazakh language. The new language legislation has also increased the rights of national minorities living in Kazakhstan. Facilities for the study of the Uighur, German, Tatar, Kirghiz, and Uzbek languages have all been increased, and societies for the preservation of these languages have been organized.

[13] *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda,* June 10, 1989.
[14] Ibid., Mar. 4, 1987.
[15] Preliminary figures from the 1989 census report 6,531,921 Kazakhs and 6,226,400 Russians living in the republic. *National'nyy sostav naseleniya* (The National Composition of the Population), Moscow, Informatsionyy izdatel'skiy tsentr, 1989, p. 68.
[16] In 1989, 2,021,598 children were being educated in Russian-language schools and only 923,990 in Kazakh-language schools. Joint Public Publications Research Service, *Soviet Union: Political Affairs* (Washington, DC), May 8, 1990, p. 1. This figure is particularly striking when one considers that because of the higher Kazakh birthrate the proportion of Kazakhs among school-age cohorts in the republic is much higher than that of Russians.
[17] *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda,* Aug. 25, 1989.
[18] See ibid., Mar. 31, 1990, for the text of a recent resolution of the Central Committee of the CPK on increasing the amount of Kazakh on locally produced television broadcasts.

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Although many Kazakhs believe that not enough is yet being done to popularize the use of Kazakh, many Russians oppose legislation making Kazakh the republic's state language. Currently less than 1 percent of all Russians living in the republic speak fluent Kazakh. Some Russians accept with equanimity the need to learn Kazakh. But far more complain of the injustice of the recent law, arguing that the truly multi-national nature of the republic makes Russian the more natural official language.

Opposition to the language law has been strongest in the northern oblasts, where Kazakhs make up a minority of the population.[19] The shift in the curriculum has led to the dismissal of some Russian-language teachers, and this action has further angered many. The most common complaint is that Russian youths from Kazakhstan will now be less successful in competing for places in Russian universities. Moreover, in northeast Kazakhstan, the griping has led to the formation of political action committees whose goal is to get several northern *rayons* to secede from Kazakhstan and join Omsk oblast in the Russian republic.[20]

The Kazakh party leadership is certain to remain firm on pushing for the expanded use of Kazakh in the public life of the republic. This is the one issue that easily unifies all Kazakhs, and to waiver on it would irrevocably damage Nazarbayev's prestige. It is a linchpin in the party's program to reassert Kazakh control over the republic, and, in the view of Kazakh reformers, if it encourages disgruntled Russians to leave, all the better.

Rediscovery of the Kazakh past. A critical part of the CPK's political agenda is to fill in the "blank pages" of Kazakh history by offering an accurate rendition of the history of the Kazakh people in general and of Soviet Kazakhstan in particular. This is in keeping with the goals of *glasnost'*, but it also goes well beyond them. By encouraging the rediscovery of the Kazakh past, Nazarbayev is also justifying his policies, whose objective is the reassertion of Kazakh control over the republic. The rewriting of Kazakh history is designed to establish historical claims to all of the territory in present-day Kazakhstan. It is also designed to demonstrate clearly how much Kazakhs have suffered from tsarist and Soviet policies, so that they might be inspired to press for control over their own economic affairs.

As is true of all of the Soviet republics, the boundaries of Kazakhstan were rather arbitrarily set. The Kazakhs have historical claims to all of the territory that currently makes up the republic. But other national groups also have claims to some of this territory. Moreover, the Kazakhs have claims to some territory now located outside of the republic.

From the Kazakh point of view, the most threatening claims are those of the Russians living on the territory of the former Semirech'ye Cossacks in eastern Kazakhstan. Ethnographer Viktor Kozlov championed the cause of these Russians in an article published in *Istoriya SSSR*.[21] The article created a huge controversy, and Kozlov was even publicly chastised by Nazarbayev in an address to the recent 17th CPK Congress.[22]

At the crux of the argument is the question of the historic relationship between the Russian and Kazakh peoples. Were the Kazakhs conquered or did they "voluntarily submit" to Russian rule, as official Soviet sources still maintain? The question is a very complex one, because in 1731 Khan Abul'khayr of the Small Horde (one of three Kazakh hordes) signed a treaty recognizing the authority of Tsarina Anna. But, as the well-known Kazakh writer Anuar Alimzhanov argued in a recent interview, it was clearly not Abul'khayr's intention to turn over the Kazakh lands to the Russians, who had to use force in the middle third of the 19th century to assert full control over this territory.[23]

The nature of the Russian takeover would justify a claim for independence, and it certainly is justification for the current demand for republic sovereignty. For now, the leading Kazakh historians have been nervous about taking on this question directly, and the CPK has concentrated on defending the current boundaries of the republic rather than reopening these fundamental historiographic problems. Leading Kazakh writers and poets, such as Shakharim (1858–1931), who had been banned as "nationalists" have been rehabilitated, but those who led the opposition to Russian rule, such as Khan Kene (Kenisary Qasimov) of the Middle Horde, have not.

Kazakh historians have been more aggressive in rewriting the history of the Soviet period. Most of the leading figures of *Alash Orda*, the short-lived Kazakh autonomous government of 1917–19, have been rehabilitated as part of the party's review of the cases of all 35,000 people charged with political crimes from 1930 to 1953. Currently, there are also plans to republish the works of all of the major figures of the movement and biogra-

[19]According to the 1989 census, Kazakhs are a minority in the oblasts of Kustanay, Pavlodar, East Kazakhstan, Karaganda, Dzhezkazgan, Tselinograd, Kokchetav, and North Kazakhstan. They are also a minority both in Alma-Ata oblast and in the city of Alma-Ata. See Bess Brown, "Kazakhs Now Largest Nation Group in Kazakhstan," Radio Liberty, *Report on the USSR* (Munich), May 4, 1990, pp. 18–19.

[20]Proceedings of the All-Union Conference of Ethnographers, which took place in Alma-Ata, May 28–June 1, 1990.

[21]V. I. Kozlov, "The National Question: Paradigms, Theories, and Policy," *Istoriya SSSR* (Moscow), No. 1, 1990, pp. 3–22.

[22]*Kazakhstanskaya Pravda*, June 8, 1990.

[23]*Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Apr. 11, 1990.

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phies of some of these people have already begun to appear. Some members of the *Alash Orda* movement who went on to serve the Bolshevik government are being more visibly honored; for example, the Kazakh language institute of the republic's academy of sciences now bears the name of Ahmed Baltursunov (1873–1937), who organized the Soviet education system in Kazakhstan. Only Ali Khan Bukeykhanov (1869–1932), a descendant of Abul'khayr and a member of the party, remains discredited. However, although the *Alash Orda* movement's support for Kazakh autonomy is applauded, the movement is still officially criticized for its initial failure to support the Bolshevik Revolution.

Kazakh leaders such as Turar Ryskulov (1894–1939), who supported the Bolshevik Revolution from its inception, but were later purged as nationalists, have been completely rehabilitated.[24] Although most of these people had been exonerated during Kunayev's rule, they had not been accorded public recognition in the life of the republic. Now they are national heroes, and history is being rewritten to cast as villains the Soviet officials who purged them. One such villain is F. I. Goloshchekin, who came to Central Asia with Mikhail Frunze in 1920 and was first secretary of the communist party in Kazakhstan during the collectivization drive.[25]

The period of the collectivization drive in Kazakhstan is the one now most interesting to the Kazakhs. A great debate is currently raging in academic circles over the intent of Moscow's collectivization campaign. Officially, collectivization is now described as a severe policy miscalculation that created an artificial famine that led to 3–4 million Kazakh deaths and destroyed the economy of Kazakhstan.[26] However, some young Kazakh historians, members of the informal organization *Archives,* are asserting that collectivization was a deliberate policy of genocide on Stalin's part, and they complain that the archives of the period are still inaccessible to historians.

Similarly, another period of real controversy is the early 1950's, the years of Nikita Khrushchev's Virgin Lands drive, which Leonid Brezhnev helped direct. The CPK has now attacked Khrushchev's policy as economically disastrous, because it further disrupted Kazakh livestock breeding and led to the irrevocable destruction of Kazakhstan's environment.[27] Dissident Kazakh intellectuals argue that official historians continue to whitewash the history of this period to downplay the racist quality of Moscow's policies.

Nazarbayev's policy toward the rewriting of Kazakh history has tried to expose the past in a way that provides new legitimacy both to his own leadership and to the rule of the CPK. He has emphasized that there were honest and patriotic Kazakh communists among those who were purged, and has implied that if the vision of the Kazakh communists had been implemented, the economic development of Kazakhstan would have proceeded far more smoothly. Although criticism of the selectivity of even the new official version of the past has emerged, it will take most Kazakhs a long time to absorb the wealth of historical material that has been published or is about to appear. As important, by encouraging the "filling-in" of Kazakh history's blank pages on terms determined by the party leadership, Nazarbayev has managed to address one source of popular concern while at the same time undercutting potential support for opposition groups within the republic.

New attitude toward Islam. The CPK has also redefined its relationship to Islam. In recognition of the Kazakhs' Islamic heritage, Nazarbayev strongly supported the successful efforts of the Kazakh clergy to gain its own Muftiate, independent of the religious board of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. This new muftiate was organized in February 1990 and is headed by Ratbek-haji Nysanbai-uli. In addition, the number of officially sanctioned mosques has grown in recent years to 60, and every major city in Kazakhstan has at least one large mosque. Moreover, Kazakhstan's mufti is trying to enlist the cooperation of the hundreds of mullahs within the republic who lack formal training—and have hitherto lacked official recognition—to create a single Islamic establishment.[28]

Some Kazakhs are critical of the government's "endorsement" of Islam. Members of Kazakhstan's more secular informal groups see the rapprochement with Islamic authorities as a cynical effort to harness religion as a means to bolster the party's foundering fortunes. At the opposite extreme, religious activists view this seeming conversion by former proponents of atheism as sacrilegious.

Nonetheless, most Kazakhs seem pleased with the party's public recognition of the special relationship

[24]Both a biography of Ryskulov and a volume of his collected works appeared in 1984. See V. M. Ustinov, *Sluzheniye narodu* (Service to the People), Alma-Ata, "Kazakhstan," 1984; and T. R. Ryskulov, *Izbrannyye trudy* (Selected Works), Alma-Ata, "Kazakhstan," 1984.

[25]See Manesh Kozybayev, "F. I. Goloshchekin. Political Portrait," *Zarya* (Alma-Ata), forthcoming.

[26]For an example of the new scholarship on collectivization, see Zh. B. Abylkhozhin, M. K. Kozybayev, and M. B. Tatimov, "The Kazakhstan Tragedy," *Voprosy Istorii* (Moscow), No. 7, 1989, pp. 53–71.

[27]For a clear statement of the CPK's official view of history, see the lengthy interview with the party's secretary for ideology, Uzbekali Dzhanibekov, in *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda,* May 19, 1990.

[28]See Paul Goble, "The New Mufti in Alma-Ata," Radio Liberty, *Report on the USSR,* June 22, 1990, p. 21.

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A Central Asian fisherman sits near his vessel, which is stranded on what was formerly part of the Aral Sea.

—Fred Mayer/MAGNUM.

between Islam and Kazakh nationalism. Kazakhs have lamented the acute shortage of Korans in the republic, and pressure has risen for the planned Kazakh-language edition of the Koran to be published even sooner than scheduled.[29]

Nazarbayev's policies toward religion represent a long-term gamble. Nazarbayev is betting that the newly created Kazakh muftiate will be able to channel the Islamic revival in ways that are supportive of the party's reform efforts. But his new alliance with the clerical establishment of Kazakhstan is sure to stimulate an even greater religious revival. In addition, members of *Alash* (see below) and other unlicensed informal Islamic oriented groups want religion to be wholly separate from the state and are suspicious of a mufti who came to power with official approval. They are also critical of the decision to create a separate Kazakh muftiate, claiming that this action was designed to cut off Kazakh believers from the rest of their Central Asian brethren.

As Islam plays a more visible role in Kazakhstan, and as people come to acquire more knowledge about religion, it will become more difficult for a single state-sanctioned religious official to speak for the community of Kazakh believers. Unsanctioned Kazakh informal groups with explicitly religious agendas are gaining influence in southern Kazakhstan, particularly in the cities of Dzhambul, Chimkent, and Kzyl Orda. Their influence is sure to increase, and as it does, the power base of Nazarbayev and the Kazakh party elite is sure to weaken, even if these *apparatchiki* now encourage religious invocations at public occasions.

Ecology and economic sovereignty. In the end, the leadership of the CPK will be only as secure as the economic recovery of the republic. Kazakhstan's economy is a diverse one. The economy in the western part of the republic, especially around the Aral Sea, is extremely depressed, as a result of a failing oil industry and a dying inland sea. Until the past year, however, the standard of living, especially as measured by food supply, was by Soviet standards relatively good in

[29]Chapters of the Koran have already appeared in *Qazag adebieti*. See Azade-Ayse Rorlich, "Islam in Kirghizia: The Making of Thinking Believers," ibid., May 11, 1990, p. 21.

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Waving the Kazakh SSR's flag, Kazakh students from the Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement petition the Soviet Ministry of Defense on October 7, 1989, to cease nuclear tests in their republic. The signs, from left to right, read: "Close the Sary Ozek Nuclear Test Site," "Close the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site," "Ministry of Defense, Stop the War Against Your Own People," "Nevada-Semipalatinsk—The Way of People's Diplomacy," "We Kazakh Students Are Part of Our Nation," "No to Nuclear Tests."

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

Alma-Ata and in many of the principal cities of the northern half of the republic.

Nevertheless, calls for major economic reforms have been increasing in Kazakhstan for the past several years, linked first to the growing ecology movement, and then in the first half of 1990 to the demand for republic economic autonomy. However, until the Novyy Uzen' riots of June 1989, when unemployed Kazakhs assaulted settlers from the North Caucasus, few concrete measures were put forward to improve the situation.

Official recognition of the harshness of conditions in cities like Novyy Uzen' existed before the riots. In fact, Novyy Uzen' was itself the subject of an article in *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda* just a month before the riots. The article highlighted the high rate of unemployment, the absence of gas and oil in a region that produces both, and the dire health and sanitary conditions in the region.[30] However, many still complain that the passage of new measures notwithstanding, new jobs have yet to be created and food and consumer goods are still in very short supply in western Kazakhstan.

The Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement, organized in March 1989 largely on the personal initiative of Suleymenov, seems likely to succeed in its primary goal of eliminating nuclear testing in Kazakhstan.[31] However, this is in large part because the organization enjoys the support of the CPK leadership. In fact, the first secretary of the Semipalatinsk *obkom* is also head of the oblast Nevada-Semipalatinsk committee. But this support was not forthcoming until Suleymenov successfully stage-managed a well-orchestrated republic and all-

[30] *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda*, May 17, 1989.

[31] A test site for chemical weapons is located in Akmolinsk, and nuclear warheads are stored at the chemical testing facility at Staryy Ozek.

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Union publicity campaign that included television film clips and newspaper photo spreads of blighted areas and diseased livestock and people.[32]

There are also complaints that Kazakhstan's major ecology movements have done well at publicizing their aims, but have made few, if any, improvements in the standard of living in the republic. Thus, given the now universal support within the republic for eliminating nuclear testing, some believe that the organization should devote more attention to the movement's secondary goals—gaining compensation for the destruction of the local environment and the impairment of the health of local residents that prolonged testing has caused. Such critics decry the money spent on the May 1990 world anti-nuclear congress in Alma-Ata and Semipalatinsk, paid for in large part by American and Japanese donations.

Suleymenov has also been a key organizer in the movement to "Save the Aral Sea," which also enjoys the strong support of the CPK.[33] This effort is an expansion of the work of the "Committee on the Problem of the Aral, Balkhash, and Ecology of Kazakhstan," which was organized in March 1989 and chaired by Suleymenov's fellow writer and USSR Supreme Soviet Deputy Mukhtar Shakhanov. Here, too, the movement's aims have been to try and attract attention to the problem, and to enlist assistance and financial aid from all-Union and international sources. But once again, its primary aim is not to provide direct assistance to the afflicted region.

CPK leaders cite the limited economic resources of the region as the primary reason why they are unable to address directly these and other ecological problems.[34] At first, Nazarbayev made this argument only gingerly,[35] but now he repeatedly underscores that the situation could be rectified if the Kazakhs "owned" the natural resources of the republic. These resources—the oil, gas, gold, and copper that lie beneath the soil of Kazakhstan—are the unexploited wealth that could potentially be used to fund the republic's economic recovery and environmental clean-up. In all of his recent addresses, Nazarbayev has detailed the hard-currency earnings that have accrued to the USSR from raw materials and goods exported from Kazakhstan, of which sum less than 10 percent has been reinvested in the republic.[36] Thus, the question of protecting the ecology of the republic is now directly linked to that of republic sovereignty.

For now at least, the question of republic sovereignty has overshadowed all other economic questions. Nazarbayev has become a very vocal champion of Kazakhstan's economic autonomy. For example, within days of USSR Premier Nikolay Ryzhkov's announcement of plans for a regulated market economy and for an accompanying rise in prices, Nazarbayev appeared on television to report that prices in Kazakhstan would not rise.

Such apparent independence of mind notwithstanding, Nazarbayev has approached the question of economic autonomy with caution. Kazakhstan's economy is well integrated with that of the all-Union economy in general and the RSFSR's economy in particular. What Nazarbayev terms economic autonomy simply denotes greater discretionary authority for officials in Alma-Ata to decide their own economic plans, combined with setting world-market prices for Kazakhstan's extractable resources. Nazarbayev is not a proponent of radical economic reforms, nor has he proposed private ownership of property; he favors long-term leasing arrangements where rights of inheritance are ensured. Moreover, critics of Nazarbayev's position report found little support within the Kazakh legislature.[37]

However, Nazarbayev seems to understand the potential vulnerability of Kazakhstan's economic position, as well as that of the other Central Asian republics. Thus, he has been pushing for the five republics to work in concert to solve their common problems through setting up direct economic ties and developing an all-Central Asian market. In June 1990, the Central Asian republic presidents met in Alma-Ata and signed an agreement for economic, social, and cultural cooperation.[38] But even regional cooperation will not rectify Kazakhstan's dying environment, modernize its coal industry, or revive livestock breeding. Moreover, if Nazarbayev cannot deal with these problems, he will be unable to preserve the power of the CPK.

Political Currents in Kazakhstan

The CPK has patterned its "liberalization" on Moscow's timetable for democratic political reforms. Although the "demands" of Kazakhstan's political elite

[32]For an example, see *Sobesednik* (Moscow), No. 25, 1989.

[33]See *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda*, May 16, 1990, for Nazarbayev's statement on the Supreme Soviet of Kazakhstan's plea with regard to the Aral Sea.

[34]The June 6, 1989, edition of *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda* was devoted almost in its entirety to elaborating a program for arresting the deterioration of the ecological disaster zones of the republic. These measures were targeted for Semipalatinsk, the Aral Sea, and Lake Balkhash. The program also included measures designed to reduce air pollution and the pollution of the republic's rivers and smaller lakes.

[35]See the interview with Nazarbayev in *Ogonek* (Moscow), No. 26, 1989, pp. 9–11.

[36]See *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda*, May 23 and June 8, 1990.

[37]*Sovety Kazakhstana* (Alma-Ata), No. 5, 1989.

[38]*Kazakhstanskaya Pravda*, June 23, 1990.

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Olzhas Suleymenov, prominent Kazakh writer, communist party member, USSR Supreme Soviet deputy, and leader of the Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement, which has protested nuclear testing in Kazakhstan.

—Photo by the author.

sometimes go beyond concessions that Mikhail Gorbachev has already promised to grant, Nazarbayev's criticisms of the pace of Moscow's reforms are well within tolerable limits, and pale by comparison with those offered by the presidents of the Russian and Moldavian republics, not to mention those of the Baltic republics.

Although Nazarbayev undoubtedly wants greater political and economic autonomy for Kazakhstan, he has absolutely no plans for Kazakhstan to leave the USSR. He has remained a steadfast critic of independence for Lithuania, and has criticized the Baltic popular fronts for sending "emissaries" to his republic to organize political opposition groups.[39]

Whatever personal antipathy he might have toward Gorbachev for how he was treated in December 1986, Nazarbayev remains a loyal lieutenant of Moscow's communist party leadership. For example, in the meeting held in early June to begin drafting a new Treaty of Union between Moscow and the republics, he was reported to be the only member of the council of republic presidents to support the idea of a strong center.[40] Moreover, at the 28th Congress of the CPSU this summer, Nazarbayev demanded that the congress endorse both increased discipline and republic sovereignty.[41]

The CPK has moved in recent years to advocate greater autonomy for Kazakhstan and to try to reassert the Kazakhs' control over their homeland. However, the party is only marginally more democratic than it was under Kunayev. If real debates over policies are taking place, they are being conducted behind closed doors. The party appears to be in no danger of splitting apart from within. Even the CPK's 17th Congress gave the appearance of being a well-orchestrated event.[42] The republic leadership was careful to present a unified front, and the calls for greater democratization within the party were so few as not even to warrant serious discussion.

Kazakhstan's Supreme Soviet has passed legislation on informal organizations that roughly parallels similar legislation passed by the USSR Supreme Soviet. Thus, Kazakhstan's informal organizations are licensed once they complete the necessary formalities. However, with the exception of Suleymenov's Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement and a few officially sponsored language societies and ecology committees, most receive no official encouragement. Kazakhstan's party elite seems determined to retain control of the republic as long as is feasible.[43]

Suleymenov himself plays a critical role in the political life of the republic, serving almost as an official conscience of the party. As a member of the CPK's Central Committee and the first secretary of Kazakhstan's Writers' Union, he is certainly part of the ruling elite. However, he has also made himself into a virtual one-man "loyal opposition," saying things that in the context of Kazakhstan's politics sometimes seem shocking, but that are moderate compared to the demands of nationalist politicians in other republics.

Suleymenov has been a popular poet in the republic for nearly 30 years, but gained increased notoriety in 1975 when he published *Az i Ya,* which retold the *Lay of the Host of Igor'* tale from a Turkic perspective.[44] This

[39]Ibid., Aug. 20, 1989.

[40]*Literaturnaya Gazeta,* June 20, 1989.

[41]*Vremya* (Moscow), July 4, 1990.

[42]*Kazakhstanskaya Pravda,* June 9–12, 1990.

[43]For a full survey of informal groups in Kazakhstan, see Bess Brown, "The Role of Public Groups in *Perestroika* in Central Asia," Radio Liberty, *Report on the USSR,* Jan. 26, 1990, pp. 20–25.

[44]Olzhas Suleymenov, *Az i Ya. Esse, publitsistika, stikhi, poemi* (*Az* and *Ya.* Essays, Articles, Verses, Poems), Alma-Ata, "Zhalyn," 1989. (*Az i Ya* is a complicated pun. The title spells "Asia" [*Aziya*], but can also be interpreted to mean *Az,* or the old Russian word for "I," plus *Ya,* which is the modern Russian word for "I." Thus, *Az i Ya* can be roughly translated to mean "my ancient self and my modern self" or "the past and I.")

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book, initially banned as heretical, has recently been republished in an enormous print-run, and is now publicly praised by all Kazakh historians.[45]

Moreover, public regard for Suleymenov has increased because of his activities with the Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement and because of the visible role that he has played in the USSR Supreme Soviet. A member of the Inter-Regional Group of Deputies, Suleymenov has frequently appeared on all-Union television, and has emerged as a public champion of such diverse causes as support for the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, the Georgians whose peaceful demonstration in Tbilisi was violently ended by Soviet authorities on April 9, 1989, and the citizens of Baku who were assaulted by Soviet troops in January of this year.

It is hard to pin down Suleymenov's own political philosophy. He claims to be a democrat, but not an anti-communist, although he is not very precise about what each term means. He is both an internationalist and a nationalist. Suleymenov is an advocate of all-Union democratic causes, but is most convincing and articulate as an advocate of Kazakh national aims and Central Asians' general political concerns.

Suleymenov's basic agenda seems to be to push for more open government. At the CPK's 16th Congress in February 1986, he demanded that Kunayev's many critics explain why they had sat so long in silence.[46] At the 17th Congress, he demanded that the period of *zastoy* be appraised no less honestly than the rest of Kazakh history. But while Suleymenov demands accountability of the party elite, he does not really offer a clear alternative to it. He can turn out crowds, but he has not offered a distinct political agenda. Thus, Suleymenov's movement serves as an effective lobby but is not a real political opposition group.

Suleymenov is without doubt one of the most powerful political personalities not just in Kazakhstan but throughout Central Asia. Moreover, he has now agreed to serve as a coordinator for all the Central Asian democratic groups, so his influence is sure to grow. However, Suleymenov's primary goal is to facilitate dialogue between the informal groups and the government rather than to mobilize a new political force.[47]

New political parties have recently emerged, but they are sure to remain politically marginal for the foreseeable future because the CPK elite has managed to retain firm control of the newly elected republic Supreme Soviet.[48] The Social Democratic Party of Kazakhstan was organized by several hundred Russian and Kazakh intellectuals in June 1990. The membership of this party hails almost exclusively from the Alma-Ata region, and is drawn from Kazakhstan's branch of Memorial and a group called Forum. Only 30 percent of the members of this party are Kazakhs, but as the Kazakhs note, this is sufficient to prevent the party from becoming anti-Kazakh. Moreover, the party leadership tries to work actively with Kazakhs from the United Front, a group that is committed to the rebirth of the Kazakh culture and the reorganization of a democratic Kazakh republic that is part of the USSR.

The Social Democrats are hampered by their lack of financial support, and they are seeking recognition from foreign social democratic parties to help establish their party. Party leaders have undertaken extensive public opinion polling in Alma-Ata, and in their judgment the results indicate that their program could achieve public support if it were publicized. A poll done in February 1990 showed that 50 percent of those surveyed favored the creation of a multi-party system and 47 percent favored private ownership.[49] The group is now working to organize branches in other parts of the republic.

Zheltoksan is now reorganizing as the National Democratic Party, and is headed by Amanzhol Nelabayev and Khosen Murzakhmetov, the latter a former political prisoner. This group hopes to draw additional support from three other Kazakh informal groups, *Zhertsiuk, Akikat,* and *Azamat.* The goal of the first group is to preserve Kazakh culture; the second is a movement of young historians; and the third hopes to serve as an independent Kazakh youth organization. All these groups favor a renaissance of Kazakh culture and Kazakh control of the republic. For now, they accept Kazakhstan as part of the USSR, but they are working to foster the ideal of eventual Kazakh independence.

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[45]The print-run for Suleymenov's work was 250,000. Public praise was recently offered by Manesh Kozybayev, director of the Institute of History, Archeology, and Ethnography of the Academy of Sciences of the Kazakh SSR, in his welcoming address to the all-Union Conference of Ethnographers, Alma-Ata, May 29, 1990.

[46]*Kazakhstanskaya Pravda,* Feb. 8–11, 1986.

[47]In his interview in the July 18, 1990, *Literaturnaya Gazeta,* Suleymenov mentioned that he attended both the meeting of the Central Asian presidents and that of the Central Asian informal groups, which were held concurrently in Alma-Ata in June.

[48]Only 126 of the 270 election districts had two or more candidates run, and an additional 165 candidates stood for the 90 seats that were reserved for members of "social" organizations. *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda,* Apr. 4, 1990.

[49]Unpublished material from the Social Democratic Party of Kazakhstan. The size of the sample and the date of the survey are not available, but the breakdown of the sample was representative of the population of the city. For the program of the Social Democratic Party of Kazakhstan, see *Programma i ideynaya platforma politicheskoy partii Kazakhstana sotsial-demokraticheskogo tolka, "Partiya spravedlivosti"-"Edilet partiyasy"—EP-PS* (Program and Statement of Principles of the Social Democratic Party of Kazakhstan "Party of Justice"—EP-PS), May 1990.

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Not all of Kazakhstan's informal organizations accept the present boundaries. The "Organization for the Autonomy of Eastern Kazakhstan" is a Russian group that is trying to get the republic's eastern oblasts declared as an autonomous region so that they will be exempt from Kazakh-language legislation. This group is becoming a powerful lobby in the eastern part of the republic, and some Kazakhs fear it will encourage the formation of other Russian nationalist organizations.

A growing Islamic opposition to communist party rule is also emerging in Kazakhstan. A number of different groups have Islamic nationalist agendas, but information about their membership and their political goals is hard to obtain and often contradictory. Thus, it is hard to evaluate the threat that these radical Islamic nationalists pose. It is also difficult to know precisely how many different informal groups actually exist, as these groups are often short-lived and have overlapping memberships.

One such group is "Turkestan," with headquarters in Tashkent, whose goal is to establish an independent Islamic state of Turkestan that would unify all five Central Asian republics. The leadership in Tashkent claims strong support in Kazakhstan, but there is little direct evidence of this.[50] However, *Alash,* a Kazakh Islamic nationalist group, named after the legendary founder of the Kazakh nation, shares many of the same goals as "Turkestan." *Alash* has branches in all of the principal Kazakh cities, but again no precise information about its membership is available. *Alash* advocates Islam as the basis of the national regeneration of the Kazakhs, and wants Kazakhstan to be part of an independent Central Asian confederation. Although *Alash* claims to seek a peaceful political transition, its political opponents in Kazakhstan claim that *Alash* is prepared to use force to obtain its goals and has armed disciples prepared to fight for its mission.[51]

There also appear to be plans to form an Islamic Democratic Party in Kazakhstan. But it is difficult to determine whether this is a distinct group, another name that *Alash* organizers use, or the reformulation of an earlier group named "Islam and Democracy," whose existence the CPK has long denied.[52] Although the existence of "Islam and Democracy" is in doubt, its presumed leader, Almaz Yesetov, has been subjected to constant criticism in the Kazakh press.[53] Yesetov is editing his own journal, *Turkestan*, whose first issue was printed in Estonia in spring 1990. The second issue is currently in press.

Turkestan is published in Russian, and includes materials about events in all the Turkic republics. The content is secular in orientation, but it has a religious coloration. The second issue in particular includes previously unpublished political tracts by a number of Kazakh intellectuals, including Suleymenov, in whose company Yesetov is frequently seen. Yesetov claims close ties with Islamic nationalist groups throughout Central Asia. However, he maintains that he has broken with *Alash* inasmuch as he is now committed to peaceful change in Kazakhstan.

The deterioration of communist party rule in the center is affecting the political environment in Kazakhstan. Political alliances that would earlier have been unimaginable now attract little comment, as people jockey for position in a new and as yet largely undefined political order. For now, none of the informal organizations poses a direct threat to the authority of the CPK. But their existence serves as a reminder of the popularly-supported items on the political agenda that remain unresolved.

Conclusion

Kazakhstan is accustomed to strong leaders, and Nazarbayev has moved quickly to consolidate his control while working hard to ensure that the Kazakhs get fair treatment from Moscow. The CPK's political fortunes will be determined by the outcome of the republic's quest for sovereignty and by the ability of Kazakhstan's government to gain this sovereignty quickly enough to spur economic recovery.

However, Nazarbayev may face more serious political challenges. Kazakh intellectuals continue to demand an accurate accounting of the Alma-Ata demonstrations. Mukhtar Shakhanov has revealed that none of the 2,401 demonstrators arrested in December 1986 were alcoholics or drug addicts, and a government investigator has admitted that local ministry of internal affairs officials ordered the attack on the demonstrators. Nazarbayev, who then served as chairman of Kazakhstan's Council of Ministers, will have to work to dissociate himself from the subsequent official "cover-up."[54] Moreover, Suleymenov's efforts to gain a fair evaluation of Kunayev's rule leaves Nazarbayev vulnerable to fur-

[50]Interviews with "Turkestan" activists in Uzbekistan, July 1990.

[51]However, rumors of thousands of armed Islamic fighters with links throughout Central Asia are now commonplace, and can neither be confirmed nor discredited.

[52]*Kazakhstanskaya Pravda*, Nov. 23, 1988; *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Dec. 7, 1988.

[53]Yesetov spent nearly three years in jail on drug charges. He maintains that he was framed because of his dissident political activities. Personal communications with Yesetov, July 1990.

[54]Shakhanov's protest took the form of an open letter to the chairman of the KGB, dated May 10, 1990, which appears in *Turkestan*, No. 2, along with a letter from an investigator from the staff of Kazakhstan's procurator's office.

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ther charges of political adventurism, as he was one of Kunayev's most vituperative opponents.

But Nazarbayev's greatest liability is that for all his "new thinking," he has found no way to juggle Russian and Kazakh interests. The simultaneous rise of Russian nationalist sentiment and Islamic nationalism creates a potentially volatile situation. In a deteriorating economy, ethnic rivalries are like dry kindling: any spark will ignite them.

Nazarbayev will find it difficult to complete his five-year term as president unless he finds a way to bridge the gap between the Kazakh and the Russian visions of a reconstructed Kazakhstan. Most Russians want a more democratic republic, with a strong economy that preserves their linguistic domination and their cultural autonomy. By contrast, most Kazakhs want the republic to become their homeland, where their language, faith, and culture dominate, and their environment is protected. Over time, these two visions will come into greater conflict, and as they do, first Nazarbayev, and then Kazakhstan's party elite, will be toppled.

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Books

Soviet Nations

John A. Armstrong

GREGORY GLEASON. *Federalism and Nationalism: The Struggle for Republican Rights in the USSR.* Boulder, CO, Westview, 1990.

BOHDAN NAHAYLO and VICTOR SWOBODA. *Soviet Disunion: A History of the Nationalities Problems in the USSR.* New York, The Free Press, 1990.

NADIA DIUK and ADRIAN KARATNYCKY. *The Hidden Nations: The People Challenge the Soviet Union.* New York, William Morrow and Co., 1990.

IT WAS easy to predict that the upsurge of national expression in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics during 1988–89 would stimulate publication of a variety of books. To be sure, a half-dozen first-rate treatments of the entire range of Soviet nationality issues had become available during the past quarter-century: the symposia edited by Erich Goldhagen, *Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union* (1968) and by Jeremy R. Azrael, *Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices* (1978); Robert Conquest's *Soviet Nationalities Policy in Practice* (1967); Jürgen Arnold's *Nationalgebietseinheiten der Sowjetunion* (National-Territorial Units of the Soviet Union—1973); Hélène Carrère d'Encausse's *Decline of an Empire* (1979); and Rasma Karklins's *Ethnic Relations in the USSR* (1986). But the flood of information during the past three years, and the dramatic events that produced this flood, have so altered our understanding of the nationalities issue in the Soviet Union that new interpretations are in order.

The volumes under review, like their predecessors, basically afford a *synoptic* view of ethnic relations in the USSR. Although this approach, when pursued competently, can enhance comprehension of individual ethnic situations as well as of the entire Soviet predicament, readers trained as social scientists would appreciate a *synthetic* interpretation based on theory, or at least the kind of pre-theory represented by systematic typologies. At the present underdeveloped stage of social science conceptualization of ethnic interrelations, though, such synthetic interpretations are extraordinarily difficult to achieve for specialists on the Soviet Union. Consequently, up-to-date synoptic surveys are all one can reasonably expect.

The first, and perhaps best so far, of the new synoptic interpretations to reach this reviewer was *The Nationalities Factor in Soviet Politics and Society*, a symposium edited by Lubomyr Hajda and Mark Beissinger.[1] Although I deal with this volume in greater detail elsewhere,[2] it serves as a standard by which to judge the works under review here. Despite the large number of contributors (13), editorial oversight has achieved a considerable measure of synthetic analysis, notably in statistical presentations. Moreover, the brief volume contains seven analytic chapters which, without being fully coordinated, apply theoretical frameworks to such aspects of nationality issues as religion, economics, the role of the military, literature, and language.

On the other hand, the book's analytic approach did not leave much

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[1]Westview, Boulder, CO, 1990.

[2]See *Bulletin of the Association for the Advancement of Central Asian Research* (Rocky Hill, CT), forthcoming.

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space for the treatment of specific nationalities, nor did it contain a strictly historical treatment of Soviet nationalities policy. Consequently, the three books reviewed here, although not matching the standard of analysis of the Hajda/Beissinger volume, are highly useful complements. The massive work by Bohdan Nahaylo and Victor Swoboda, explicitly a "history" of the nationalities problem, provides impressive chronological coverage of developments during the past two decades. Gregory Gleason's approach to federalism is also primarily historical. But unlike Nahaylo/Swoboda, it uses a systematic interpretative framework, namely, legal analysis of the federal structure. The vivid contemporary account by Nadia Diuk and Adrian Karatnycky, on the other hand, will be especially valuable to the general reader.

THE work by Gleason applies a systematic interpretive framework—namely, analysis of the federal structure—to the study of the contemporary struggle for republic rights in the Soviet Union. He did not pioneer in constitutional interpretation. In addition to the notable commentaries by John N. Hazard and Julian Towster published in the 1940's,[3] the Arnold monograph mentioned above provided a thorough public law interpretation. However, the Gleason book brings our knowledge up to 1989. With the advantage of hindsight, he is more realistic than some earlier scholars concerning the role of Marxist-Leninist ideology in the federal system: "[T]hrough legerdemain and prevarication, the formal guarantees were ignored in practice or circumvented by means of artful ideological reinterpretation. In sum, the federal structures were adopted by the center to placate national sentiment, were adapted to contain it, and were designed eventually to destroy it" (p. 5). As Marxist-Leninist imperatives lose force, however, legal interpretations and legal innovations such as the new, restrictive rules on secession become salient—and Gleason's book correspondingly more useful.

His treatment is weaker on the implications of earlier Soviet maneuvers. For example, Gleason's account (p. 54) of the 1940 annexation of Bukovina (which the volume by Swoboda and Nahaylo correctly describes) is inaccurate. Bukovina (*not* "Bukhovina") was indeed incorporated into the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, but never into the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Rather, parts of Bessarabia acquired at the same time from Romania were added to the small pre-1940 Moldavian ASSR, which was then (for the most part) removed from the Ukrainian SSR to become the new Moldavian SSR.

Chapters 2–8 of *Soviet Disunion* (written by Swoboda) provide a better summary of Soviet nationality policy prior to Leonid Brezhnev's rule than does Gleason. The treatment would have been improved, however, had Swoboda systematically consulted up-to-date Western monographs on nationality policies under Stalin and Nikita Khrushchev. Moreover, Swoboda's scant nine pages on the significant tsarist background to Soviet nationality policies are inferior to Roman Szporluk's excellent chapter, "The Imperial Legacy," in the Hajda/Beissinger volume.

The main thrust of *Soviet Disunion*, which emerges in the subsequent chapters written by Nahaylo, is a dense chronological account of nationality developments after the accession of Brezhnev. In addition to Soviet sources, Nahaylo relies on the cogent, detailed analyses by Radio Liberty Research and on a wide range of other Western studies. For the years after 1986, his coverage is virtually week-by-week. To a greater degree than volumes which excel in *analysis* of the nationalities problem, *Soviet Disunion* will remain an indispensable *factual* reference book for Sovietologists for years to come.

The Hidden Nations will appeal to a rather different audience.[4] Diuk and Karatnycky, a wife-husband team whose work was sponsored by the Shevchenko Scientific Society in New York, traveled extensively in the Soviet Union during 1989–90. Fluent in Ukrainian and Russian, they encountered nationality concerns at an intimate, human level. This experience gives their book an immediacy that familiarity with up-to-date written materials alone cannot provide. By vividly presenting their observations, the two authors offer a book that may well reach a wider public than the others considered here.

Like other journalistic accounts, *The Hidden Nations* relies on anecdotes. The reader must trust the authors' assurance that these are in some sense "representative" of contemporary Soviet society. Where the authors are thoroughly familiar with the societal context, as in Ukraine, their anecdotal approach generally works well. Occasionally, they are a shade starry-eyed, as in their enthusiasm regarding the prospects (p. 98) for construction of a monument to Taras Shevchenko in Lviv; the authors are apparently

[3]See, for example, John N. Hazard, *The Soviet System of Government*, which has appeared in many editions; and Julian Towster, *Political Power in USSR, 1917–47*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1948.

[4]I read *The Hidden Nations* in page proofs. It will become available in early autumn 1990. No doubt pagination, and possibly some details, will be altered.

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unaware of the fact that a monumental statue of the outstanding 19th century Ukrainian poet has graced Kharkiv at least since the 1950's.

In regions (primarily Muslim, as will be noted below) with which the authors' acquaintance is limited, shrewd personal observations tend to take second place to reliance on local oral informants. A pitfall throughout Soviet history even for Pulitzer-prize-winning journalistic accounts, until recently such oral information was distorted by official guidelines imposed on the informants. Now local informants can be drawn from broader spheres, including adamant opponents of the Marxist-Leninist regime. Most, however, find it difficult to set aside Soviet thought patterns, and still harder to overcome areas of ignorance that official disinformation has fostered. Moreover, anyone—like the present reviewer—brought up in a historic American town knows that even in an open society, numerous factors—reflexes of local pride, glib assumptions that natives naturally know better than outsiders, and a tendency to diametrically oppose interpretations previously imposed—combine to undermine the reliability of local informants about areas outside the sphere of their personal observation.

ALL four of the authors of *Soviet Disunion* and *The Hidden Nations* have Ukrainian connections, and hence provide exceptionally strong coverage for the "Second Soviet Republic."[5] At this moment in history, both specialists and non-specialists urgently require such knowledge. Ukrainians, nearly one-fifth of the Soviet population (and therefore two-fifths of the non-Russians), are intrinsically more important than any likely combination of smaller Soviet nationalities. The present Ukrainian situation is so complex, not to say ambiguous, that authoritative information on it is indispensable for shaping a coherent view of the rapidly evolving Soviet situation as a whole. The coverage by Nahaylo/Swoboda and Diuk/Karatnycky is especially welcome because the Hajda/Beissinger book, although providing numerous analytic insights and very useful statistics on Ukrainian developments, is somewhat fragmented in its coverage of this vital region.[6]

The least satisfying treatment of Ukraine is in Gleason's book, which is weak in its discussion of specific features of earlier "federal" arrangements affecting that republic: for example, the virtually autonomous status (under Moscow) of Ukraine's "councils of the national economy" (*sovnarkhozy*) in the early 1960's and the special role of Ukrainian party provincial committees (*obkomy*) in all-Union party affairs. While correctly emphasizing "national bureaucracies" (that is, the republic apparatuses) as the principal agents in the implementation of the federal principle under Brezhnev, Gleason exaggerates the degree to which such a national bureaucracy emerged in Ukraine and a number of other republics. In fact, a deep cleavage affected the Ukrainian apparatus at least since the mid-1960's. *Apparatchiki* in Dnipropetrovsk and the Donbass, whether Russians or ethnic Ukrainians (as symbolized by V. V. Shcherbyts'kyi) developed intense identification with the central apparatus in Moscow, whereas a large official Ukrainian segment, headed by Ukrainian party First Secretary Petro Shelest until his 1972 ouster, strove to maximize Ukrainian cultural expression. Under these circumstances, the notion of a united "national bureaucratic" position in Ukraine comparable, say, to that in Kazakhstan, is far off the mark. Innumerable details adduced by Diuk/Karatnycky and Nahaylo/Swoboda refute Gleason's discovery of a "national climate" permeating the Ukrainian scientific community and other bureaucratic agencies.

On the other hand, Swoboda tends to exaggerate the suppression of the Ukrainian language in official use. Also, the assertion by Diuk/Karatnycky (p. 53) that all Ukrainian graduate students are required to write their Ph.D. dissertations in Russian is dubious. Conceivably this became the norm in recent years when Shcherbyts'kyi was first party secretary in Ukraine. In any case, I read—and reported in print—no fewer than five dissertations on historical subjects written in Ukrainian and accepted by Ukrainian educational institutions during the late 1940's and early 1950's.[7]

The negative impact of the Soviet system on the Ukrainian national spirit is vividly portrayed in the interviews conducted by Diuk and Karatnycky in Kiev and Lviv. "Among Lviv's senior citizens, one is apt to encounter sad eyes, uncertainty, and nervousness—all telltale signs that *glasnost'* has a long way to go before it removes the fears built by the experiences of decades of terror and repression" (p. 90). As late as autumn 1989, such old fears were reinforced by forcible disruption of mass protest meetings. Yet

[5]This expression comes from Yaroslav Bilinsky, *The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine after World War Two,* New Brunswick, NJ, Rutgers University Press, 1964.

[6]The excellent chapter in Hajda/Beissinger by Roman Solchanyk (an expert from Radio Liberty Research) is handicapped by his requirement to cover (in 30 pages) Belorussia and Moldavia as well as Ukraine. Bohdan Bociurkiw, another Ukrainian expert, succinctly clarifies the major topic of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in his chapter on religion, but could not, of course, treat most Ukrainian issues.

[7]If *my* 1979 oral informant was accurate, dissertations could be presented in Georgian even in the Tbilisi Higher Party School.

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the young continue to protest, and (in Western Ukraine) old and young together attend Ukrainian Catholic services. In a way, the countryside is worse off, for no regime change is likely to restore its role as the reservoir of Ukrainian traditions and self-reliance, since nearly all males, especially the young, have left. " 'We've gotten used to the way things are,' says Maria a sixty-year-old retired collective farmer, 'What could I possibly do with the land on my own without the men. Things might get worse if we were left each to fend for ourselves' " (p. 82).

The issue of uneven development of national consciousness in different regions of Ukraine—which is larger than France—persists. Perhaps because of his narrow focus on overtly national concerns, Nahaylo ignores the crucial issue of the 1989 coal-miner strikes in the Donbass, which recurred in 1990. Diuk and Karatnycky repeatedly but confusedly note the events: on p. 17, militant strike committees are set up in Ukraine and in Kazakhstan (a minor strike locale); on p. 45, the July 1989 strikes in the principal centers, the Kuznets Basin and Vorkuta, are mentioned without reference to the Donbass strikes that quickly followed. On p. 87, the authors imply, on the contrary, that the discontents of the Donbass miners "spilled over" from the concerns of other Ukrainians, whereas abundant evidence indicates that the entire coal-miner movement, starting in Russian Siberia (Kuzbass), was an extraordinarily unified labor protest, determined (as the authors admit) to exclude "politicians," including those from the Popular Movement for Restructuring in Ukraine (*Rukh*).

Quite possibly Diuk and Karatnycky are correct in remarking (p. 95) that "Now more and more miners from the Donbass, Ukrainians and Russians alike, are warming to the idea of an economically sovereign Ukraine." The startling July 16, 1990, action of the new Ukrainian parliament in adopting, almost unanimously, a sweeping declaration of sovereignty, may reflect such support. It is also possible, however, that the parliament's principal motivation was Boris Yel'tsin's dynamic appeals, as president of the Russian republic, for broader powers for all constituent republics of the USSR. And, it is worth noting that the Kiev parliament did stop short of calling for secession from the Union.

Ultimately, both *Soviet Disunion* and *The Hidden Nations* reach remarkably similar conclusions about the strength of the Ukrainian national movement. On p. 331, Nahaylo writes that "*Rukh*'s mission was complicated, though, by the fact that Ukrainian feeling remained very strong in Western Ukraine and much weaker in the more Russified southern and eastern parts of the republic." Diuk and Karatnycky more precisely refer to the "bedrock" strength of the national movement among Eastern Rite Catholics in Western Ukraine and argue that the movement is gaining strength among the Orthodox Ukrainians of central Ukraine, including Kiev. However, "in the regions farther to the east, support for outright Ukrainian independence is still weak. Many Russians live there and most Ukrainians are Russian speakers who have lost their links to their Ukrainian roots" (p. 96). Hence, *Rukh* recognizes that demands for self-determination must be incorporated into a framework that "makes economic sense for Russified Ukrainian miners and steel-workers, whose main concerns are their paycheck, the availability of consumer goods, and food" (p. 97).

IN contrast to some earlier works that assumed Russian nationalism had been replaced by Marxism-Leninism or Soviet patriotism, all three books (as well as the Hajda/Beissinger volume) examine Russian nationalism in depth. The authors draw on recent monographic literature on Russian movements, notably the books by John Dunlop.[8] Nahaylo/Swoboda provide a brief but trenchant passage (pp. 171–72) on the emergence of extreme Russian nationalism during the early Brezhnev period. In *The Hidden Nations,* discussion of *Pamyat'* (The Memory Society) and its staunch critic, the Ukrainian writer and editor of *Ogonek* Vitaliy Korotich, is especially penetrating. An excellent analysis of the style and substance of *Pamyat'* spokesmen, especially their bitter anti-Semitism, is presented. Apart from the Russian liberal opponents of *Pamyat',* there are other brands of Russian and Pan-Slavic nationalism, such as the "union of eastern Slavs," that endorse more positive aims (although these aims are also objectionable to many). But one is compelled to agree with Nahaylo's conclusion that, on the whole, irrational thinking is more marked among Russian political actors than among most other national spokesmen, notably *Rukh* leaders.

On the other hand, the authors of *The Hidden Nations,* in an unfortunate historical excursus (p. 183), exaggerate the peculiarities in the earlier development of Russian nationalism. To be sure, Russian tradition does not include a strong democratic orientation—but this is true of many nations in East-Central Europe and the present USSR. Indeed, East-Central Europeans trans-

[8]See, e.g., John B. Dunlop's *The Faces of Contemporary Russian Nationalism,* Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1983; *The New Russian Nationalism,* Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, 1985; as well as his periodic articles in Radio Liberty, *Report on the USSR* (Munich).

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mitted to Russia a gentry's contempt for urban minorities and bourgeois pursuits that continues to brake economic development to this day. Nor is the determined drive for "ingathering" other Slavs and Orthodox Christians altogether peculiar to the Russians. At some stage of their histories, all major nations, most notably Poles, Castilians, English, and northern French, legitimized comparable expansion by appeals to divine missions. But the existence of such historical analogies in no way justifies Russian chauvinistic behavior today.

There are some indications, such as protests by Russians against calling up reservists to suppress the 1989 ethnic strife in Azerbaijan —which, curiously, none of our authors mentions—that Russians are beginning to perceive as excessive the costs of imperial domination. With all due reservations, it appears reasonable to hope that the Russian nation may become a thoroughly acceptable partner in European confederal relations.

Each of these books provides excellent discussions of the Baltic nations, whose initiatives during the past three years have done so much to force the Soviet regime to face up to the problem of real equality among nations. One result of these overt actions is that information has become highly accessible. Nahaylo's week-to-week coverage of this material is just what is needed to provide a sense of the evolution of the Baltic peoples' position, including evidence of overwhelming solidarity among members of each Baltic nation. Romuald Misiunas succinctly analyzes this evidence in his chapter in the Hajda/Beissinger book. Generally, treatment of anti-Semitism and other problems confronting Soviet Jews is adequate, and Tatars are covered fairly well. In all four books, though, lesser Soviet nationalities are barely mentioned, and even Moldavians and Belorussians receive abbreviated attention.

COVERAGE of the Transcaucasus and Central Asia in these books is most problematic. For the Transcaucasus, Ronald Suny's expert discussion in the Hajda/Beissinger volume stands out. However, his treatment is too brief to examine fully the tangled background of this area, which includes intricate Muslim-Christian and intra-Christian relations. Unfortunately, neither *The Hidden Nations* nor *Soviet Disunion* appears to have drawn on Suny's book-length treatments, except for that on Georgia.[9] Neither do they cite very recent publications by other Western experts on the Transcaucasus: Audrey Altstadt, Tamara Dragadze, and Tadeusz Swietochowski.

Diuk and Karatnycky falter less by omission than by imprudent acceptance of local Transcaucasian interpretations. In accepting the position that mass demonstrations on the border of the Nakichevan ASSR (part of the Azerbaijan SSR) with Iran expressed a wish for reunion with fellow Azeris in northeastern Iran, the authors ignore the interpretations by some specialists that the real pressure was to claim the fertile land withdrawn from cultivation by the authorities to constitute the very deep Soviet border zone. Either or both interpretations may be valid—but it is incumbent on observers to seek out the range of plausible explanations.

More generally, the authors are prone to accept self-serving statements, like the local argument that provocation by KGB or other regime supporters instigated the bloody strife between Azerbaijanis and Armenians. Some members of the elite of both nations no doubt foresaw the danger of giving Moscow a pretext for armed intervention. But the record hardly sustains the notion of high-level Azerbaijani-Armenian harmony; statements by Geydar Aliyev, not long ago the leading party figure in Azerbaijan, condemned Soviet intervention but demonstrated little concern for the fate of the large Armenian minority.[10]

Over-reliance on local sources is still more serious for Central Asia, second only to Russia and Ukraine in significance for the Soviet Union's future.[11] Relative to the Baltic and even the Transcaucasus region, information on Central Asia is hard to obtain. Diuk and Karatnycky barely mention Kirgizia and Turkmenistan, which they apparently did not visit. However, familiarity with Western sources would have gone a long way to clear up historical misconceptions clouding their interpretation. The discussion of the "process of Uzbek nation-building" (pp. 156–64) tends toward preconceived Soviet or Western conceptualizations instead of placing the subject in the framework of Central Asian history. The authors recognized a life-style cleavage between Uzbeks and Tajiks, but their implication that the separation ran along urban-rural lines is far from precise. Until the 13th century, Tajiks (Persian speakers) constituted the basic *sedentary* population (peasant as well as city-dweller) of the oases. Later, most Tajiks in what is now contemporary Uzbekistan (in con-

[9]For example, Ronald G. Suny, *Armenia in the Twentieth Century*, Chico, CA, Scholars Press, 1983, and *The Baku Commune 1917–1918: Class and Nationality in the Russian Revolution*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1972. For Georgia, see Ronald Grigor Suny, *The Making of the Georgian Nation*, Bloomington IN, Indiana University Press, 1988.

[10]*The New York Times*, Jan. 26, 1990.

[11]Unfortunately, Martha Brill Olcott's very brief chapter on the region in Hajda-Beissinger, though expert on the Kazakhs, does not provide a complete overview comparable to Suny's on the Transcaucasus.

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trast to the Tajiks in Tajikistan itself), assimilated to the Uzbeks linguistically but not in life-style. Until the 1920's, within a common Sunni Muslim framework there was no clear concept of national distinction. At that point, the Bolshevik regime set up separate republics delineated by minor linguistic distinctions to fragment a heightening Islamic Turkestan identity.

Similarly, the assumption in *The Hidden Nations* about an "atomized peasantry of Uzbeks and Kazakhs" (p. 32), as contrasted to more cohesive Slavic peasantries, is dubious. Such major authorities as Alexandre Benningsen and Hélène Carrère d'Encausse have suggested that Sufi networks in Central Asia have paralleled the admittedly strong "murid" underground in the North Caucasus. If this is true, Central Asian peasants—persistently dominant demographically—and surviving nomads may be *more* firmly structured than European contingents of the declining Soviet peasantry. Additional evidence points to Central Asian peasants' maintenance of a coherent, relatively uniform life-style derived from Islamic customs.

A third explanatory problem is related directly to very recent disorders in Central Asia. One line of interpretation considers the major cause to be "social immiseration" (to use the term adopted by Diuk and Karatnycky on p. 216), which produces resentment by local groups against the perceived advantages enjoyed by minorities. Thus Uzbek assaults on Turkic Meskhetians are explained as resentment against these newcomers' advantages in obtaining scarce housing. Soviet publications, however, present a different picture: on the whole, they treat the outburst as the result of prolonged incitation and plotting, and even claim that the assaults followed an explicit refusal by Meskhetians to join a pan-Islamic front to "get rid of the Russians."[12] Neither *The Hidden Nations* nor *Soviet Disunion* mentions this striking assertion, nor do the two books suggest a somewhat parallel interpretation for the riots in the new town of Novyy Uzen' at about the same time. There Soviet dispatches did emphasize preferential economic treatment of outsiders, but also noted that violence escalated between native Kazakhs and the large "Caucasian" minority, numbering 20,000 out of 56,000 inhabitants.[13] Inasmuch as the 1970 census (the latest available detailed information) indicated that the large Gur'yev province, in which Novyy Uzen' is located, had only 6,000 Caucasian inhabitants altogether, it is evident that a sudden "invasion" by ethnic aliens was a major factor in those riots. It is possible that the non-Muslim Armenian contingent, of indeterminate size, was the main target of Muslim resentment. Without additional quantitative data, it is impossible to choose between the two explanations. Again, though, a presentation of alternative interpretations would be very valuable, for the true extent of Muslim-Turkic solidarity against non-Muslims is a fundamental consideration for all projections about the future of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus.

TAKEN together, the three books reviewed plus the Hajda/Beissinger volume provide abundant material for an observer seeking to draw tentative conclusions about the direction of national interaction in the USSR. Except for some portions of the Hajda/Beissinger book, though, the reader must make a considerable effort to assimilate and assess masses of data not fully analyzed. Considering that all four books endeavor to cover a very complicated on-going process, their accomplishment is laudable. Precisely because national evolution is still in midstream, however, it is necessary to stress gaps and weaknesses, so that these books may become starting points for more definitive assessments when—regardless of the outcome of the national upsurge—a period of relative stabilization occurs.

Deficiencies are more notable in treatments of Central Asia than of more accessible European regions, which are also more familiar to Western observers. Many criteria for further investigation apply, however, to both Europe and Asia. More extensive resort to analytic concepts, even if a holistic theory of national interaction continues to elude social scientists, should provide initial hypotheses to help researchers consider all relevant interpretations and avoid missing crucial bits of evidence. A thorough utilization of existing monographic literature, even if it relates to chronologically remote periods, would also deepen awareness of potentially crucial factors.

Neither of these indirect approaches is, of course, a substitute for directly confronting the mass of new information, including that provided by increasingly available on-the-spot informants. Still, immersion in theoretical and background studies should refine appraisals of such local information. In addition, observers of the Soviet nationalities scene should constantly keep in mind that erosion of the "monolithic" Soviet ideology has not eliminated all sources of bias, most notably those resulting from the subconscious effects of ingrained Soviet thought patterns and from newly awakened national self-assertion.

[12] *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow), June 21, 1989, abstracted in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, OH), July 19, 1989, pp. 22–23.

[13] Compare *Soviet Disunion*, p. 324, and *Izvestiya* (Moscow), June 20, 1989.

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Poland: Phase Two and Beyond

Christine M. Sadowski

PAUL G. LEWIS. *Political Authority and Party Secretaries in Poland, 1975–1986.* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989.

WERNER G. HAHN. *Democracy in a Communist Party: Poland's Experience Since 1980.* New York, Columbia University Press, 1987.

ANDRZEJ SWIDLICKI. *Political Trials in Poland, 1981–1986.* London, Croom Helm, 1988.

JANE CAVE, Ed. *On Trial in Gdansk: A Transcript of the Proceedings Against Adam Michnik, Bogdan Lis, Wladyslaw Frasyniuk.* Washington, DC, The Poland Watch Center, 1986.

J. L. BLACK and J. W. STRONG, Eds. *Sisyphus and Poland: Reflections on Martial Law.* Winnipeg, Canada, Ronald P. Frye & Company, 1986.

SHORTLY after the declaration of martial law in Poland on December 13, 1981, Lech Wałęsa said that the suppression of his union was only "phase two" of Solidarity's existence (phase one comprising the period from its emergence in August 1980 until the suspension of its activities in December 1981). Implicit in Wałęsa's statement was the vision that Solidarity would again emerge sometime in the future as a significant, viable, and legitimate political actor in Poland. Wałęsa himself did not pretend to know how or when this phase three would come about or what it would look like when it arrived. Nevertheless, his comment was prophetic, and Poland has, in fact, entered phase three.

The books under review focus largely on phase two,[1] and they show that in many respects this phase was unique to Poland. It was a period during which established political and military actors and entrenched members of the security apparatus, using old methods, attempted to reassert their control and *reverse* the massive process of change that had taken hold of an entire nation. But unlike in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and thereafter, this reassertion of control took place without the direct intervention of Soviet or other Warsaw Pact troops. The process in Poland began under the watchful eye of Leonid Brezhnev and continued through the short and never fully established tenures of Yuriy Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko, yielding eventually to phase three under Mihkail Gorbachev.

In Poland, this period was one of heightened conflict that, to be sure, was never fully resolved. In light of the tumultuous and very sudden changes that swept Eastern Europe in late 1989, a number of conflicts in Poland in the 1980's seem to have been played out in slow motion: the internal struggles within a party grasping for opportunities to reestablish its control and baffled by its disgraced public image; the standoff between the communist party and society; and the polarization between the security apparatus and those individuals and groups in society (who in fact constituted a substantial share of the population)

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[1]Paul Lewis's *Political Authority and Party Secretaries in Poland,* however, begins in 1975 and ends in 1986. Werner Hahn's *Democracy in a Communist Party* begins in phase one and ends in 1986, midway through phase two.

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who were either seeking to institute change or were at least ready to embrace change when it became possible.

This essay-review focuses on the complicated nature of conflict in phase two in Poland, especially as it applies to the roles of the communist party elite and the security apparatus within the broader context of Polish society. However, new conflicts have arisen under phase three, and this essay will address those conflicts as well.

IN HIS *Political Authority and Party Secretaries, 1975–1986,* Paul G. Lewis argues that the protracted crisis in Poland was less a matter of the communist party's weakness than of the inability of its provincial committees to implement central party directives. Lewis begins his analysis with a description of three changes instituted by Edward Gierek in the mid-1970's that contributed to the erosion of the authority of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP). The first change was an administrative reorganization of the party that eliminated the district (*powiat*) level and increased the number of provinces (*województwa*) from 22 to 49. Although undertaken in the name of decentralization, this restructuring in fact increased direct central control over these substantially smaller provinces. The second change was an attempt to delineate clearly the lines of jurisdiction between party and state. The third change was the introduction of an "economic maneuver," whereby investments were to be cut in order to decrease Poland's foreign debt and priorities were to shift toward the production of consumer goods.

In effect, these changes meant that provincial secretaries were under direct pressure from the central leadership to oversee the implementation of the "economic maneuver" at the very time that Warsaw was attempting to separate the functions of party and state. In addition, provincial secretaries lacked the necessary experience and expertise in crucial economic areas to supervise the implementation of economic reform. Over time, this situation led the party apparatus, particularly at the provincial level, to act as a major source of resistance to change initiated during the heyday of the Solidarity trade union movement. Moreover, provincial secretaries increasingly fell under pressure for reform from the party's rank and file and, in some cases, had their influence circumvented by local party organizations that communicated directly with each other rather than through the normal vertical channels dictated by democratic centralism.

Lewis explains that although the division between Solidarity and the party was blurred by the fact that one-third of the party's members were also members of the independent trade union, "the major political division lay more between the higher levels of the party organization—the Central Committee and the provincial committees—and the lower level party organizations and the rank and file" (p. 105). This statement underlines a fundamental misconception about Polish society in the 1980's: that the line of polarization ran between party and non-party members. True, the early to mid-1980's were characterized by a major stand-off between society and the communist party that was heightened in intensity immediately following the declaration of martial law and sharpened by the sudden substantial drop in party membership. However, the most distinctive line of polarization in Poland, as elsewhere in Eastern Europe, lay not between party and non-party members, but rather between the security apparatus and those members of society who actively or passively opposed the *status quo.*

Finally, Lewis argues that given its internal divisions, the party was effectively neutralized by its inability to meet the conflicting demands being made, on the one hand, by leading party conservatives calling for the invigoration of democratic centralism and, on the other, by an increasingly assertive rank and file calling for the institutionalization of intra-party democracy. Political paralysis eventually gave way to increased military representation within the highest party and government bodies, and later to military rule in Poland. Amidst continuing problems of economic stagnation, the party had little opportunity to recover either its authority or its power.

THE WORK by Werner G. Hahn—*Democracy in a Communist Party: Poland's Experience Since 1980*—focuses in particular on the process of democratization within the PUWP in late 1980 and in 1981. Hahn describes in detail the change in election procedures that forced party leaders for the first time to appeal openly to their constituencies and paved the way for the replacement of virtually the entire Politburo and Central Committee through the use of secret ballots and the endorsement of multiple candidacies. He then follows the fate of that reform through the periods of martial law and "normalization." This book is exceptionally well-written, systematic, and enlightening in its elaboration of the dynamics of reform, factional struggles for reform within the party, the swelling power and outspokenness of the party's rank and file, the success of the rank and file in toppling Stanisław Kania in October 1981, and the subsequent powerlessness of the rank and file in the face of General Wojciech Jaruzel-

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ski's consolidated control over the military and security apparatuses.

Hahn makes clear the tensions that existed among liberals, moderates, and conservatives within the party leadership and the degree to which Kania felt he needed to keep conservatives near him in order to appease the Kremlin. Kania, in fact, had been able to attain his position as first secretary of the PUWP by carefully maintaining his own moderate position while keeping both liberals and conservatives within reach. Although he did this successfully, he resigned his position in October 1981 under mounting pressure from the party's rank and file.

Hahn is relatively kind in his evaluation of Jaruzelski, arguing that the General's intention was never to abandon totally the many democratic reforms the party had adopted, but rather simply to put a halt to the increasing militancy of some factions of Solidarity and to reestablish control over the collapsing economy. Hahn supports his argument by pointing out that Jaruzelski undertook no massive purge of party leaders at the upper or intermediate levels and that many of the procedural changes enacted during the period of reform were reactivated once the most severe rigors of martial law were lifted. Nevertheless, substantial resignations from the party and a series of expulsions left the composition of the political leadership less diversified than it had been in 1981.

In effect, both Lewis and Hahn provide recent histories of the PUWP that help in understanding its subsequent decline. The authors ascribe the party's demise variously to its lack of authority at the intermediate level of its hierarchy, the internal conflict it experienced in 1980–81, and the loss of much of its power to the military establishment. However, many other factors came into play over the years, not the least of which was the party's lack of legitimacy in Polish politics and its responsibility for the collapse of the country's economy.

EVEN with the less diversified leadership that emerged following the imposition of martial law, the party as a whole could no longer count on a "strength-in-unity" formula. One might say that the PUWP suffered the fate of Humpty-Dumpty. At the round-table talks with Solidarity in early 1989, it had carefully stacked the cards in its own favor, offering Solidarity only 35 percent of the seats in the Sejm, scheduling the partially free elections so early that Solidarity had little (many felt too little) time to organize its election campaign, requiring that Solidarity submit its list of candidates first and then selecting its own candidates accordingly, and, finally, arranging for General Jaruzelski to nominate his candidate for prime minister with seemingly built-in guarantees that his candidate would be ratified. The PUWP still lost the June 1989 elections.

Since its humiliating defeat, the PUWP has had to face squarely the depth of its disrepute in Polish society. It is, after all, unlikely that the communist party candidates who ran and lost in elections to the Senate were all less qualified than their opposition counterparts. Nor did the outcome necessarily represent an enthusiastic endorsement of Solidarity, especially when one considers that membership in that organization stands today at only 20 percent of what it had been in its 1980–81 heyday. Instead, the outcome of the elections reflected a nationwide vote in favor of change and, hence, against communist party power.

Still other forces have come into play over the past year. A firm commitment to the transformation of the economy into a market-oriented system, expressed in the form of major economic policy changes that went into effect on January 1, 1990, have made earlier communist party policies obsolete and the leading role of the party apparatus irrelevant. It is no wonder, then, that the Polish communist party has scrambled to reposition itself in the new socio-economic order.

Attempting to adapt to the new system, the PUWP voted in January 1990 to dissolve altogether and to transform itself into a left-of-center party, the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic (SDPR). In the course of its transformation, two other splinter groups formed. One is led by Tadeusz Fiszbach, a reform communist known for his role in the Lenin Shipyard negotiations of August 1980 while he headed the Gdańsk party organization, and for his subsequent resignation from this post in protest against the imposition of martial law. Fiszbach refused to endorse the new SDPR, saying it was too closely associated with the old PUWP. A group of party hard-liners formed a second splinter party.

Undoubtedly, the formation of more than one party from the original PUWP will dilute the impact of society's contempt for the old organization. Still, many of the members have names that have become synonymous with the Polish communist party. Irrespective of what they call themselves, they will always be regarded as communists first and foremost. Thus, the party (under a new name) is tackling the dubious task of distancing itself from itself. It is not alone in this regard. Communist parties throughout Eastern Europe have also undergone similar name changes and are engaged in similar efforts.

THE courtroom was another arena where conflict between opposing

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forces in society was played out in phase two. The books by Andrzej Swidlicki and Jane Cave focus on the political trials of the 1980's in Poland, the former broadly and inclusively and the latter by providing a transcript of the proceedings from one particular trial. Swidlicki's book covers more than its title, *Political Trials in Poland, 1981–1986,* suggests. It explains the military's takeover of state institutions (mass media, the courts, industrial enterprises), the extraordinary legislation enacted under martial law that aimed to eradicate all pockets of opposition in society, and the numerous instances in which prosecutors went beyond these laws or applied them retroactively. Moreover, Swidlicki describes numerous cases in which members of the security apparatus went about intimidating, beating, arresting, and even murdering those whom they identified as part of the underground Solidarity movement. As such, this book is as much about human rights abuses in Poland in the 1980's as about the political trials of the period.

What is unique about Swidlicki's work is his description of the fate of little-known blue-collar and rural Solidarity activists who suffered systematic abuses, which most of the well-known Solidarity figures managed to escape by virtue of their international renown. These less visible activists were the targets and victims of the brunt of martial-law legislation and cruelty at the hands of the security apparatus.

Swidlicki is harsher than Hahn in his evaluation of General Jaruzelski, portraying him as a relentless foe of change and an unbending ruler who set out to break the back of the Solidarity trade union. Yet, such opposing assessments are not necessarily contradictory as it stands to reason that Jaruzelski, while trying to do away with a movement he had forced underground was at the same time attempting to protect the integrity of his party.

In his conclusion, Swidlicki argues that the strategy of normalization was not the success Jaruzelski had hoped it would be, since it failed to end popular support for Solidarity. In view of the startling speed of change in Eastern Europe in late 1989, this lesson was perhaps the most important one that Poland's phase two had to offer—namely, the futility of attempts by the military, the party, and the security apparatus to suppress popular pressures for change once they have taken hold of the larger society. Justifying his attempt to "restore order" through the use of Poland's military and security apparatuses, Jaruzelski argued that his imposition of martial law prevented a Soviet invasion. By late 1989, other East European communist leaderships could no longer argue the same and were thus left to act on their own, with the full knowledge that military rule in Poland in the early and mid-1980's had ultimately failed to achieve its goals. That Nicolae Ceauşescu proved uneducable in this regard is another matter.

While Swidlicki describes in some detail the 1985 trial of Adam Michnik, Bogdan Lis, and Władysław Frasyniuk, the edited transcript of the proceedings is presented by Jane Cave in *On Trial in Gdansk.* The defendants were "selected" for arrest from a group of eight Solidarity activists who attended a meeting to discuss a plan of action in response to recently announced price increases. They were charged with membership and/or leadership in a secret or illegal association and with provoking social unrest and/or with organizing an illegal protest action. Because of the international renown of the three defendants, this political trial was not entirely typical of those held in Poland in the 1980's. On the other hand, precisely because these were well-known, articulate, high-ranking Solidarity leaders and advisers, the transcript of the proceedings is particularly interesting.

In the introductory comments to her book, Cave provides a background to the trial, arguing that its purpose was to reassert the power of the security apparatus following the embarrassment of the arrest and conviction of members of the security police for the murder of Father Jerzy Popiełuszko. In short, it was a way of demonstrating that the police had not softened. The judge and the prosecution never pretended to follow normal legal procedures: defense lawyers were not given time to review the records and evidence for the trial; the major evidence used was fabricated; contradictory evidence by expert witnesses was not allowed; and defendants were repeatedly thrown out of the courtroom and were not allowed to speak on their own behalf.

No publisher of fiction would accept such a manuscript, as the text completely lacks subtlety or imagination on the part of the prosecution and is entirely predictable from beginning to end. The failure of the proceedings even vaguely to disguise the utter baseness and dimwittedness of Judge Krzysztof Zieniuk might qualify it as parody. But in fact this is a transcript of words that were actually spoken and, as such, provides both chilling evidence of the relentless nature of repression and extensive documentation of the ignorance of the oppressors, who were forced through their own stupidity to rely solely on the "argument of power" rather than on the "power of argument."

Much has been written of the failure of Poland's economic system under communist rule. But virtually

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no attention has been paid to the high cost of repression: the imprisonment of semi- and highly-skilled workers as well as of members of the scientific community who were prevented on a long- or short-term basis from contributing their special talents to society; the large sums of money necessary to fund an extensive security apparatus (including judges, prosecutors, censors, informants, jailers, and uniformed officers) whose principal task was the repression of individual freedoms; the money and other resources used to elaborate the systems of law necessary to legalize the repression, and so forth. In reading Swidlicki's book, one is struck by the enormity of the social and financial expense entailed by the performance of these tasks. In this respect, ending repression must also be seen as a financial savings.

The books by Swidlicki and Cave encapsulate the polarization between certain groups in Polish society. After all, political trials are about polarization. These books highlight the harm that was done over the years by political actors in illegitimate institutions who attempted to assert their power or seek revenge against their opponents. The books make clear how great a challenge it is to seek to reconcile polarized groups as a means to assure future stability.

This challenge has been seen elsewhere in Eastern Europe in recent months. In East Germany, former Prime Minister Hans Modrow's plan to organize a new security apparatus was met with great anger by opposition leaders and inspired large-scale demonstrations on the part of East German citizens. We have also heard cries from Romanian citizens to keep the death penalty in force until members of Ceauşescu's *Securitate* are properly punished. There, in a country where the powerful did more harm to the powerless than elsewhere in Eastern Europe, reconciliation is at best many generations down the road.

THE collection of 11 studies and essays edited by J. L. Black and J. W. Strong, *Sisyphus and Poland: Reflections on Martial Law,* complements the topics covered in the other four volumes discussed here. Although many of the contributions are well-researched and provocative treatments of some of the issues of the phase-two period in Poland, the book fails to treat some very major topics. For example, there is no separate treatment of martial-law legislation and its implementation; the role of the PUWP is not discussed; and the book contains no separate examination of Solidarity under martial law, except for a very interesting article by Hania M. Fedorowicz on "Poland and the War for Information." This piece covers Solidarity's efforts to secure access to the media prior to, but also during, the martial-law period.

Robin Alison Remington provides an excellent discussion of "The Leading Role of the Polish Military" in which she describes its Warsaw Pact obligations and Jaruzelski's dual role as head of the military forces and head of the communist party, tracing his political evolution from an army general in a military uniform to a party leader in a suit. She argues that his evolution was important to the Kremlin, inasmuch as the military's exercise of a leading role was contrary to Marxist-Leninist ideology and the traditional leading role of the party. Finally, Remington presents the profound dilemmas faced by the Warsaw Pact when the Polish military, seen as crucial to the defense of the region because of its size and the location of its forces, had its attention diverted from its primary function to that of policing the population within its own borders.

Vincent C. Chrypinski's "Church and State in Poland After Solidarity" provides an analysis of the political strategies of the Vatican and the Polish Episcopate during the period of martial law. At the time the article was written (November 1983), there was much debate about whether or not the Church had actually sold out to the Jaruzelski regime, since it had failed to reflect the hostility and bitterness of much of Polish society toward the imposed military order and talked about reconciliation long before most Poles were in the mood to consider it. But Chrypinski defends the cautious policies of the Church, which refused to add fuel to the fire, and contends that history will be kind to Primate Józef Glemp's policies during that period. Indeed, in retrospect, the policies of the Church were effective in that they continued to underscore its major role as a mediator in Polish society. In the long run, it will be interesting to see how the position of the Church changes in Poland, when it will no longer play the role of the primary ideological alternative to the communist party.

Foreign policy concerns are also highlighted in this volume, including an analysis by Paul Marantz of the "Economic Sanctions in the Polish Crisis," in which he argues that Western sanctions failed to achieve their purpose. The volume also contains a scathing indictment, written by Richard T. Davies, of Western policy toward Poland in which he contends that Western governments allowed themselves to be manipulated by both the Kremlin and its "junior partners in Warsaw" into believing the threat of a Soviet invasion, accepting reports of total economic chaos, and assuming responsibility for a return to the cold war if they went ahead with hardline policies in response to the declaration of martial law.

Despite the weakness of some of

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its more impressionistic essays, this volume does assume an important place in the literature on Poland's phase two, in part because it was written in the heat of the moment and because it reflects "the sound and the fury of [then] contemporary debate about the years 1981–1983 in Poland" (Preface). This book also focuses on many concerns that are linked specifically with Poland's recent history—the role of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland, the impact of a Polish Pope on his homeland, and martial law and its effects on East-West relations—all of which contributed to the course and the outcome of phase two.

PHASE two was a stand-off between Solidarity and the Jaruzelski regime. It was a waiting game to see which side could last the longest without the other's cooperation. Changes elsewhere in Eastern Europe in late 1989 were not preceded by such a period of waiting. Indeed, one might argue that in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, and to a lesser extent, in Bulgaria, spontaneous, massive, popular demonstrations demanding far-reaching change leapfrogged over phase two and immediately entered phase three, where dialogue between the new reformist leaders of the communist parties and opposition groups was held upon demand and where some measure of defeat, or at least public repentance, was voiced by the communist parties.

The irony of martial law and "normalization" in Poland is that they inadvertently provided a period of gestation not only for Solidarity and its supporters, but also for other groups and institutions in Polish society. This period allowed opposition forces to work out strategies for confronting the ruling elite and to devise programs for reform, the implementation of which would occur only if and when the opportunity arose. Jacek Kuroń, for one, has argued in favor of evolutionary change for the slow and peaceful process of establishing a democratic order piece by piece and institution by institution—and against a more sudden, revolutionary elimination of the entire political structure.[2] By the late 1980's, the success of this strategy of chiseling away at the communist institutions of power through the underground press, organized opposition, and massive defiance provided citizens in other East-Central European countries with an example that showed that change was possible. What happened in Poland also underlined the need for solidarity as a prerequisite for entry into phase three, that is, for the end of the communist monopoly of power and the introduction of a multiparty system of government.

In Poland's ongoing phase three, both the program for gradual, evolutionary change and the need for continued solidarity—still the preferred policies of the Solidarity-led government—have been questioned by Lech Wałęsa. Wałęsa argues that the government is acting too slowly in its program of political and economic reform and that the slow pace is directly benefiting the old communist party members and the *nomenklatura,* while placing structural constraints on Poland's workers and farmers. Two-thirds of the seats in the Sejm continue to be occupied by members of the old Polish United Workers' Party and its puppets. But whom do they represent? While wielding considerable political power in parliament, the communist party in Poland today lacks a sizable membership and is largely irrelevant to the new political and economic order. Wałęsa is demanding that new elections be held as soon as possible to clear away the old system of power and to give others in Poland a greater sense of participation in the building of democracy. Yet, those currently in power—old and new alike—fear the loss of their positions and the likely subsequent change from the course of reform that they have been cautiously and slowly nurturing.

Early on, Tadeusz Mazowiecki made the decision not to ostracize, alienate, or punish the old leadership or members of the *nomenklatura*. This decision was made both in the spirit of reconciliation, as well as in the name of gradual, evolutionary reform. But the slowness of the process is providing the old communist political and economic elite with the opportunity to reappropriate state-owned property for their own economic gain. Wałęsa's fear is that the old leaders will place themselves in new positions of entrepreneurial power, leaving other Polish citizens, who currently lack the capital or the contacts, and who are carrying the burden of economic reform through unemployment and bankruptcy, permanently behind in the new economic order. Wałęsa asserts that these workers and farmers must simultaneously be provided with the immediate chance for economic betterment, lest they find that the most lucrative opportunities have gone, de facto, to the old communist elite. The slow pace of reform, particularly with respect to private ownership and the sale of state enterprises, will leave economically displaced persons at a long-term disadvantage, precisely at the time they need to be instilled with a sense of hope.

The irony of the course of action taken by the Mazowiecki government is that it has consciously decided not to offend the old communist elite while inadvertently holding at bay those really suffering from

[2]See Jacek Kuroń, "Overcoming Totalitarianism," *Journal of Democracy* (Washington, DC), Winter 1990, p. 74.

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the reform process. A statement by Senator Andrzej Szczypiorski, a veteran intellectual Solidarity activist, underlines much of the problem and highlights the reason why Wałęsa feels that his "constituency" is being cut out of the new political and economic deal. Szczypiorski said, in July 1990, that "Wałęsa and the workers say with pride, 'We are simple people.' I say it is high time to get more complicated. They do not realize that in contemporary Western life real power is held by managers and professionals."[3] Here, Szczypiorski is guilty of a fundamental oversight, namely, that Poland's working class has a rich history of militancy that extends from the 1930's to the present day, and that large-scale worker strikes also constitute *real* power. This ongoing struggle for power in Poland will determine the ultimate course of Poland's phase three.

[3]*The Washington Post*, July 11, 1990.

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North Korea's Search for Legitimacy In a Multipolar World

Clark Sorensen

DAE-SOOK SUH. *Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader.* New York, Columbia University Press, 1989.

ROBERT A. SCALAPINO and HONGKOO LEE, Eds. *North Korea in a Regional and Global Context.* Berkeley, CA, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Korea Research Monograph No. 11, 1986.

ROBERT A. SCALAPINO and DALCHOONG KIM, Eds. *Asian Communism: Continuity and Transition.* Berkeley, CA, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Korea Research Monograph No. 15, 1988.

IN HIS concluding essay to *Asian Communism,* Robert Scalapino notes that North Korea has been engaged in a "continuing quest for legitimacy" ever since its establishment (p. 360). It is well-known, of course, that the division of Korea —Japan's most important prewar colony—between Soviet and American occupation forces after 1945, and the subsequent establishment of rival communist and noncommunist governments in the north and south respectively in 1948, were important milestones in the cold war. In the late 1940's, tensions between North and South quickly escalated as the Left and Right in Korea struggled to present themselves as the legitimate mainstream heir to the anti-colonial movement that had been awakened by the massive March 1, 1919, demonstrations against Japanese rule. Whichever of the two sides gained this legitimacy would also have the right to impose its vision on a liberated Korean nation.

Support of the Soviet Union and the United States for ideologically preferred groups in their respective occupation zones proved itself to be counterproductive. The ruling group that emerged in each occupation zone was prevented from extending sufficient influence into the other zone to form a united government. In the end, neither occupying power felt it could afford to see an ideologically and, perhaps, militarily hostile state established in Korea. Therefore, each settled for half a loaf, and the rival Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea were set up on the Korean peninsula. Each state asserted its own legitimacy as the true representative of the Korean nation, and declared the other to be an illegitimate puppet state set up by a foreign power.

When war broke out between the two Koreas in June 1950, the United States, believing North Korea to be an instrument of Soviet force and guile, intervened to contain Soviet expansion. What had started out as a struggle between leftists and rightists over what form of government a liberated Korea should have, eventually became an international conflagration that took the lives of millions of Koreans, both military and civilian, and resulted in tens of thousands of casualties to United Nations and Chinese forces. The political passions generated by this war have colored scholarship on Korea ever since.

It may seem peculiar that today —almost two decades after the United States recognized China, 15 years after the unification of Vietnam and the signing of the Helsinki Accords, and in the wake of the developments of 1989 in Eastern

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Europe—the issues that surfaced 40 years ago in Korea are still politically relevant. In response, one can only point to the astonishing continuity of leadership and ideology in the North, the continued military confrontation between the North and South, the consequent maintenance of United States troops in the South, and the persistent legitimacy problems of South Korean military regimes. All these things stem from the still unresolved conflicts of the period right after liberation.

As time has passed, neighboring powers have turned their attention to their internal development, and have become more and more comfortable with the status quo on the Korean peninsula. Within Korea, however, because the conservatives in the South and the communists in the North have been forced to content themselves with only half a country, neither side is willing to accept the permanence or legitimacy of its rival state, or the division of the Korean nation.

This non-recognition, of course, is a matter of state policy in the North. But even in the South, where since the 1970's, governments have been willing to consider cross-recognition of the two Koreas, large segments of the population persist in thinking of the Korean nation as having a unity that transcends particular political systems. Young people especially are reevaluating political events after 1945 and on this basis making judgments about the legitimacy of the Northern or Southern regimes and the appropriateness of the continued US presence in South Korea.

INFORMATION on North Korea is hard to come by, and works, like those under review, that provide new and up-to-date information are always welcome. The historical record is so obscured by information blackouts, self-serving accounts, forged documents, and unsubstantiated assertions that uncovering the facts requires hard detective work, mastery of several difficult languages, and extreme care in the use and evaluation of sources.

From the beginning of the competition between Left and Right, partisans of each side have been constructing an ideologized Korean history designed to maximize their side s legitimacy at the expense of the other's. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the case of Kim Il-song, leader of the North Korean state since its founding almost 42 years ago, and last of the post-war state-builders to continue to rule. From 1945 to the present,[1] Kim has to a remarkable degree set the tone and direction of North Korean policy and development. Therefore, an objective understanding of North Korea must begin with an understanding of him.

Elaboration of Kim Il-song's story has been a major preoccupation of the North, where he is presented as the sole legitimate leader of the Korean nation and an example of revolutionary, anti-imperialist success to be emulated by other leaders in the Third World. The official three-volume hagiography of Kim by Baik Bong, published in English and many other languages,[2] depicts Kim as the main leader of the Korean communist movement, whose guerrilla activities struck blow after blow against Japanese imperialism from the early 1930's until he liberated Korea in 1945 with virtually no outside assistance. Reputedly hailed as their natural leader by the vast majority of Koreans in 1945, he is said to have organized a strong, progressive, anti-imperialist base in the North and to have been thwarted from completing the liberation of the Korean nation and eliminating a US-imposed reactionary clique in the South only because of "American imperialist" intervention in the Korean War. That war is known in the North as the "Fatherland Liberation War" (*choguk haebang chonjaeng*). Since the end of that war, Kim has organized North Korea into a bastion of "proletarian strength" whose people have "nothing to envy in the world" until such time as "progressive forces" in the South can be sufficiently aided so as to be able to overthrow their rulers and be united with their fountainhead.

South Koreans, for their part, are inclined to support claims to the legacy of the March 1st Movement of almost anybody but Kim Il-song—those associated with the Korean Provisional Government, domestic nationalist leaders, even domestic communist leaders. They attempt to undermine Kim's claim to legitimacy by downplaying the importance of his guerrilla exploits and asserting that he was always dependent on the Chinese and Soviet communists. According to this version, Kim operated what amounted to a ragtag force of a few hundred guerrillas in Manchuria in the 1930's, which was never a substantial threat to Japanese power on the Asian mainland, and then fled to the Soviet Union in the 1940's. Far from being the leader of the communist movement from the early 1930's, Kim before 1945 had no connection with what is depicted as a coherent native communist movement operating within Korea. After fighting with the Soviet Army during World War II, Kim is said to have returned to Korea in 1945 as a tool of the Soviets, who used him to "Sovietize" North Korea over the opposition of those

[1] It would be difficult to find a consensus on the point at which Kim first came to control the political process in North Korea, but December 17, 1945, when he became chairman of the North Korean Interim People's Committee, is a convenient date, provided it is recognized that his power was far from consolidated at this time.

[2] See Baik Bong [Paek Pong], *Kim Il Sung: Biography*, 3 vols., Tokyo, Maraisha, 1969–70.

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communists who had been active in Korea all along. Since that time, Kim has reputedly longed to impose his alien dictatorship on the rest of Korea and can only be stopped by force of arms.

Scholars in the United States generally agree that both of these accounts are full of distortion and hyperbole. Nevertheless, the degree to which Kim was a legitimate leader both before and after 1945 is still in dispute. While it is obvious why each Korean side wishes to establish itself as the mainstream legatee of the prewar anti-colonial movement and discredit the claim of the other side, these polemics have another rationale that is less apparent to Western readers. Each reflects a specific critique of Korean civilization. The 1910 Japanese annexation of Korea—a country that had been a united, independent state since 668—was to Koreans more than a simple episode of imperialism; it was a crisis of Korean civilization. The old ruling class was blamed for having been unable to prevent annexation. Although many pointed to foreign intervention, "lack of enlightenment," or nefarious Japanese plots as basic causes of Korea's demise, many others—and not only Marxists—felt that only a fundamental critique of the traditional Korean class structure and political culture could reveal the reasons for the weakness of the old order.

One's diagnosis of the causes of Korea's fall—one's interpretation of the Korean past—necessarily has great influence on one's vision of a new, strengthened Korea. Because of this, recovery and recitation of facts by themselves cannot resolve the questions of legitimacy in post-1945 Korea. The significance of the facts can only be established within an interpretive framework. Issues such as how communism fits into the prewar Korean efforts to expel the Japanese colonialists, how legitimacy is (or has been) created for Korean leaders, and what the characteristics of Korean society as a whole are must be explicitly taken into account.

DAE-SOOK Suh, who has labored long and hard on North Korea's historiography, has gathered together in his new book, *Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader,* much factual information. It ranks as the most ambitious attempt yet to separate fact from fiction in Kim's biography.

As Suh himself notes in the introduction, the closed nature of North Korean society and the myth-making about Kim make the gathering of information on North Korean leaders extraordinarily difficult. Nevertheless, Suh has gone further than anyone else in ferreting out information about Kim. He has used a wide variety of source material, including records and first-hand accounts of guerrilla activity in Manchuria published in the People's Republic of China (PRC), records of anti-guerrilla activity published by the Manchurian police and the Japanese Manchurian police's veterans' association, remembrances and documents about the liberation and occupation of North Korea published in the Soviet Union, North Korean documents captured by US military forces during the Korean War and declassified in 1977,[3] and the published writings of Kim Il-song. Unfortunately, because Suh is not explicit about his interpretive framework and does not discuss the reliability of many of these sources, the factual status and interpretive relevance of much of what he says is open to question.

The picture Suh paints of Kim differs substantially from either of the "ideological" accounts described above, but those familiar with more scholarly accounts of Kim's life, which in general are not discussed in the text, will find little that is startling. Suh was able to fill in some gaps, refine some interpretations, and document things that in the past were only suspected, but many of the most crucial interpretive aspects of Kim's life remain obscure.

The Kim that emerges from Suh's study was born in P'yongyang but raised in Manchuria, where he attended both Chinese and Korean schools in Manchuria, and thus became literate and conversant in both Chinese and Korean. Orphaned by age 14, he became involved at an early age in communist political activity, for which he was expelled from middle school at the age of 17.

Suh, like others, refutes the allegations that the Kim Il-song who presently rules North Korea is not the same Kim Il-song who was a guerrilla fighter in Manchuria in the 1930's. He documents that Kim had the most substantial record of guerrilla activity against the Japanese of any Korean who survived until 1945, and eventually became "the most wanted guerrilla leader in Manchuria" (p. 52). Citing sources in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the (Japanese) Manchurian Army, Suh points out, however, that the bulk of the fighting against the Japanese in Manchuria after 1933 was done by Chinese and that Kim always led his partisans as a subgroup of a larger Chinese effort;[4] he never united all the Korean communist fighters in Manchuria under his own command. Eventually, Kim—together with the

[3]These records are very voluminous, and Suh is sparing in his use of them. Much undoubtedly remains to be done here.

[4]Based on Japanese sources, Suh places Kim Il-song as commander of the Sixth Division of the Second Route Army led by Wang Detai (with Wei Zhengmin as political commissar) of the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army.

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Chinese guerrilla groups that had been operating in Manchuria—was forced to retreat into the Soviet Union until Japan was defeated by the allied powers.

Between 1941 and 1945, Suh locates Kim near Vladivostok at the Okeanskaya Field School, which sheltered and trained a number of Korean and Chinese partisans until after the defeat of Japan. He lays to rest the allegations that Kim fought in the Soviet army, but notes statements in Japanese archives by captured Soviet-trained partisans that international military units were being organized in the Soviet camps. South Korean reports that Kim Il-song was appointed a major in one of these divisions are noted, though Suh gives more credence to General Nikolay Lebedev, whom he interviewed in Moscow in 1978, who says Kim wore the insignia of a Soviet captain (p. 347, fn. 4).

Suh emphasizes the influence of Kim's "Chinese mentor," Wei Zhengmin, a member of the Chinese Communist Party who kept contact with the Comintern in Moscow. He also says Kim worked closely with what is depicted as a uniformed, organized Chinese guerrilla force, and stresses the importance of Kim's period in the Soviet Union.

Since North Korean sources depict Kim's leadership of guerrilla activity as legitimizing him, the information that Suh provides in this section of the book is of crucial importance. Yet, the author does not discuss the reliability of his sources; nor does he really explain the significance of his data. Does he conclude that Kim was not an authentic Korean communist, or that he took orders from the Comintern from an early date? Did Kim belong to the Chinese Communist Party? How seriously are we to take Japanese sources that depict the guerrilla movement in Korea as a tightly organized force with a unified chain of command?

This section of the book on Kim's early life and the subsequent section on Kim's consolidation of power in North Korea after 1945 are the most interesting and informative. In both sections, Suh tries to round out information on Kim's activities through use of Japanese, Chinese, and Soviet sources. Suh emphasizes that although Kim's name was well-known and respected, he was only one of a number of such people who appeared in Korea after 1945, and that he had no contacts with communists who had remained in Korea throughout the Japanese occupation.

Suh's view of Kim's role during the Soviet occupation does not differ substantially here from what he has published earlier.[5] The author emphasizes the influence of key Soviet officials both on Kim and on policies at the central level, the importance of the monopoly of firepower held by the Soviets and Kim's partisans, the importance of key Soviet-Koreans[6] in the central administration of North Korea, and the rivalries between Kim Il-song and domestic Korean communists, particularly the Seoul-based communist Pak Hon-yong.

Kim's rivalry with the "domestic communists" (many of whom had been imprisoned, or at least forced to give up their communist activity by the Japanese police) is often interpreted in terms of struggles between personal factions with little political content. However, Suh's summary of the minutes of the 1948 Second Korean Workers' Party Congress in P'yongyang, documents that were captured during the Korean War, shows in more detail than heretofore that the establishment in 1945 of a North Korean communist party directed from P'yongyang had been opposed by many domestic communists on the grounds that it would lead to a division of Korea (pp. 84, 134). In addition, O Kisop, the most prominent domestic communist in the North before Pak Hon-yong fled there in 1948, and one with a long history of concern with the problems of workers, had apparently favored trade unions that were more independent than those that leaders following Soviet models were prepared to countenance.

Passages from the minutes summarized by Suh illustrate strikingly how the Soviet-Koreans led the attack at that meeting against domestic communist opposition to the policies of Kim and his supporters. The Soviet-Koreans undermined the authority of domestic communists by accusing them of working with former collaborators of the Japanese (an, as yet, unexamined category); they enhanced their own authority by citing their experience in "more advanced communist countries such as the Soviet Union."

As with Kim's guerrilla activity, however, the material Suh uncovers cannot simply be taken at face value (for example, it is quite likely that accusations against opponents in a party meeting would have been at least partly fabricated). Sources need to be criticized and interpretations made explicit and defended. The general impression one gets from the information summarized above is that Kim Il-song had a certain amount of legitimacy as a postwar leader of Korea, but certainly no more than many others, and that Soviet advice and power were probably more important than Kim's

[5]Dae-sook Suh, "A Preconceived Formula for Sovietization: North Korea," in Thomas Hammond and Robert Farrell, Eds., *The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1975, pp. 475–89.

[6]I.e., ethnic Koreans born and raised in the Soviet Union, who usually retained their Soviet citizenship and membership in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

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indigenous credentials in establishing his regime. Nowhere, however, are we treated to a discussion of what would make a leader legitimate or illegitimate in postwar Korea, or presented with evidence that would allow us to judge the degree of legitimacy Kim (or anyone else) might have had at that juncture.

Suh sheds little new light on the difficult question of the nature of Soviet influence during the occupation. Although Suh seems to imply that various Soviet generals or advisers "ordered" Kim to take various actions, this view appears based largely on inference rather than evidence,[7] and the larger question of the extent to which Soviet advice might have been sought (rather than imposed) is not addressed at all. Bruce Cumings, by contrast, has argued persuasively that the policies of the North during this period played well to a widespread feeling among Koreans that fundamental reform was necessary.[8] Although Suh makes much of parallels with Eastern Europe—the implication presumably being that North Korean policy in the late 1940's was "made in Moscow"—these parallels are not sufficiently discussed to give them much force.

Sources on Kim, other than those published in North Korea, begin to dry up after the Korean War. This significantly weakens the last half of Suh's book. The author notes the progressive elimination of rivals to Kim, and the trumped-up nature of the charges (used to justify his execution) that Pak Hon-yong had collaborated with the Americans, but discussion after this relies primarily on close analysis of the works of Kim Il-song himself.

Suh shows that the Sino-Soviet dispute—far from being an opportunity to play China off against the Soviet Union, as it is sometimes depicted—was a troublesome problem for Kim. He tried to remain neutral, a position he saw as being consistent with North Korean domestic needs.

Suh also discusses Kim's attitude toward the South, his relationship with the Third World, and other issues. But as we get closer and closer to the present, the material gets thinner and thinner.

Suh's careful internal analysis and comparison of various versions of Kim's published works enables him to show that references to foreign influence have been progressively eliminated, and that postwar writings have been given prewar dates. Yet, Suh's failure to consider Kim's thought in relationship to other Korean communist and noncommunist figures seriously limits understanding of the significance or appeal of Kim's point of view.

In an apparent attempt to avoid the tendentiousness that has sometimes marred works on North Korea, Suh, as has been noted several times above, concentrates throughout the book on the presentation of "facts," eschewing systematic discussion of the reliability of sources or of previous scholarly literature on Kim, and avoiding extended analysis of interpretive alternatives and how the material he has uncovered would affect these alternatives. Apart from the philosophical question of whether "facts" can exist outside an interpretive framework, Suh's approach in the end makes it difficult for those who are not thoroughly familiar with the literature on North Korea to fully appreciate the significance of the information he has gone to such pains to uncover.

THE OTHER two books under consideration, being collections of conference papers, lack the focus and unity of a monograph like Suh's, but the contributions are conspicuously more interpretive. Robert Scalapino, the co-editor (with Hongkoo Lee and Dalchoong Kim respectively) of these two volumes, is to be congratulated for these and earlier conference volumes published through the Institute of East Asian Studies at the University of California (Berkeley), which have regularly made available the latest writing on North Korea by American and South Korean scholars.[9]

Unfortunately, as is often the case with conference volumes, the contributions to these two collection vary greatly in quality and authority. *North Korea in a Regional and Global Context* (henceforth, abbreviated as *NKRGC*) is quite useful as a source on current trends in North Korean economic and foreign relations. It is therefore a pity that neither it, nor its companion volume, *Asian Communism: Continuity and Transition,* is provided with an index. *NKRGC* is organized as a series of paired essays, one by an American scholar and one by a South Korean scholar, on topics such as: ideology and foreign policy; foreign trade; and North Korean relations with South Korea, the Soviet Union, China, Japan, the United States, and the Third World.

Much of the analysis of foreign relations in *NKRGC* will be familiar to those who follow this subject closely, but the book contains some gems. For example, B. C. Koh's essay "Ideology and North Korean

[7]The major evidence cited for this kind of relationship are the report by Han Chae-dok—a defector who participated in early meetings of the Korean communist party—that Soviet authorities always attended these meetings, and an early edition of Kim's works in which Kim says "permission" was granted by Soviet authorities to establish the North Korean Provisional People's Committee, which initiated major reforms in 1946.

[8]Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945–1947,* Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1981, p. 424 passim.

[9]An earlier publication in the same series was the 1983 volume, *North Korea Today: Strategic and Domestic Issues.*

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Foreign Policy" usefully summarizes the relevance to North Korean foreign policy of Kim's ideas of *chuch'e* (self-reliance), class struggle, proletarian dictatorship, and imperialism. The essays by Yoon Suk Bum and Joseph Chung also provide badly needed current information on the North Korean economy that cannot easily be found elsewhere. Yoon's essay discusses the relationship between the domestic economy and foreign trade in North Korea, and along with a statistical investigation of hypotheses, provides us with alternate series of estimates of North Korea's GNP, based on several different assumptions.[10] Chung's essay provides very useful data on foreign trade, derived from statistics of the International Monetary Fund and the United Nations on the trade of other countries with North Korea.[11]

In spite of the fact that the conference was held six years ago, in 1984, the essays on foreign relations in *NKRGC* remain timely for today's situation—primarily because Kim Il-song remains the ultimate helmsman in 1990. In 1990, as in 1984, the question from North Korea's perspective is how to develop a modern Korean nation while preserving it from the predatory imperialism of surrounding countries.

Emphasizing the need to protect the national essence through *chuch'e*, Kim's ideology, as noted by B. C. Koh, fully endorses the Leninist theory of imperialism. Everything else follows from this. The Korean nation must have a strong state and a highly centralized planned economy, and be sealed off from both infiltration by foreign capital and incorporation into a socialist division of labor as proposed during the 1960's for members of the Soviet-sponsored Council for Economic Mutual Assistance, which North Korea never joined.[12]

What the North Koreans see as the neocolonial domination of South Korea by the United States, in particular, and world capital, generally, still prevents the completion of the liberation of Korea and endangers the North Korean heartland, where liberation from foreign domination has already been achieved. To maintain itself, the North Korean state must remain strong, and Kim Il-song's ideology must be inculcated in new generations by a reliable successor—in this case, Kim's son, Kim Chong-il—because only "monolithic ideology" will allow the North to persevere until the complete liberation of the Korean nation, something that Kim Il-song is unlikely to see in his lifetime.

Trends of political and economic development in East Asia and elsewhere in the last decade, however, have not been favorable. The North Korean economy, which in the first decade after the Korean War showed amazingly rapid growth, has tended to stagnate. Standards of living are much higher than in China and comparable to those of some East European countries, but lately, economic growth has slowed to around 2 percent a year.[13]

This has primarily been due to the inefficiencies of an overly centralized planning process, and the fact that an optimal mix of industries and economies of scale are difficult to achieve in an isolated country of only 20 million people. Moreover, the advanced technology that North Korea now needs in order to continue developing—especially now that South Korea has decisively surpassed North Korea in industrial development—cannot be obtained from other socialist countries. North Korea has perforce had to turn to the advanced market economies (particularly Japan). But trading on international markets is inherently difficult for centrally planned economies, which lack the necessary flexibility and efficiency. North Korea, thus, has consistently run trade deficits.

Decentralizing reforms have been undertaken, but the North Koreans have not turned to market mechanisms—most likely for fear of weakening the state, which is viewed as the main defense against foreign dependency and manipulation. To North Korean policy-makers, recent events in Eastern Europe seem to confirm the political dangers of straying from central planning and the need to strengthen socialism—an attitude well illustrated by the title of a recent (May 25, 1990) editorial in the party organ *Nodong Sinmun*: "Let Us Raise Still Higher the Superiority of Our Country's Socialism."

Trends in foreign relations have also been unfavorable. As is made clear in *NKRGC*, North Korea's policy consistently has been to seek international recognition for itself as the sole legitimate Korean state and as an example to all the world of liberation from colonial subjection, while promoting the idea internationally that South Korea is a neocolonial puppet set up by the United States. In accordance with this policy, North Korea has avoided any contact with South Korean government authorities that would imply recognition.[14] As a precondition for progress on the Korean penin-

[10]North Korea, like other socialist economies, does not publish data on GNP. Such can only be estimated, based on various assumptions.

[11]North Korea does not publish these figures and does not provide this trade information to the international agencies in question.

[12]The close relationship that Romania and North Korea developed with one another after the 1960's was largely based on Nicolae Ceauşescu's and Kim's agreement on the latter issue.

[13]See *Far Eastern Economic Review Asia Yearbook 1989*, Hong Kong, 1989.

(Fn. 14 follows on p. 97.)

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sula, P'yongyang has demanded cessation of the annual Team Spirit joint military exercises of United States and South Korean armed forces. The North has also sought to negotiate directly with the United States regarding unification, without participation of the South.

Early South Korean successes in achieving international recognition began to erode in the 1970's following North Korea's admission to the Non-Aligned Movement. P'yongyang's increased contacts with Third World countries enhanced its influence in the United Nations. However, South Korea's remarkable economic growth[15] has tended, especially in the last decade, to induce many countries that might otherwise be sympathetic to the North Korean position to establish or maintain ties with the South.

South Korea has encouraged this trend with its *nordpolitik*—a policy of expansion of economic and diplomatic ties with communist countries. This strategy has paid off handsomely since the 1988 Olympics: by early 1990, Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia, and Romania had established full diplomatic relations with the Republic of Korea, and the Soviet Union had established consular relations with the South. The Soviet Union and South Korea have also agreed to establish a direct air link. Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's San Francisco meeting with South Korean President Roh Tae Woo on June 4, 1990, after the US-Soviet summit, points to further Soviet implementation of a two-Korea policy. Although the Soviet Union is downplaying the significance of this meeting,[16] South Koreans confidently predict full diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union within months.

Certainly, trade between South Korea and the Soviet Union has grown by leaps and bounds, despite Soviet payment problems. It is predicted to reach US$1 billion this year,[17] and as with the countries of Eastern Europe, the South Koreans are likely to use economic ties to press very hard for recognition, despite the apparent Soviet desire to develop trade ties more quickly than diplomatic ones. Of the major communist countries, only China seems firm in withholding recognition of South Korea, and even Beijing carries on a lively trade with the South. A two-Korea policy—an anathema to the North Koreans—is fast becoming a de facto reality throughout the world.

The North Koreans criticized the Gorbachev-Roh meeting, accusing the South Korean president of "serving the great (*sadae*)" and calling the meeting "a disgraceful bit of flunkyist treachery" designed to pressure North Korea through a third party.[18] This attitude finds some sympathizers in South Korea among those who find it humiliating that "internal" Korean problems should be approached through their head of state's meeting the leader of a great power on the soil of another great power.

Nevertheless, the pressure may be taking its toll. On July 27, 1990, the two Korean government announced that their respective prime ministers would hold two sessions of talks, the first in Seoul in September and the second in P'yongyang in October.[19] It is clear that a major realignment of interests is taking place in Northeast Asia. In Japan, for example, though most political leaders view developing South Korean–Soviet relations positively, some seem to feel outflanked and advocate developing stronger ties with North Korea.[20] The United States has gradually developed channels of communication with North Korea in Beijing, and rumors have even surfaced of North Korean trade overtures to Taiwan.

North Korea needs international contacts to shore up its legitimacy and to provide it with access to modern technology, but now—despite the success of last summer's World Festival of Youth and Students in P'yongyang—it is in danger of becoming isolated. Ceauşescu, North Korea's best friend in Europe, has been overthrown. In the short run, such events will have little impact on P'yongyang's policy or on the North Korean populace. Control of information is very tight. North Koreans were informed about the overthrow of Ceauşescu by a laconic notice in *Nodong Sinmun* to the effect that Ion Iliescu had been "elected" head of a National Salvation Front and that Kim had telegraphed his congratulations. Media attention, as might be expected, is being focused on communist regimes, such as Cuba, that feel it essential to keep an iron grip on the economy and state, and to guard against foreign meddling.

Today's events, obviously, could not have been discussed in *NKRGC,* but given the fact that North Korea is not subject to pres-

[14]The on-again off-again talks with South Korean authorities might imply de facto recognition of the South Korean regime, but North Korea denies this is the case, and has frequently encouraged the visit of opposition politicians to the North while rejecting contacts with the South Korean head of state.

[15]In terms of absolute size (gross domestic product), South Korea's economy in 1988 was estimated to have been eight times as large as that of North Korea, and to be the fourth largest in Asia (excluding Soviet Asia) after Japan, India, and China. See *Far Eastern Economic Review Asia Handbook 1990*, Hong Kong, 1990.

[16]*The New York Times*, June 7, 1990.

[17]*Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), June 14, 1990, p. 10.

[18]*The New York Times*, June 8, 1990.

[19]Ibid., July 27, 1990.

[20]Seoul newspapers reported, for example, that Sakamoto Misoji, secretary of the Japanese cabinet, made such a suggestion.

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sure from the Soviet Union the way countries such as East Germany have been, and that North Korea can effectively control the flow of information in a way not possible even in Romania, the ideological basis of North Korean policy and the general trends of international relations discussed in this book mentioned before still provide a good foundation for understanding North Korea's position in the world of 1990. In the short run, market-oriented economic reforms, or grass-roots demands for democratic reforms are not in the cards for North Korea.

Asian Communism: Continuity and Transition deals with the three major Asian communist regimes—China, Vietnam, and North Korea. The comparative dimension of this book, which (like *NKGRC*) is a collection of paired essays by American and South Korean authors on selected topics, is in principle an extremely welcome departure. In most of the essays, however, with the notable exceptions of those by B. C. Koh, Lucien Pye, and Harlan Jencks, the concept of comparative Asian communism loses something in the explication.

The authors do very little to investigate the proposition whether there exists a distinctive "Asian communism"—i.e., whether North Korea, Vietnam, and China share some characteristics that distinguish them as a group from the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Cuba, or Angola. One is left with the feeling that the selection of China, Vietnam, and North Korea was arbitrary and reflects no essential commonality between the countries.

The chief justification for considering China, North Korea, and Vietnam in the same volume, of course, rests on their historical links and cultural similarity. There have also been important intellectual links among the North Korean, Vietnamese, and Chinese communist parties. As is well-known, large numbers of North Koreans were introduced to communism during the Chinese revolution, and Ho Chi Minh first organized the Vietnamese Communist Party in Canton in the 1930's. One would expect, then, especially important give-and-take between the distinctive developments of communism in China and those in Vietnam and North Korea.

In this context, it is especially disappointing that the two essays on ideology, by Lowell Dittmer and Yang Ho-min, which might be expected to tie the volume together, are weak. Both authors seem to have simply taken the works of Mao and those of Kim (and also of Ho Chi Minh, in the case of Yang) and applied the principle that where there is similarity, Kim (and/or Ho) must have borrowed from Mao.

It has been well-known for years that Mao's thought, particularly his ideas of mass line and "new democracy," were an important influence on Kim.[21] But in other cases, mere similarities are not sufficient to establish the fact of borrowing or its significance. One must consider the influence of Lenin and Stalin, among others, on all three leaders, and how the cultural background and social conditions of each country might have induced Mao, Kim, or Ho to pick and choose among various ideas.

Neither Yang nor Dittmer take the trouble to determine to which writings Mao, Kim,[22] or Ho might have had access in what period, or to consider the relevance of the indigenous intellectual traditions of Korea and Vietnam, in spite of the fact that there is significant material in English on these subjects.[23] Although many aspects of Mao's thought are linked to struggles between different lines involving concrete policy options, Kim and Ho are treated as if they were working in an intellectual vacuum in which Korean and Vietnamese conditions and intellectual traditions were irrelevant. For example, Dittmer asserts that Kim's cardinal concept of *chuch'e* is "derived from Maoism" (p. 34). Although Kim Il-song is not an original thinker, his nationalism does have authentic Korean roots, and the "great *chuch'e* idea" is one of these. Mao does not even use this term; its usage in Korea comes out of the general critique of traditional society begun as a result of Japanese colonialism, and not only predates Kim's appearance on the Korean scene but is not even specifically Marxist. Its roots most likely go back to the prewar Korean anarchist Sin Ch'ae-ho,[24] and involve elements—such as the exaltation of the 6th-century Korean state of Koguryo,

[21]The concept of mass line was developed within the CCP during the 1930's (when Kim was operating within it), and the extent to which it was a personal creation of Mao is unclear. Kim has lifted whole passages from the works of Mao without attribution, and Yang notes one case of this. Neither Yang nor Dittmer, however, mention the criticisms Mao made of Kim.

[22]It is significant in this regard that Suh (p. 10) notes Lenin as the only theoretician that Kim's Chinese mentor, Wei Zhengmin, reports having discussed among the guerrillas in Manchuria.

[23]Considering only book-length studies dealing with this issue, for Vietnam, the following may be cited: William J. Duiker, *The Rise of Nationalism in Vietnam, 1900–1941*, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1976; William S. Turley, Ed., *Vietnamese Revolutionary Doctrine in Comparative Perspective*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1980; Alexander Woodside and David K. Wyatt, Eds., *Moral Order and the Question of Change: Essays on Southeast Asian Thought*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1982. Relevant books on Korea include: Chong-sik Lee, *The Politics of Korean Nationalism*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1963 ; Gregory Henderson, *Korea: The Politics of the Vortex*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1968; and Pyong-Choon Hahm, *The Korean Political Tradition and Law*, Seoul, Royal Asiatic Society, Korea Branch, 1971.

[24]Michael Robinson, "National Identity and the Thought of Sin Ch'ae-ho: *Sadaejuui* and *Chuch'e* in History and Politics," *The Journal of Korean Studies* (Los Angeles) Vol. 5, 1984, pp. 121–42.

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which repelled several Sui invasions, and hence are unlikely to have been derived from any Chinese source.

For his part, Yang seems so concerned with denying Kim's originality that he forgets to look at what was actually going on in North Korea. For example, he states that North Korean collectivization proceeded like that of China "without appropriate development of farm machinery" (p. 47). Collectivization may or may not have been the best policy for North Korea in the 1950's, but by 1963 (five years after collectivization was completed) almost 90 percent of the farmland in North Korea was reported being plowed by tractors—a level of mechanization far greater than China, South Korea, or Taiwan had at that time.[25]

One aspect of North Korea that has always distinguished it sharply from China is consistency of policy, attention to the details of effective administration, and concern with creating a core of technical experts. The disorganization, pervasive disillusionment, and cynicism brought about in China by constant mass mobilization campaigns and shifts in line have not appeared in North Korea. While both China and Vietnam have turned more and more to an individual household system in agriculture and to de facto decollectivization, rural North Korea remains organized in collective farms that still provide a better standard of living than is found in rural China or rural Vietnam.[26] Kim's policies, thus, should not be understood simply as blind copying of Chinese precedent.[27]

EACH of these books expands our meager knowledge of North Korea. Nevertheless, they all have one glaring weakness—they are short on historic context. No significant attention in any of the books is given to pre-1945 Korea in spite of the fact that it was the critique of traditional Korean society begun during the colonial period that led many Koreans to support communism in the postwar period.

North Korea, one of the most tightly organized countries in the world, has been led for all of its existence by a single man, an individual who has built an unprecedented personality cult and who disseminates mindnumbing, repetitious cant as an example for all the world to follow. It is easy, therefore, to make the mistake of dismissing that state as derivative and unimportant when it is neither. Whether North Korea will gain the legitimacy that it continues to seek both domestically and abroad must be gauged in terms of its success in overcoming the ineffective state organization and over-reliance on foreigners that many Koreans see as the root cause of their country's falling prey to Japanese domination early in this century. Only if we look at North Korea's development in these terms can we understand why North Koreans, many ethnic Koreans in Japan, and an important though small number of Koreans in the South apparently grant legitimacy to a state organization and leader that most Westerners find repugnant.

[25]Joseph Sang-hoon Chung, *The North Korean Economy: Structure and Development*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1974, p. 37. See also Robert Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee, *Communism in Korea, Part II: The Society*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1972, p. 1095.

[26]Comparisons of standards of living are inherently difficult, but estimates of per capita income in North Korea, China, and Vietnam put North Korea some four times higher than China and five to six times higher than Vietnam. South Korea and Taiwan have per capita incomes four to five times higher than that of North Korea. See *Far Eastern Economic Review Asia Handbook 1990*, p. 6. Although for China, the urban living standard has been estimated to be three to four times the rural living standard (see Martin King Whyte and William L. Parish, *Urban Life in Contemporary China*, Chicago, University of Chicago, 1984, pp. 53–54), for the other societies in question, rural/urban differences are much less significant. Robert Dernberger's essay in *Asian Communism, Continuity and Transition* confirms these general trends using a variety of published data sources.

[27]Dernberger's essay, loc. cit., is quite aware of the differences in the economic policies of the East Asian communist countries.

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China's Leaders: Individuals or Party Spokesmen?

Marcia R. Ristaino

JÜRGEN DOMES. *Peng Te-huai: The Man and His Image.* Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1985.

YANG ZHONG MEI. *Hu Yao Bang: A Chinese Biography.* Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1988.

CHING HUA LEE. *Deng Xiaoping: The Marxist Road to the Forbidden City.* Princeton, NJ, Kingston Press, 1985.

THE writing of accurate biographies recording the lives of China's historical and contemporary leaders is seriously hampered by features inherent in the Chinese Communist political culture. In the Western tradition of biographical writing, one of the biographer's principal tasks is to come to grips with the unique qualities and attributes that best define an individual's character and help explain his behavior and contributions. Application of this approach to China's leaders becomes difficult if not impossible because they are not presented, nor do they even present themselves, as unique individuals with personal views and private lives open to exploration. The biographer does not have access to information on how a particular leader viewed certain important events, how and why he arrived at key decisions, what his personal tastes and preferences were—in other words, the details of life that help illuminate the often complex personalities of public leaders. Such data are lacking even for those leaders who have dominated public life for decades. Another problem is that biographic material that appears in official sources often is distorted to reflect an ideal communist background or model behavior for others to emulate.

My purpose in this essay is to reflect upon how the problems of the biographer, his materials, and his subject are dealt with in the books listed above. Following brief comment on earlier key examples of biographic studies of China's leaders and their impact, I will discuss each of the books considered here, paying particular attention to the issue of internal conflict between a person's role as political leader and party spokesman, on the one hand, and his views as a private individual, on the other—a special problem for the biographer of China's leaders. The essay will conclude with remarks as to what these biographies reveal about the nature, priorities, and functioning of China's political culture, and, recognizing the fact that a biography is shaped by the material available for its presentation, what the reader can expect to gain from this form of scholarly research.

EDGAR Snow was probably the most effective biographer of China's early revolutionary leaders, although similar recognition also must be given to Agnes Smedley for her remarkable study of Red Army Commander Zhu De (Chu Teh).[1] Snow and Smedley had the tremendous advantage of direct access to the leaders they wrote

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[1]See Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China,* New York, Random House, 1938; and Agnes Smedley, *Great Road: The Life and Times of Chu Teh,* New York, Monthly Review Press, 1956.

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about and broad exposure to the historical events shaping the early history of the Chinese Communist movement. In addition, both authors had exceptional journalistic talents that helped make their complex subjects accessible and informative to scholars and general readers alike.

As soon as Snow had arrived at the Communist Party's headquarters in Shaanxi province, he began his quest to learn "what sort of man" Mao Zedong really was. Mao had been described in various sources as a mad fanatic, as an illiterate peasant, and even as having already died. Before addressing Mao, however, Snow made the interesting observation from his past experiences in interviewing Chinese Communist leaders that most were able to relate at length the details of their youthful activities, but when they reached the point in their lives where they were discussing activities as members of the Red Army, the emphasis changed. Any personal contributions and history-making exploits they might have made were left undiscussed, to be replaced by detailed accounts of battles, military campaigns, and movements that were all significant for their having been conducted collectively and in service of the greater cause of the Red Army (p. 111).

With this phenomenon in mind, Snow brought along a list of specific questions by means of which he persuaded a reluctant Mao to provide an in-depth discussion of his early years. At Snow's prodding, Mao revealed the psychological roots of his rebellious behavior, the shaping of his intellectual development, and his sensitization to social and political issues. Even so, as Mao's story reached the stage where the Communist movement was beginning to coalesce and develop an independent character, Mao, too, began to express events in terms of collective activity rather than his individual contribution, causing Snow to question him repeatedly for his personal attitudes regarding, and role in, the described events. Snow's observation is an important one, particularly as regards the subject of biographies of China's leaders. It suggests that these works may well tell us more about the political movements taking place within a historical period than about the individual leaders in charge of their development.

Snow's work contributed to a body of Western scholarship spanning the decades of the 1950's through the 1970's that made Mao's revolutionary experiences and theoretical writings the focus for approaching and understanding the content and development of the Chinese revolution.[2] To a large extent, this focus can be attributed to the systemization within China of Mao's writings into a body of thought that became the supporting ideology of the new revolutionary state and society. Published in five volumes and available in several languages, Mao's works became a comprehensive resource available to researchers, while other historical materials remained generally inaccessible.

The heavy emphasis on Mao's political and theoretical significance fostered a one-dimensional approach that failed to sort out and examine underlying processes, levels of leadership, and regional variations when approaching the study of China's leaders and the revolution. China came to be understood as "Mao's China," a concept that carried with it a misleading appearance of unity, stability, and homogeneity that made it increasingly difficult to detect the strains and tensions developing within the changing society. More recent Western scholarship has shown greater interest in a multi-disciplinary approach that examines a revolutionary leader within a dynamic political, social, and economic context.[3]

In addition to the difficulties that the creation of Mao Zedong Thought presented for Western scholarship, in China, this systematization meant the presentation of only one official set of answers to emerging problems—that provided by the current set of leaders empowered to interpret Mao's writings. No dissenting voice could be expressed outside the official system, because its existence would call into question the central idea that only the Communist Party's most authoritative leaders were qualified to interpret the true political situation and develop the necessary and correct social and political alignments to deal with it. And because the scope of Mao's writings was so comprehensive, almost the entire range of human behavior fell somewhere within its boundaries, making the body of his thought the foundation for a pervasive Chinese Communist political culture touching every aspect of society.

Another equally important consequence of the systematization of Mao's thought was its distortion of the Marxist-Leninist concept of collective leadership. As the party, under Mao's direction, elevated his role and importance to Olympian heights, the particular contributions of other early Chinese Communist revolutionaries were substantially lost, or their significance was seriously slighted.

[2]Notable examples are Benjamin I. Schwartz, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1951; Stuart Schram, *Mao Tse-tung*, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1966; and Jerome Ch'en, *Mao and the Chinese Revolution*, London and New York, Oxford University Press, 1965.

[3]One example of this approach is Fernando Galbiati, *P'eng P'ai and the Hai-Lu-Feng Soviet*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1985.

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Beginning in the early 1980's, efforts were made to rectify this situation by the official publication of memoirs, reminiscences, and biographies of well-known early revolutionary leaders. More important, in 1981, Mao's historical position was reevaluated, and the conclusion was reached that in his later years, Mao made serious mistakes. Nevertheless, because China's Communists continue to give Mao's thought the doctrinal stature of being a major development of Marxism-Leninism, they perpetuate the idea that his was a unitary achievement and not a collective one.

THE BOOKS being considered here are biographies of three key Chinese leaders whose lives further illuminate the tensions between the individual and his projected official status as a party leader. The books also reveal how this double status affects and is played out in China's political process. This issue is important for what it reveals about how the political culture in China defines its leaders and delineates their role in its functioning.

Jürgen Domes's calls his slim volume a political biography of Marshal Peng Dehuai (P'eng Te-huai). Domes poses at the outset a number of questions, the most interesting of which for the present discussion are how and why Peng became a Communist military officer; what Peng's famous challenge to Mao at Lushan revealed about the nature of political conflict in China; and what these findings say about "political communication" in a Marxist-Leninist state. The author directly asks whether leading party figures, political or military, are viewed as individual leaders or as symbols to be manipulated by the party to serve the immediate requirements of the state. Domes thereby goes beyond identifying factional groupings and equating personal loyalties with competing policy lines, an approach taken in earlier scholarship addressing China's leadership. Rather, in the case of Peng Dehuai, he considers both the individual and the leader in the context of the unique characteristics of China's political process, particularly its ideological aspects.

Domes maintains that Peng, a rural Kuomintang military officer, became a Communist Party member in 1928 after observing and being impressed by the behavior of Communist cadres working closely with the impoverished rural population. He explains that Peng was not an adherent of Marxism-Leninism, which he did not begin studying in a systematic way until 1960. Rather, Peng operated from a deep populist desire to understand and alleviate rural suffering and came to view the Communists as the only organized force in the country promoting progressive social and political change. Peng's motivations can easily appear on the surface as simple altruism, an unlikely character trait in a military commander. Nevertheless, this analysis does provide some credible basis for understanding Peng's eventually becoming incensed by the havoc created in the countryside by Mao's "three red banners" policies,[4] and helps explain his politically naïve challenge to the Chairman on these policies at Lushan in 1959.

Peng's attack, which led to his dismissal, dealt directly with the excesses of the Great Leap Forward, the people's communes, and Mao's authoritarian work style. Domes clearly demonstrates that Peng was moved to his audacious attack on Mao by the consequences of these policies for rural inhabitants, which had become clear to Peng from his own investigative travels to the provinces.

However, Domes fails to bring the same clarity to his subsequent discussion of the reasons for Peng's defeat at Lushan. Employing vague terms such as "intermediate-range and long-range factions," Domes explains that Peng's defeat was the result of leader allegiances to a "consensus of procedures," which he says meant "the agreement of all the participants that decisions should be made within the formal organs of the party" (p. 101).

This argument is basically flawed because it overlooks the fact that Mao himself certainly did not abide by any consensus, threatening as he did to take to the hills and gather military support if his position were not upheld.[5] And once Mao had made his position known, most of the party leaders who had supported Peng, including military commanders, fell in line behind Mao, leaving Peng out in the cold.

The historical record shows that Peng had had several previous clashes with Mao,[6] but had survived each time to serve in key positions and participate in decision-making. But these clashes had occurred before Mao had been elevated to unchallenged political leadership. By the time of Lushan, the Mao personality cult had in fact replaced collective decision-making within formal party organs.

Domes's book provides an interesting perspective on what he calls "communist political communication"—the purposeful manipulation of the facts of a leader's life in order

[4]The "three red banners" were the Great Leap Forward, the general line of socialist construction, and the people's communes.

[5]Mao's ultimatum stated: "I shall then go to the countryside to lead the peasants to overthrow the government. If you from the PLA do not follow me, I shall find myself a Red Army" (p. 95).

[6]Domes notes earlier criticism of Mao by Peng, centered around military doctrine, the cult of personality, and the liberalism entailed in initiating the Hundred Flowers Campaign. See pp. 72–73.

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to symbolize either positive or negative public behavior. In this process, the individual himself and the accurate biographical events of his life are discounted; what matters is the party's ascribing to the individual desirable and undesirable personal attitudes, which then can be publicized through the media as examples of "correct" and "incorrect" behavior. The party uses the resulting positive and negative paradigms to promote and better explain current policies and goals. Domes's discussion is instructive regarding the Chinese political system and cautionary with respect to the interpretation of official party biographical accounts.

On balance, Domes's book provides insightful commentary on Peng the man, and calls our attention to the way in which the Communist system often manipulates the individual for political ends. Less clear is the author's discussion of the dynamics of elite conflict to support his argument that a leadership consensus on procedures explains the unity against Peng that appeared at Lushan. (Domes's explanation that he has presented his arguments systematically in other publications does not help the reader in considering this important subject, which is central to a book on Peng Dehuai.) A more likely explanation is that the extreme deference shown by most leaders to Mao's profound party authority and revolutionary prestige won out over their allegiance to Peng's rational arguments.

YANG Zhong Mei, born and raised in China, proposes in his biography to provide a free and critical assessment of Hu Yaobang, the former party general secretary who was closely associated with urban intellectuals and a leader of China's reform movement. Yang begins his discussion by pointing out that throughout China's history, the biography has been a crucial form of historical expression, mainly because power has typically been concentrated in the hands of key personalities whose actions have thereafter been presented as mirroring whole historical periods.

Yang's difficulty in treating Hu Yaobang as his subject, however, is that Hu never was China's primary leader, and Mao's legacy was a political system that concentrated decisive power in one authoritative individual. At the pinnacle of his influence, Hu still served under the direction of such a primary leader, Deng Xiaoping. Consequently, although Hu may have originated some key policies, such as the creation of a successor generation groomed to lead China's reform efforts, his ideas and contributions necessarily became ascribed to Deng and were buried in Deng's official speeches and collected published works.

Moreover, the reader has difficulty gaining an accurate sense of Hu's own political preferences or personal views. For example, as Yang explains, under Mao's leadership, Hu did not intervene when the political reaction that came in the wake of the liberal Hundred Flowers Campaign brought the arrest of several members of the Communist Youth League Central Committee (under Hu's charge). But, later, in 1978, under Deng Xiaoping's leadership, Hu apologized for the harsh crackdown. The duality in Hu's approach involved swings between supporting party discipline and orthodoxy, on the one hand, and encouraging innovation, on the other. The first tendency was evident in his invention (in 1963) and subsequent publicizing of the self-sacrificing model patriot Lei Feng. The second, more tolerant attitude can be seen in Hu's commitment to review and overturn cases of those condemned during the Cultural Revolution, and more recently in his support for reformist journalists, students, and intellectuals. Much of the explanation for these shifts lies in Hu's having to follow the policy direction of the primary leader. As Yang suggests, however, Hu's background in youth affairs and, most important, his associations with students, artists, and intellectuals led him to identify personally with an innovative and open approach.

Yang explains that Hu's political demise came about after his attempt to provide an innovative solution to the succession problem in China's leading bodies by having the old revolutionary generation retire from office and raising a new generation of younger, more qualified leaders to replace them. Hu tested the limits of tolerance by reportedly advising Deng himself to retire in order to set an example for the others.

Yang's arguments are well presented. He is particularly convincing when he argues that once the Anhui student demonstrations for democratic elections spread to many cities in late 1986, a power struggle was set off in the Chinese leadership. Deng, supported by the older and threatened conservative leaders, cracked down on the demonstrations with firm control measures and removed Hu from power. Yang dwells on the illegality of Hu's removal from power, calling it a coup d'état. His point would carry more weight, however, had Hu actually exercised ultimate power while serving as party general secretary. Once removed, Hu was transformed—in the manner described by Domes—into a convenient example of negative behavior for party propagandists. He was blamed not only for the student incidents, but also for economic dislocations, dissent, and other consequences of Deng's reform program.

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In his next-to-last chapter, Yang attempts to evaluate Hu Yaobang's thinking and intellectual development, a difficult task in a political culture that allows full expression only to the official set of ideas. One of Yang's major points is that, in contrast to Mao's emphasis on struggle as a creative force, Hu espoused a synthetic approach to social problems that combined theory and practice in service of a stable and harmonious course of development. The difficulty with this assertion is that the several ideas Yang ascribes to Hu can easily be found in the voluminous writing of Deng Xiaoping, making it impossible to know who actually originated them, Hu or Deng.

A more serious complaint concerns the factual errors in Yang's account. For example, he notes (p. 20) that the Sixth Plenum of the Third Central Committee of the CCP occurred in September 1930 and stripped Li Lisan of his party leadership position. Far from the mark, this event formally took place at the Fourth Plenum of the Sixth CCP Central Committee, in January 1931.[7] In addition, Yang ascribes to Hu (pp. 51–52) the concepts of "unity and struggle," which fostered the expansion of Communist influence and later became part of Mao's "united front" strategy. Abundant evidence indicates that these ideas date back to the late 1920's, i.e., before either Hu or Mao was leading the party.[8]

Also, one can only wish that Yang had provided better documentation for his discussion of Hu Yaobang's life and activities. The author had extraordinary access to personalities, memoirs, interview material, and internal documents, yet his sourcing is rather thin and disappointing. Still, one is grateful for the many interesting details he provides, particularly on Hu's later years.

CHING HUA LEE, a Taiwan-based scholar, writes an instructive biography of the "political life" of Deng Xiaoping. Lee emphasizes in his account that from his early days as a young revolutionary, Deng was remarkable for his organizational and administrative talents rather than for his originality or theoretical contributions to the Chinese Communist movement.

The author pursues this argument by examining Deng's behavior during key events. For example, Deng opposed the Hundred Flowers Campaign with the objection that it was a spontaneous movement, difficult to control, and lacking the discipline of essential party leadership. Deng thought that criticism must be constructive and always be aimed at strengthening the party's position and the socialist cause (p. 109).

In addition, although Deng defended in writing Mao's opposition to Peng Dehuai's challenge at Lushan, when it came to defining the course of the Mao's Socialist Education Campaign late in 1962,[9] Deng attempted to moderate the Chairman's program by stressing the role of party leadership. When Mao initiated the Cultural Revolution and unleashed the spontaneous Red Guard organizations, Deng objected to the formation of autonomous groups outside the regular party organization and sent in party work teams to restore discipline and order. Finally, Lee notes that although Deng was officially blamed for the spontaneous April 5, 1976, demonstrations in Tiananmen Square, and temporarily removed from power for not suppressing them, once he returned to power, he responded to rallies and demonstrations that threatened to undermine his leadership by proclaiming the "four cardinal principles" in March 1979 to reinvigorate the leading role of the party and its ideology,[10] outlawing "big-character posters," and arresting dissidents. Lee argues that Deng learned from the Cultural Revolution to distrust mass movements, which he felt required party guidance if catastrophe was to be avoided. Deng also recognized the military to be a key player for sustaining order and discipline in China's politics.

Lee attempts to contrast Deng, the bureaucrat and "practitioner," to Mao, the philosopher and conceptualizer. He depicts Deng as having only a limited understanding of Marxism, even though, as Lee himself points out, Deng was trained in Moscow at Sun Yat-sen University and was among the first to graduate in the special class on theory. The author seems to overlook Deng's own agenda—that China's task was no longer revolution but economic development and construction, which demands an empirical, technocratic approach that is unencumbered by binding philosophical tracts and arguments.

In any case, Deng cannot be dismissed as a thinker without first at least considering his voluminous published writings, particularly his August 1980 speech to the enlarged meeting of the 11th Political Bureau outlining his plans for politi-

[7]The Third Congress of the CCP took place in June 1923.

[8]See Marcia R. Ristaino, *China's Art of Revolution: The Mobilization of Discontent, 1927 and 1928*, Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1987, pp. 157–62.

[9]The Socialist Education Campaign (1962–65) was a radical rectification campaign, which emphasized class struggle and aimed at arresting revisionism within the party. It is considered a precursor to the Cultural Revolution (1966–76).

[10]The "four cardinal principles" are keeping to the socialist road; upholding the dictatorship of the proletariat; party leadership; and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought.

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cal reform of the party and state leadership systems. Instead of discussing such materials, Lee compares Deng's programs to the mid-19th-century reform movements that valued the assimilation of Western technology but not the spirit of Western culture (p. 219).

Lee finds Deng devoid of any new vision or creative force for China's growth and ready to blame failures of the communist system—such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution—on "human errors," rather than on the system itself. Lee locates Deng's difficulties in the aspiration to achieve modernization while maintaining the communist political system, i.e., eschewing political democratization. He contends that Deng is therefore a transitional figure whose main contribution was to help the country recover from the revolutionary era.

The argument is raised in this book that Deng Xiaoping is "liberal" concerning economics and conservative politically. In the author's usage, the first term suggests that Deng is open not to adopting important elements of the Western economic system but only to incorporating advanced technology and innovations that might improve China's standard of living. Politically, Deng should be regarded as conservative, Lee maintains, because he is a convinced Communist who will insist that the party select the course for China's future and lead the society along it. The question remains whether the combination of these two outlooks is inherently contradictory and self-defeating or is stabilizing and conducive to integration and growth. Lee clearly favors the former conclusion over the latter.

THESE books all indicate how China's Communist political culture places fierce limits on the biographer's ability to provide a clear grasp and understanding of the character and personality of China's leaders. In a system that prescribes that the party, and not the individual, leads, evidence of individual thought and behavior escapes official recognition. The rituals of party unity enforce conformity and, in so doing, suppress evidence of divergent individuality. Loyalty to the party organization and its political line supersedes any identification with the self.

The materials employed by these biographers to describe the early formative years of the lives of Peng Dehuai, Hu Yaobang, and Deng Xiaoping were inherently limited and fail to provide much information or insight into their subjects' early intellectual growth or development. This lack of information makes it impossible to construct a psychological profile, as Edgar Snow did for Mao Zedong, that might illuminate the unique qualities, thoughts, and experiences that helped shape the later stages of their lives, when they came to occupy high positions. Moreover, even the official biographic materials and sketches that do exist often reflect the party's tailoring of background information to meet the requirements of an ideal Communist's biography. For example, in the case of Hu Yaobang, Yang points out that party biographical sketches gave Hu the preferred status of having been born into a poor-peasant family, when, in fact, reliable records show that Hu's family was better off and more appropriately described in the Maoist lexicon as middle-peasant in status (p. 5).

This lack of material and the official manipulation of documentation to fulfill the party ideal present serious obstacles to biographic writing and impair the usefulness of biographies of China's leaders. Even more important, these barriers also suggest that in China's political culture, the individual really does not exist until he is engaged in significant collective activity, and even then, the life being considered must be contoured to conform with established Communist principles.

Peng Dehuai is a good example of subordination of the self to party loyalty in order to satisfy the party requirement of broad unity. Peng agreed to humiliate himself in a public confession, accepting blame for a host of "severe mistakes" which covered several decades, and even incriminated some of his closest allies. Peng's "errors" went beyond the immediate Lushan events and were viewed as linked with ideas and positions already condemned by the party—the Li Li-san and Wang Ming lines. His fall provided another opportunity for the party leadership to define unacceptable and deviant political behavior and to deliver a firm hortative message to all party cadres.

Domes notes that Peng participated in this ordeal of confession even though, as he confided privately to Zhou Enlai, in doing so "For the first time in my life, I have spoken against my very heart" (p. 98). Yet, even after incarceration and prolonged hardship, Peng still looked to the party for an official statement of rehabilitation to validate his long life of military and party service. The conditioning of his loyalty to the party over the years had clearly been very thorough and successful.

Domes suggests (p. 135) that Peng lacked "the programmatic drive and ability" to form a viable faction to represent his challenge to the prevailing party line. This evaluation of Peng might be questioned on two counts. First, Peng's dispute with Mao's policies was probably the boldest and , for a time, the most widely supported among the leadership (incidentally it also proved, in hindsight, to have been correct).

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Second, the possibilities for forming a cohesive and independent program identified with a group of key leaders just did not exist in the closed political system run by Mao Zedong. One only need read Peng's letter to Mao to observe the cautious tone of even Peng's pleas.[11] Loose and shifting groupings of opinion were the most the political system tolerated. Mao's personality cult militated against any other political leader's being able to create or project a commanding presence, let alone a vision for a new policy direction.

Likewise, under Deng Xiaoping, even with a policy of reform and opening-up of the country, party discipline required unity and consensus. While different economic approaches and a shifting emphasis on the content and momentum of economic reform often appeared, formation of an opposition *political* faction with its own program to advance was simply beyond the acceptable limits of the communist political system.

Deng, in his major speeches on political reform, has emphasized the principle of collective leadership, stressing its ameliorative effects on the rigid system of the leader cult under Mao. Deng plausibly argues that a firm centralized collective leadership is required to guide a country that is economically and culturally backward and lacks practical experience with democratic traditions. But Deng's actions belie his "trust" in the functioning of truly collective leadership. This mistrust was confirmed by Zhao Ziyang's astonishing revelation during his televised speech in May 1989 that, in reality, the key decisions in China were still made by one man—Deng Xiaoping. Zhao said: "We formally adopted a decision at the first plenary session of the 13th CCP Central Committee —though this decision has never been published, it is a very important decision—that on most important questions, we still need him [Deng Xiaoping] as the helmsman."[12] Zhao's statement clearly shows that the tensions between the partriarchal individual and institutionalized collective leadership remain unresolved in contemporary China.

ONE factor seriously challenging the charismatic leader and the supporting unitary party line as a viable combination for guiding the political system has emerged from Deng's own policy of opening up the country to the outside world. The information and ideas flowing into the country are for the most part beyond party manipulation and control. Hence, China now must deal not only with its "socialism under Chinese conditions," but also with the reality, under its current policy priorities, of the penetration from the outside world of ideas of every kind. The need to interact effectively with the outside world clashes with China's long-standing goal of preserving national autonomy, which has been a basic component of the national psyche. The new problem becomes how to assimilate and integrate information—cultural, economic, scientific, and even political—while preserving the social and political stability needed for growth and development. It at least appears that a broadened debate, if not power-sharing, will be essential to release, manage, and resolve the many tensions arising in this society undergoing change. Future research will do well to follow the major Chinese spokesmen who have ideas and write on this problem.

Although China's political system appears to remain basically dependent on one charismatic leader, other figures are, in fact, important in shaping the content and direction of important issues. We need to study their speeches and writings and analyze their perspectives. How China deals with the issue of leadership in a communist state, especially in the context of a changing and communicative world dispersing information and provoking diversity and thoughtful expression, is an important world issue. The methods its leaders employ in attempting to make the political system responsive to this challenge will be an important matter for attention by future biographers of China's leaders.

[11] Sara Crimes, Ed., *Peng Dehuai, Memoirs of a Chinese Marshal*, translated by Zheng Longpu, Beijing, Foreign Language Press, 1984.

[12] *Renmin ribao* (Beijing), May 17, 1989, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC), May 17, 1989, p. 16.

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CHECKLIST UPDATE

TO THE EDITORS: I would like to make a number of observations and updates on information provided in the useful "Checklist of Communist Parties in 1989," appearing in the March-April 1990 issue of *Problems of Communism*. I reference my comments to the alphabetic or numerical designation of the entry being discussed and provide the source of the information in parentheses.

C. The secretary general of the National Democratic Union (UND) of Chad is Facho Balaam, and its first congress took place in August 1986 (*African Communist* [London], No. 110, 3rd Quarter 1987).

F. The Congress Party for Malagasy Independence (AKFM) split in March 1989. Its former leader, Richard Andriamanjato, founded and is president of the AKFM-Renouveau or AKFM-Fanavaozala (*Horizont* [East Berlin], No. 11, 1988). The 11th congress of the AKFM began on September 7, 1988 (see *Pravda* [Moscow], Sept. 8, 1988). In parliamentary elections at the end of May 1989, the AKFM got 1.4 percent of the votes and two of 137 seats; AKFM-Renouveau got 2.1 percent of the vote and three seats (*Horizont,* No. 6, 1989; and *Le Monde* [Paris], May 31, 1989).

G. The Front for the Liberation of Mozambique claimed 201,440 members at its 5th congress (*Southscan* [London], Aug. 4, 1989: and *Horizont,* No. 9, 1989).

3. The Communist Party of Réunion claimed 10,000 members in 1987 (*Probleme des Friedens und des Sozialismus* [Prague], No. 3, 1987).

4. The secretary general of the Democratic League-Movement for the Party of Labor (LD-MPT) in Senegal is Abdoulaye Bathily (see *Horizont,* No. 12, 1987). The LD-MPT got 1.41 percent of the votes in the parliamentary elections of 1988 (see *West Africa* [London], Mar. 14, 1988)

7. The Communist Party of Argentina participated in the parliamentary elections of May 14, 1989, via the United Left Coalition, which won 3.48 percent of the votes and elected one deputy—from MAS (*El Economista* [Buenos Aires], Aug. 18, 1989).

8. The United Left coalition obtained 9.98 percent of total (11.05 percent of valid) votes and only 10 seats (not 12) in the parliamentary elections. The percent given in the "Checklist" was for the presidential election. (*Lateinamerika. Analysen, Daten, Dokumentation* [Hamburg], No. 13; *Lateinamerika zwischen demokratischer Konsolidierung und politischer Instabilität,* January 1990, p. 109; *Opinion* [La Paz], May 30, 1989). The minority faction of the PCB no longer exists. It merged at the beginning of May 1988 with the MIR-Masas, the Coordinadora Cuatro de Marzo, and Bloque Patriotico Popular to found the Eje Patriotico which is a member organization of the United Left (*Granma* [Havana], May 4, 1988). The PCB surely has more than 500 members; at its 1985 congress, 577 delegates participated (*Neues Deutschland* [East Berlin], Feb. 11, 1985).

12. The Communist Party of Colombia claims 51,000 members in 2,000 cells (*Horizont,* No. 2, 1989; *Probleme des Friedens und des Sozialismus,* No. 5, 1989, p. 647).

13. In 1986, the Popular Alliance obtained 2.3 percent of the vote in parliamentary elections and 0.8 percent of the presidential vote in Costa Rica. The United People's coalition obtained 2.7 and 0.6 percent respectively. The Popular Vanguard Party and the Costa Rican Communist Party reunited in this coalition, which obtained 0.6 percent of the vote in the presidential elections of February 4, 1990, and one seat in parliament (*Pensamiento Propio* [Managua], No. 31, March 1986; *Inforpress Centroamericana* [Guatemala City], Feb. 15, 1990).

20. As there were nearly 400 delegates at the 1988 Congress of the Communist Party of Ecuador, membership must be higher than 600 (*Horizont,* No. 9, 1988).

22. The Communist Party of Honduras is one of five (not six) organizations in the Honduran Revolutionary Movement: the others are PRTC-H, FMLH, MUR, and MPL-Cinchoneros (*Cerquin* [organ of the PRTC-H], No. 68, May 1987).

25. The Mexican Socialist Party got 4.54 percent of the votes in the parliamentary elections of July 6, 1988 (*Lateinamerika. Analysen, Daten, Dokumentation,* No. 13, January 1990, p. 106).

26. The Sandinista Front for National Liberation (FSLN) had 37,500 members in 1989 (*International Herald Tribune* [Paris], July 5, 1989). The 12th congress of the Socialist Party of Nicaragua (PSN) took place in July 1981 (*Neues Deutschland,* July 6, 1981). In the parliamentary elections of 1984, the PSN got 1.4 percent; the Communist Party of Nicaragua (PCN), 1.5 percent; and the FSLN, 66.8 percent of the valid votes. In 1990, the FSLN got 40.8 percent and 39 seats; the PSN and the PCN, 3 seats each via the UNO-Coalition (*Dritte Welt* [Marburg], April 1990; *Envio*

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[Managua], April 1985).

27. The People's Party of Panama got 0.7 percent (4,598) of the votes in the elections of 1984. It has less than 1,000 members. The 25,600 members it claims are the signatures it had to collect in order to participate in the elections (*Dialogo Social* [Panama], No. 169, July 1984).

28. The Paraguayan Communist Party seems to be legal, because the law that was used to outlaw it was repealed in August 1989 (*Analysis del Mes* [Asuncion], August 1989).

32. The Frente Amplio coalition in Uruguay obtained 20.6 percent of the votes in the parliamentary elections and 21 seats. 47 percent of this vote was for *Democracia Avanzada,* the grouping of the Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV) in the front. The PCV claimed to have 5,000 members in 1985 and to have recruited 27,000 by the end of 1988 (*Nueva Sociedad* [Caracas], No. 105, January-February 1990, p. 12; *Neuer Weg* [East Berlin], No. 17, 1988, and No. 5, 1989).

35. The Communist Party of Bangladesh claims 1,600 cells, each normally having 20–40 members; so the membership must be much higher than the 9,911 claimed (*Probleme des Friedens und des Sozialismus,* No. 6, 1989, p. 771).

37. The Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party claims 23,000 members in 3,023 cells (ibid., No. 5, 1989, p. 652)

41. Elections to Japan's house of representatives were in 1986 and not in 1989. In 1990 elections, the Japan Communist Party obtained 7.97 percent and 16 seats in elections to the house of representatives (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung* [Zurich], Feb. 21, 1990).

44. Chin Peng claimed 1,000 members for the Communist Party of Malaya before its dissolution (*The Guardian* [London], Dec. 4, 1989).

49. The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) claimed 35,000 members at the end of 1988 (*Ang Bayan,* Vol. 20, No. 10, December 1988). The 9th congress of the rival PKP took place on December 30, 1986 (*Zeitung vum Letzebuerger Vollek* [Luxembourg], Jan. 2, 1987).

62. *Le Monde* of Dec. 15, 1988, says the Socialist Vanguard Party of Algeria had approximately 15,000 members.

63. The Egyptian Communist Party presented four candidates as independents in the parliamentary elections of April 6, 1987. They all got less than 700 votes (*Middle East Report* [Washington, DC], July-August 1987, p. 29).

68. The Lebanese Communist Party claimed more than 20,000 members at its 5th congress in 1987; it took part in the parliamentary elections of 1972 (*Neuer Weg,* No. 11, 1987; *Unsere Zeit* [Dusseldorf], Feb. 5, 1987).

70. The first congress of the Communist Party of Palestine took place in September 1983 (*Horizont,* No. 9, 1985).

75. The Federal Union of Communists in Belgium claimed 4,000 members (*Neuer Weg,* No. 8, 1989).

79. The French Communist Party still claims 600,000 members (*Horizont,* No. 1, 1990).

81. The Communist Party of Great Britain claims 7,500 members (*Vorwärts* [Zurich], Nov. 30, 1989). The Communist Party of Britain had 1,591 members at its founding congress; Mike Hicks is its secretary general (*Frontline* [Oakland], Oct. 10, 1988).

82. The Greek Left claimed 12,000 members in 1987 (*El País* [Madrid], Apr. 27, 1987). The KKE-Interior is not a member of the leftist coalition.

85. The Italian Communist Party claimed 1,431,000 members at the time of its 19th extraordinary congress in March 1990 (ibid., Mar. 8, 1990).

86. The Communist Party of Luxembourg got 4.4 percent of the votes in the elections of 1989. The figure in the "Checklist" seems to have been calculated by adding the votes of the four voter districts. This method distorts the result, because the voters can cast as many votes as there are seats to be attributed in their district. So the voter can cast 7 votes in the north but 23 in the south (*Zeitung vum Letzebuerger Vollek,* June 20, 1989).

88. The Communist Party of the Netherlands claimed 7,000 members in 1989 (*Unsere Zeit,* May 5, 1989).

92. Most members of the Communist Party of the Peoples of Spain (PCPE) joined the Communist Party of Spain in 1989. A reunification congress took place January 14, 1989. The rest of the PCPE obtained 0.31 percent of the votes and no seats in the parliamentary elections of 1989. The Workers' Party of Spain-Communist Unity obtained 0.42 percent and no seats (*El País,* Oct. 31, 1989).

93. The Communist Workers' Party of Sweden did not participate in the elections of 1988.

96. The Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin had 3,800 members in December 1989; 3,000 members at its extraordinary congress held February 16-18, 1990; and 1,600 members in May 1990, when it changed its name to the Socialist Initiative (*AK* [Hamburg], No. 316, Mar. 5, 1990).

NICO BIVER
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MR. STAAR and THE EDITORS RESPOND: We are delighted at the painstaking interest shown by Mr. Biver in his letter regarding the "1989 Checklist." He has provided considerable new data that fills gaps in our coverage, and usefully updates other information.

We would stress that the choice between estimated and claimed membership data is up to the individual contributors to the *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs*. In a number of cases, they judged that claimed membership was inflated. In addition, some of Mr. Biver's information is dated subsequent to the January 1, 1989, cutoff date for coverage in the 1989 *Yearbook*.

We trust that Mr. Biver will continue to read the *Checklist* with interest, and we look forward to his observations in the future.

RICHARD F. STAAR
and THE EDITORS

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